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Abstract 
 
Among Asian countries, Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao 
PDR) is one of economies with high degree of currency substitution (CS), 
recorded around 56% during 1992–2012. The feature of CS in Lao PDR is 
peculiar and more complicated than the case of other economies with CS, 
namely Cambodia or some Latin American countries. Menon (2008) defined 
the CS in Lao PDR as ‘multiple currency phenomenon’ because the country 
has two main foreign currencies—the US dollar and Thai baht—that are 
widely used in parallel with the domestic currency, kip. In this dissertation, 
I adopted Calvo and Végh’s (1992) CS definition to reflect the substitution 
of domestic currency by foreign currencies in its role as a means of payment,  
unit of accounts, and store of value. The presence of CS has important 
implications for the conduct of monetary policy, exchange rate determination, 
and stability of demand for money functions. 
  In view of the adverse policy implications of widespread CS, a 
strategy for reducing CS should be considered. However, one of the 
impediments to the design of such strategy in Lao PDR is a scarcity of 
studies which provide a rigorous analysis of the determinants of CS. 
Reliable estimates of CS determinants can provide implications of CS for the 
design, execution, and effectiveness of monetary, fiscal, and exchange rate 
policies. The primary objectives of this dissertation are to examine three 
issues that play a crucial role in the macroeconomic management for 
promoting monetary and financial stability conducive to the sustainable 
growth in Lao PDR.  
First, the dissertation examines the determinants of CS in Lao PDR 
over a two decade period within a cointegration and error-correction 
mechanism framework. Second, the dissertation tests the proposition of 
long-run neutrality (LRN) of money in the Lao economy based on the Fisher 
and Seater method. Third, the dissertation constructs a macroeconometric 
model to evaluate the effectiveness of macroeconomic policies in the Lao 
economy.  
The results from the analyses of CS determinants show that the 
interest rate differential is a significant CS determinant in the Lao economy. 
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The negative relationship in the short-run and the positive relationship in the 
long-run between interest rate differential and the demand for foreign 
exchange suggest that a strategy for reducing the CS ratio through higher 
interest rate on kip deposits will only be effective in the short-run; however, 
in the long-run the high level of the interest rate and its further increase 
shift the domestic portfolio allocations toward foreign-denominated assets 
even more due to the increase in risk premium. Moreover, there is evidence 
supporting the existence of a ratchet effect in the currency allocation of 
deposits, implying that particularly strong policies would need to be pursued 
over an extended period of time in order to convince depositors to switch 
back to kip-denominated assets. 
The results from the analyses of LRN show that changes in the 
quantity of money have negative effect on the level of real output in the 
long-run in Lao PDR. A permanent rise in the levels of M2 from 20% to 50% 
reduced real GDP by 1.5%. The negative impact of money on real GDP 
implies that monetary expansion is unlikely to stimulate output, eliminate 
recession, and increase job opportunity. By contrast, the net effect of 
expansionary monetary policy may result in higher prices and make the 
economy more vulnerable. Hence, the monetary authority should not 
manipulate monetary policy to stabilize the fluctuations in business cycle 
before considering the relationship between money and real output. 
The results from the simulation analyses of macroeconomic policies 
effectiveness show that the combination of fiscal and monetary policies 
tends to be more effective under the fixed exchange rate regime than under 
the managed-floating exchange rate regime. An increase in both government 
investment and kip-denominated deposit rate increases real GDP by 1.8% 
and 3.6% under the managed-floating and fixed exchange rate regimes, 
respectively. This implies  that a strategy to reduce the degree of currency 
substitution seems to be a clear means to strengthen the instruments of 
monetary policy and minimize seigniorage loss. 
 
Key words: Currency substitution, long-run neutrality of money, 
macroeconomic policies, bounds test 
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Introduction 
 
  Currency substitution (CS) is a phenomenon defined as the 
substitution of domestic currency by foreign currency in its role as a means 
of payment, unit of accounts, and store of value (Calvo and Végh, 1992). 1 
CS has been a challenging issue to several developing and transitional 
economies since the early 1990s. While some countries suffered from the 
difficulties of maintaining competitive exchange rates, other countries faced 
the difficulties in managing monetary systems with high degree of CS and 
controlling inflation rate. As a consequence, CS is one of the topical issues 
in many developing countries in Asia as well as in Latin America and 
Africa; and in the transitional economies in Eastern Europe, and the former 
Soviet Union (Sahay and Végh, 1996).  
  Among Asian countries, Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao 
PDR) is one of economies with high degree of CS, recorded around 56% 
during 1992–2012. 2  The feature of CS in Lao PDR is peculiar and more 
complicated than the case of other economies with CS, namely Cambodia or 
some Latin American countries. Menon (2008) defined the CS in Lao PDR as 
‘multiple currency phenomenon’ because the country has two main foreign 
currencies—the US dollar and Thai baht—that are widely used in parallel 
with the domestic currency, kip. In this dissertation, I adopt Calvo and 
Végh’s (1992) CS definition to reflect the substitution of domestic currency 
by foreign currencies in its role as a means of payment, unit of accounts, and 
store of value. The presence of CS has important implications for the 
conduct of monetary policy, exchange rate determination, and stability of 
demand for money functions. First, monetary policy becomes less effective, 
because changes in the domestic money supply or the domestic monetary 
base have less impact on domestic expenditure. Second, the volatility of 
exchange rates is likely to increase. With two or more currencies in 
circulation, the demand for domestic currency may become more sensitive to 
                                                     
1  When only the store of value and the unit  of account propert ies of the domestic currency 
are transferred to foreign monies, the term ‘dollarization’ is  used (Calvo and Végh,  1992).  
2  CS is measured by the ratio of foreign currency deposit to  broad money M2, which wil l  
be explained later.  
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changes in its expected opportunity costs. Third, the presence of CS causes 
the instability in the demand for money functions. As the demand for 
domestic money becomes less stable, the impact of monetary policy measure 
on spending is harder to predict.  
  In view of the adverse policy implications of widespread CS, a 
strategy for reducing CS should be considered. However, one of the 
impediments to the design of such strategy in Lao PDR is a scarcity of 
studies which provide a rigorous analysis of the determinants of CS. Reliable 
estimates of CS determinants can provide implications of CS for the design, 
execution, and effectiveness of monetary, fiscal, and exchange rate policies. 
The primary objective of this dissertation is to fill this research gap by 
examining the effectiveness of macroeconomic policies in the Lao economy.  
  The term ‘macroeconomic policies’ here refers to the monetary, fiscal 
and exchange rate policies that help determine the rate of inflation and 
output growth. In particular, I examine three issues that play a crucial role in 
the macroeconomic management for promoting monetary and financial 
stability conducive to the sustainable growth in Lao PDR.  
First, the dissertation examines the determinants of CS in Lao PDR 
over a two decade period within a cointegration and error-correction 
mechanism framework. Because this study empirically investigates the 
determinants of CS using quarterly data for Lao PDR over the period 1993–
2011, it differs from most existing Lao studies, which examine causes of CS 
using descriptive analysis. These include studies from Chaleunsinh (2003) 
and Keovongvichith (2007) who find that CS is caused by the deregulation 
of financial sector in the early 1990s and the rapid increase in high inflation 
and sharp exchange rate depreciation during the Asian financial crisis 1997–
1998. There are two main problems with these studies. First, because the 
studies employ either graphical presentation or descriptive statistics, we 
cannot take the results of these analyses using a certain period and cannot 
generalize them to the longer period that the sample represents. Therefore, 
the contribution of these studies to the formulation of national policies is 
limited. Second, they do not take account of more recent advances in 
econometric modeling, such as testing for unit roots and cointegration, 
which address the issue of spurious regression and hence boost the reliability 
of results. 
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  There are two major studies which empirically investigate the causes 
of CS in Lao PDR using time series analysis. These studies include de 
Zamarocksy and Sa (2002) and Ra (2008). De Zamarocksy and Sa (2002) 
conduct the causality test between inflation and CS, using monthly data from 
February 1995 to September 2001. These authors use the Granger (1969) 
methodology to test for the direction of causality between the two variables.  
Furthermore, Ra (2008) examines whether the holdings of US dollar depend 
on the effect of the expected rate of depreciation in market exchange rates,  
using monthly data over the period 1993–2007. My dissertation differs from 
de Zamarocksy and Sa (2003) and Ra (2008) in three important respects. 
First, I make use of the error-correction framework to report both long- and 
short-run impacts. Second, instead of using the Johansen method, I apply the 
bounds testing procedure to cointegration, within an autogressive distributed 
lag (ARDL) framework, which was developed by Pesaran and others 
(Pesaran and Pesaran, 1997; Pesaran and Shin, 1999; Pesaran et al., 2001). 
Finally, my study includes the interest rate differential and the ratchet 
variable in modeling CS in Lao PDR.  
  This study applies the bounds testing approach to cointegration to 
examine the dynamics of CS. Estimates using the Engle and Granger (1987) 
and Johansen (1988) methods of cointegration are not robust for small  
sample sizes (Mah, 2000). Expanding the number of observations through 
using monthly or quarterly data does not increase robustness to the 
cointegration results because what matters is the length of the period, 
instead of the number of observations (Hakkio and Rush, 1991). However, 
estimates in the bounds test are robust in small sample sizes (Pesaran and 
Shin, 1999). 
  The analysis of CS determinants also differs from existing studies in 
that I examine whether the parameter estimates are stable over time. There is 
no reason to believe a priori that the relative importance of factors affecting 
CS have remained unchanged over time. This has to be empirically 
ascertained. To do this, I apply the Pesaran and Pesaran (1997) test for 
parameter stability. 
  Second, the dissertation tests the proposition of long-run neutrality 
(LRN) of money in the Lao economy using data of monetary aggregates, real 
GDP, and real output in three sectors, namely, agriculture, industry, and 
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services. In the monetarist theories, money is assumed to be neutral in the 
long-run. That is, changes in the quantity of money affect the nominal 
variables in the macroeconomic system such as prices, wages and exchange 
rates, but not the real variables, like employment, real GDP, and real  
consumption. 
  Lao PDR offers an interesting case study for testing the LRN 
proposition for four reasons. First, the empirical study for Lao PDR provides 
more empirical evidence to the existing literature on LRN in the context of 
developing countries. The underdeveloped financial systems and less 
sophisticated economies in developing countries may conduce to money 
neutrality. As note by Humphrey (1991, p.4), three sources of non-
neutrality–including sticky prices, sticky nominal wages, and fixed nominal 
costs–are unlikely to exist in developing countries.  
  The second reason for testing LRN in Lao PDR is that the country has 
experienced a series of monetary and financial sector reforms that aimed at  
improving the financial system launched since the implementation of the 
New Economic Mechanism in 1986. Despite these significant changes in the 
financial environment in Lao PDR, no study has taken into consideration the 
interaction of rising money stock and real GDP, with particular reference to 
the Lao experience.  
  The third reason for testing LRN in Lao PDR is that the identification 
of the money-income causality will be particularly relevant for policy 
makers in developing and transition economies who face a challenging task 
in designing appropriate stabilization programmes aimed at alleviating or 
eliminating vulnerability of their economies.  
  The fourth reason for testing LRN in Lao PDR is that it is important 
to determine if conclusions regarding LRN with respect to aggregate real 
output hold at the disaggregated or sectoral level. This is particularly 
important given the low power of the Fisher and Seater tests, an issue 
stressed by Coe and Nason (2003, 2004). If one fails to reject LRN at the 
aggregate level, a similar finding using sectoral data would provide 
support for the aggregate neutrality conclusion. It is also conceivable that 
one could fail to reject LRN at the aggregate level, yet miss significant 
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sectoral effects. Garrett (2003) shows that regression results using 
aggregate data can be very different from those using the disaggregated 
components. Alternatively, if LRN is rejected at the aggregate level, then 
it is important to examine disaggregated data to identify possible sources 
of non-neutrality and the transmission mechanism(s) of monetary policy.  
Finally, the dissertation constructs a macroeconometric model to 
evaluate the effectiveness of macroeconomic policies in the Lao economy. 
Macroeconomic policies are evaluated for the case of an economy with 
partial CS compared with the case of an economy with complete CS. The 
economy with partial CS is represented by the managed-floating exchange 
rate regime, whereas the economy with complete CS is represented by the 
fixed exchange rate regime. The effectiveness of macroeconomic policies is 
evaluated against changes in output and price.  
There are limited Lao studies on the evaluation of macroeconomic 
policies effectiveness. For example, Toyoda and Kyophilavong (2007) 
construct the Lao macroeconometric model and conduct a simulation 
analysis to examine the impacts of macroeconomic policies under different 
exchange rate arrangements in Lao PDR. However, their macroeconmetric 
model is based on only the product and labor markets. It also does not 
include any behavioral model to capture the feature of Lao economy with CS. 
My research will contribute to the policy debate and academic research on 
CS. As to the CS debate, the existing literature on CS offers two conflicting 
pieces of advice for economies with CS. One is that they should focus on the 
reduction of CS degree to improve macroeconomic policies’ effectiveness. 
The other is that they should adopt ‘official dollarization’ which completely 
uses foreign currency. My research will provide additional evidence on the 
CS debate exemplified by the case of Laos. The academic contribution of my 
research is to introduce a money demand equation for foreign currency in 
macroeconometric model as a key characteristic of economy with CS. 
Therefore, the estimation results of Lao macroeconometric model reflect 
more realistic output and price determination.  
Three different econometric approaches have been employed to 
analyze each of the objectives. The first objective, the determinants of CS in 
Lao PDR is investigated within the bounds testing procedure to cointegration, 
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within an autogressive distributed lag (ARDL) framework, which was 
developed by Pesaran and others (Pesaran and Pesaran, 1997; Pesaran and 
Shin, 1999; Pesaran et al., 2001). The second objective, impact of money 
stock on real output, is analyzed by applying the Fisher and Seater (1993) 
method. The third objective, policy options in the presence of CS, is 
investigated through the simulations in macroeconometric model.  
Data on several macroeconomic variables, such as price level, output, 
consumption, investment, and trade will be collected over the period 1988–
2011. Such data will be obtained from the Lao government’s statistical 
agencies and international organizations, such as UN’s World Investment 
Directory, IMF’s International Financial Statistics, IMF’s Direction of Trade 
Statistics, and other related sources.  
The structure of this dissertation is organized as follows: 
Chapter 1 provides a broad picture of the Lao economy in the pre- and 
post-structural reform. It first describes the reform process, transitioning 
from a centrally-planned economy to a market-oriented one. Then, major 
economic developments in the modern economic system have been reviewed 
by describing sources of output growth, and the financial system. Special  
emphasis has been placed on the financial system through the investigation 
of the banking system and flows of funds analysis. 
Chapter 2 contributes to answering question whether the present 
institutional arrangements and the implementations of macroeconomic 
policies in Lao PDR promote financial sector stability and enhance 
efficiency and development. This chapter describes the institutional and 
macroeconomic policies framework for the Lao economy. The structures of 
two macroeconomic institutions have been investigated, including the Bank 
of Lao PDR, and the Ministry of Finance. The chapter ends with the review 
of three macroeconomic policies, including monetary policy, exchange rate 
policy, and fiscal policy.  
Chapter 3 focuses on the theoretical and empirical developments of 
three macroeconomic issues, namely the determinants of CS in Lao PDR, the 
LRN proposition, and the effectiveness of macroeconomic policies in an 
economy with CS. The chapter starts with a review of empirical issues on the 
analysis of CS determinants and a review of the theoretical model of CS. It 
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then reviews the empirical evidence of the LRN proposition as well as its 
theoretical foundation. The chapter ends with a review of the application of 
macroeconometric model to evaluate the macroeconomic policies.  
Chapter 4 provides a comprehensive discuss about the developments 
of empirical models for analyzing CS determinants, testing LRN proposition, 
and evaluating macroeconomic policies effectiveness in Lao PDR. Their 
respective estimation methods are also provided. Finally, data used in the 
empirical analyses are described in the final section of this chapter.  
In Chapter 5, two main empirical results are presented. First, the 
determinants of CS in Lao PDR are investigated by applying a cointegration 
and error-correction mechanism framework. Second, the LRN proposition is 
tested for the Lao economy, applying the Fisher and Seater model. 
Chapter 6 deals with the third major objective of this dissertation, the 
evaluation of macroeconomic policies in Lao PDR. The macroeconometric 
model is formulated and estimated. Several simulations have been conducted 
in order to investigate the outcome of implementing macroeconomic policies.  
Finally, key findings and final conclusions are provided at the end of 
this dissertation. Moreover, some empirical results are reported in 
appendices. 
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Chapter 1 Development of Lao PDR’s Economic System and 
Structural Reforms 
  
In this chapter, I present the pre- and post-structural reform of the 
Lao economy. It first describes the reform process, transitioning from a 
centrally-planned economy to a market-oriented one. Then, major economic 
developments in the modern economic system have been reviewed by 
describing sectoral contribution of economic growth, and the financial 
system. In addition, financial systems are reviewed through the investigation 
of the banking system and flows of funds analysis. 
1.1 Structural reforms: from centrally-planned economy to market-
oriented economy 
 After a prolonged civil war from 1955 to 1974, the Lao PDR was 
proclaimed in 1975, abolishing the monarchy, and establishing a centrally 
planned economy until 1985. The economic system during 1975-1985, was 
extremely controlled. Prices and trade in agricultural products were 
administratively determined, trade among provinces was restricted, food 
coupons for public employees were usable only in state shops, and the 
exchange rate was artificially determined. The industrial and foreign trade 
sectors were largely composed of state-owned enterprises under the state 
planning system. These enterprises had to transfer annual targeted amounts 
to the budget, regardless of their financial performance, and often had to 
borrow heavily from the banking system to finance current operation. In 
addition, collectivization was introduced in the agricultural sector under 
consultation with the former Soviet Union and its allies (Otani and Pham 
1996).  
However, the results were unsatisfactory. Domestic price controls and 
foreign trade restriction led to the emergence of parallel markets for goods 
and foreign exchange. A lag monetary policy, which accommodated 
borrowing requirements of the state enterprises, had driven rapid inflation. 
Laos had been distressed by the chronic and expanding budget and trade 
deficit. The budget deficit rose from 300 thousand kip in 1976 to 93 billion 
kip in 1985. Trade deficit and external debt had also increased. The external  
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debt increased from 64 million dollars in 1975 to 478 million dollars in 1985. 
Because Laos had no export goods other than electricity power, logs and 
coffee which accounted for only about 30 percent of imports and most goods 
including fuel, machinery, raw materials, and consumer goods were import-
dependent, structural deficits occurred. 
In response to the unsatisfactory economic performance, the 
government officially announced the new economic reform as revision of 
socialism and permitted commercial activity by individual persons and 
private enterprises in 1986.  
The introduction of the New Economic Mechanism (NEM) in 1986 
generated an initial step for moving the economy towards a more market-
oriented economy. Major reforms have been done by removing price controls,  
abandoning socialist cooperative farming, unifying the exchange rate system, 
removing the government’s monopoly on trade, reducing the number of 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs), promoting private-firm establishments, 
implementing fiscal reform, and banking and financial reform.  
Price liberalization resulted in the dramatic adjustments in official 
retail and wholesale prices, beginning with a nine-fold increase in the price 
for basic rice rations in 1985 and continuing with an average 360% increase 
in most other controlled prices throughout the rest of the year. The two-tier  
price system of market prices and generally much lower official prices lasted 
until 1989. The official prices were set on the basis of production costs plus 
margins, but in view of political and social considerations. The public sector 
pricing reform was made in 1987 to allow for market determination of prices, 
except those of a few utilities, public services, and several key industrial 
products.  
Trade reform significantly reduced constraints on domestic and 
international trade. Prior to 1987, both domestic and foreign trade had been 
controlled by the government. The Lao Trade Corporation was responsible 
for official and wholesale trade and rice distribution at the national level, 
while provincial offices were in charge of procurement and distribution 
operations at the local level. Moreover, an extensive network of state stores 
and cooperative shops was responsible for distributing goods at the retail 
level. As to foreign trade, both exports and imports were monopolized by the 
state, except trade made by joint public and private companies or a few state 
10 
 
enterprises. However, the domestic and external trade system was liberalized 
since 1987, resulting in the elimination of most of these restrictions on trade 
in 1988.  
In late 1989, the government extended the access of state and joint-
venture industries to broad import licenses, which allowed the import of all  
but a small list of goods. Then, in 1990, all industries had granted 
permission to engage in nonstrategic import and export activity. Eligibility 
criteria for trade operations were limited to a registration procedure, 
whereby a potential exporter or importer obtained a permit from the Ministry 
of Industry and Commerce. At the same time, specific licensing are required 
for imports of petroleum, cement, steel, automobiles, motorcycles, rice, and 
a few locally manufactured items as well as for exports of timber, wood 
products, rattan, coffee, and livestock. In addition, the public sector 
monopoly on exports has been reduced to only two strategic goods, log and 
minerals, which only specially authorized state enterprises and provincial 
trading companies are allowed to export. All other goods can be freely 
exported by private sector. 
State enterprise reform substantially enhanced the privatization of 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) activity. Prior to the implementation of the 
NEM in 1986, SOEs were run based on the standard model of a command 
economy. Product and input prices, salaries, investment, reinvestment,  
financing, product mix, and output targets were controlled by the 
government according to the plan or the budget. In addition, the enterprises 
were obliged to transfer their operating surplus to the budget and to 
reimburse loans that they received from the government for their fixed 
investment. However, some degree of autonomy was granted to four of the 
most important centrally supervised enterprises in 1983. These enterprises 
included the tobacco and beer factories, the electricity company, and the Lao 
Wood Industry Corporation. In 1988, the government granted operating 
autonomy to state enterprises, and most of them became free to control their  
production levels, wage and price policies, and investment plans. Subsidies 
and capital transfers to state enterprises were stopped. As a result, in 1989, 
several state enterprises substantially increased wages in cash for their  
employees with opposite to the previous system as they mainly issued 
payments in kind of rice coupons and then financed the losses with bank 
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credit. Although the old system ended in 1990, several state enterprises had 
already accumulated substantial overdue debts to the banking system. 
Exchange rate reform brought multi exchange rates into one in 1988. 
Seven different exchange rates prevailed in the Lao economy in the early 
1986. These exchange rates consisted of a symbolic official rate of KN 10 
per U.S. dollar; a commercial rate of KN 95 per U.S. dollar; and various 
rates close to the then-prevailing parallel market rate of roughly KN 400 per 
U.S. dollar. Thanks to the exchange rate reform, the exchange rates were 
brought down to four in September 1987 and to one in January 1988. In 1995, 
the managed floating exchange rate system was adopted within the 
framework of the Structural Adjustment Facility program supported by the 
IMF (Arshad, 2003, p. 92). 
Fiscal reform started in 1988 to adjust the revenue and expenditure 
system as financial autonomy was extended to a larger number of SOEs. As 
to the reform of revenue system, the new tax system was implemented, 
resulting in several different tax rates. Based on the activity type, profit tax 
on commerce and industry was levied at rates ranging from 20% to 85% for 
profits obtained from domestic sales and ranging from 0% to 80% for profits 
obtained from exports. The turnover tax and the new import tariff system 
were levied with rates ranging from 1% to 15% and from 1% to 70%, 
respectively. As to the reform of expenditure system, expenditure priorities 
were reordered. Subsidies to civil servants and other consumer subsidies 
were gradually decreased, while public wages were raised. 
Banking and financial sector reform began in 1988, resulting in the 
establishments of several commercial banks. Despite this reform, little 
change was made on interest rate policy, controlled by the cabinet of the Lao 
government. The originally low deposit rates were raised by 20–50%, and 
the lending rates were approximately doubled. Nonetheless, real interest 
rates remained negative. The reform also entailed the establishment of a two-
tier banking system in 1988 with the establishment of the Bank of the Lao 
PDR (BOL) in accordance with the promulgation of the Central Bank Law. 
Moreover, the state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs) were recapitalized in 
1994 due to increased competition in the banking sector. 
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Following the new economic reform in 1986, the Lao economic 
system has moved toward an open market-oriented economy. The reforms 
helped to reactivate private sector activity and the quantity of goods in 
domestic market was improved. The service sector was the quickest to 
respond to the improved incentives: private and public transport operator 
took advantage of the removal of international trade restrictions, while 
enterprises involving handicrafts and consumer services (repair shop, tailors 
and restaurants) quickly emerged. Many enterprises and activity have been 
privatized without adverse impact on employment. The privatization process 
has been central to the economic liberalization program.  
However, reforms proceeded sporadically. The reform measures in the 
area of taxation, privatization, the civil service, as well as the updating of 
the rolling public investment plan were not implemented fully as planned. 
Some delays were also experienced with regard to institution building, 
notably the establishment of Treasury with an effective accounting system 
and the enactment of business and other laws. The government also lack of 
tools of indirect macroeconomic management which led to temporary 
financial policy slippages soon after the reforms were introduced. 
Furthermore, the institutional and administrative structure for implementing 
reforms was extremely weak and characterized by a lack of skill workers.  
This weak structure limited the absorptive capacity of the economy, as was 
shown in the delays in both the effective execution of aid-financed projects 
and the utilization of technical assistance. The extremely limited statistical 
data base severely constrained the authorities’ ability to analyse and monitor 
economic developments and thus formulate policies. 
1.1.1 Comparative socio-economic performance in Lao PDR 
  The social-economic performance in Lao PDR is relatively good. As 
illustrated in Table 1.1, Lao per capita GNI (gross national income) of $661 
in 2012 is well in excess of the per capita income of the low-income 
countries ($403). This is a remarkable achievement considering that in 2000 
the figure was only $360. The Lao high rate of growth is behind this almost 
two-fold increase in per capita income, with an annual average growth rate 
of 4.9% in real terms over the period 2000–2012. One reason for this high 
rate of growth has been a high rate of investment which has average 15.8%, 
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a rate much higher than for East Asia and the Pacific region which itself has 
experienced a fast growth in gross investment compared to other regions. 
The export sector is another factor which has seemingly contributed to high 
rate of growth in Lao PDR. The Lao export growth of goods and services 
was averaged 7.7% over 2000–2012. But it is lower than that of East Asia 
and the Pacific (8.2%) and of low-income countries (10.3%).  
 
Table 1.1: Socio-economic profiles of Lao PDR and other regions, 2012 
 
Source :  World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2012. 
a Figures are for 2005. 
  The rest of Table 1.1 provides a comparative picture of other socio-
economic aspects of Lao economy, including sectoral composition, 
urbanization, life expectancy, infant mortality, and adult literacy rates. In all  
these respects, Lao PDR appears to be far behind of the East Asia and the 
Pacific region, whereas it compares favourably with the low-income 
countries. 
1.1.2 Sectoral contribution of economic growth  
In this section, summary of sectoral analyses covering key sectors are 
provided in order to gain better understanding about some of the sources of
Indicator Lao PDR
Low Middle High
Per capita GNI (constant 2005 
US$) 661 17,039 403 3,144 30,268
Growth (2000–2012)
Total GNI 6.8 5.4 5.4 4.9 2.9
Per capita GNI 4.9 4.0 2.8 3.5 1.9
Gross investment 15.8 7.5 10.0 8.3 3.6
Exports 7.7 8.2 10.3 8.6 5.3
GDP share (%)
Agriculture 28 13 33 12 2
Industry 36 29 20 30 30
   Manufacturing 8 13 9 13 13
Services 36 59 46 58 68
Urbanization (%) 35 58 32 54 76
Life expectancy at birth (years) 68 74 59 69 79
Infant mortality rate 55 22 58 27 6
Adult literacy ratea
Female 63 77 16 73 92
Male 82 89 37 86 92
Income groupsEast Asia and the 
Pacific
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Table 1.2: Development of Lao PDR real GDP by sector, period averages 
 
Source : Author’s calculation based data from Asian Development Bank ‘Key Indicators for Asia and the Pacific 2011’, available at 
www.adb.org/statistics.  
 
Sector Share of GDP Growth rates Contribution to growth
1990–1994 1995–1999 2000–2004 2005–2010 1990–1994 1995–1999 2000–2004 2005–2010 1990–1994 1995–1999 2000–2004 2005–2010
Agriculture 58.7 50.9 43.1 35.1 5.2 3.8 2.3 3.4 3.6 3.1 2.6 2.6
Industry 16.8 19.1 20.3 23.9 12.5 15.4 55.6 15.4 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.8
Mining 0.2 0.2 1.1 5.8 13.1 19.3 204.1 37.7 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.4
Manufacturing 12.2 11.1 9.0 9.9 13.8 10.6 8.9 8.3 0.8 0.7 0.5 0.7
Electricity, gas, and water 1.4 2.6 5.1 3.6 11.5 25.4 5.7 6.8 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.3
Construction 3.0 5.2 5.1 4.7 11.7 6.2 3.8 8.8 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3
Services 24.5 30.0 36.6 41.0 7.1 7.1 8.8 11.4 1.5 1.8 2.2 3.0
Trade 7.6 12.0 17.7 20.9 9.1 6.9 14.8 7.6 0.5 0.7 1.1 1.5
Transport and communications 5.1 4.7 4.7 5.2 0.6 8.7 9.4 8.8 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4
Finance 1.1 1.4 1.8 3.1 19.1 12.7 12.4 25.5 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2
Public administration 4.7 4.1 4.3 4.8 -5.9 0.8 4.3 10.0 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3
Others 6.0 7.7 8.1 7.0 12.4 6.1 3.2 5.0 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5
GDP at factor cost 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 6.2 6.0 6.1 7.3 6.2 6.0 6.1 7.3
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growth for the Lao economy. The share of GDP, growth rate, and 
contribution to overall GDP growth of each sector are provided in Table 1.2. 
1.1.2.1 Evolution of Agricultural Sector 
Agriculture is the most important sector for fighting poverty in Lao 
PDR. About 80% of the total population is engaging in farming and the 
overwhelming majority of them are the poor located in rural areas. As noted 
in Table 1.2, agriculture, including crops, livestock, fisheries, and forestry, 
accounted for more than half of GDP in the early 1990s, although 
substantially declined to about a third of GDP in 2005–2010. Agriculture 
also contributed nearly half of the GDP growth recorded in the 1990s, 
although this dropped to about a third in 2005–2010.  
 
Diagram 1.1: Agriculture value added per worker (constant 2000 US$) 
Source :  Author’s compilation.  
 
The agricultural sector in Lao PDR has performed relatively well. 
Agricultural growth rate in Lao PDR was about 4.4% during 1990–2010 
which is higher than Vietnam (3.8%), and Thailand (1.7%) 3 . Nonetheless, 
agricultural productivity in Lao PDR remains low.  Agriculture value added 
                                                     
3  Figures were obtained from the World Bank ‘World Development Indicators and Global  
Development Finance’,  avai lable at http:/ /databank.worldbank.org/  
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400 1990  –1999  2000–2010  
16 
 
per worker in Lao PDR was much lower than those in Mongolia and the 
Philippines (Diagram 1.1). 
1.1.2.2 Evolution of Industrial Sector  
The industrial sector has performed very well. It  has achieved an 
impressive growth record of 25% on average, and accounts for 20% of GDP. 
The industrial sector gradually contributed to GDP growth, rising from 1% 
in 1990–1994 to 1.8% in 2005–2010.  
The manufacturing sector is one of the most important sectors in 
industry although its share of GDP fell over time. It accounted from 12.2% 
of GDP in 1990–1994 and 9.9% in 2005–2010, falling by 2.3 percentage 
points. In contrast, the mining sector has achieved high growth rate,  
recorded at 69% on average over the period 1990–2010. Electricity and 
construction have also played a significant role in economic development in 
Lao PDR, accounting for 7.7% of GDP and stimulating about 8.2% of GDP 
growth on average over the 1990–2010 period.  
Although the manufacturing sector in Lao PDR has performed well, 
there are several significant challenges for future development of this sector. 
First, the manufacturing sector has limited competitiveness due to relatively 
low labour productivity, high logistics and transport costs, high comparative 
cost of doing business. Second, several important subsectors can experience 
specific risks. It is still unclear whether Lao PDR’ garment industry can 
compete in the global market as it  became a member of the World Trade 
Organization in 2012. Wood and wood processing is characterized by low 
value-added and efficiency. 
1.1.2.3 Evolution of Services Sector  
Services account for an even greater share of GDP (over 33%), and 
performance has been moderately strong, with growth around 8.6% on 
average (see Table 1.2). The bulk of the growth contribution has come from 
wholesale and retail trade, which accounts for over 44% of services value 
added and more than 14% of total GDP, and has grown at over 9% on 
average. The second most important subsector is transport and 
communication, which accounts for about 15% of services value added and 
4.9% of GDP. Tourism is widely cited as an area of high growth potential in 
services for Lao PDR, but the present, poor information base precludes any 
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detailed analysis. Using World Development Indicator Diagram s for cross-
country comparisons, however, it is clear that during 1995–2009 Lao PDR 
attracts only a tiny fraction of the tourists received by its neighbours which 
is about 3.9% of Thailand and 15.3% of Vietnam on average. Improving 
tourist infrastructure and service quality could allow Lao PDR to tap into 
these large regional tourist flows as part of a multi-country visit. 
1.2 Trade liberalization and changes in trade tax revenue 
Efforts to liberalize trade reduce fiscal revenue unless the liberalizing 
countries are able to find alternative sources of revenue. In this section, the 
relationship between trade liberalization and trade tax revenue is evaluated 
in order to gain a better understanding about the foreign trade policy in Lao 
PDR. More precisely, the objectives of this section are to investigate the 
impact of trade liberalization on trade tax revenue and to examine whether 
reforms of domestic indirect taxes have been targeted to compensate for 
fiscal revenue losses from trade liberalization. To do so, it is interesting to 
begin with the developments of trade liberalization and domestic indirect  
taxes in Lao PDR. 
  Among other tax reforms in 1986, foreign trade tax as well as 
domestic indirect tax (turnover tax and excise tax) have been reformed. 
Efforts of the fiscal reform in the late 1980s aimed at generating sufficient  
sources of revenue to compensate for the losses of transfers from public 
enterprises due to the autonomy provided to state-owned enterprises, the 
price reform and the tightening of bank credits.4  
  As shown in Diagram  1.2, the share of total tax revenue in GDP rose 
from 1.2% in 1987 to 8.7% in 1988 and to 14.4% in 2011. One of the 
important sources of revenue is foreign trade tax. Approximately one third of 
total revenue was contributed from this source during 1988–1999, while it  
accounted for only one fifth of total revenue prior to the implementation of 
the reform during 1980–1987. The rapid increase in trade tax revenue in 
1988 is explained by the significant increase in both import and export  
duties. While exports contracted since 1992, imports continued to rise until 
1997. Fundamental factors describing the performance of revenue from 
                                                     
4  60 out of about  200 state-owned enterprises were privatized.  
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import duties included trade liberalization and the rising imports of 
intermediate inputs and capital goods, the substantial devaluation of Lao kip 
due to the unification of exchange rates at level close to parallel market rate,  
the elimination of exemptions for those benefiting imports from the non-
convertible area, and improved tax collection. The fundamental factors 
describing the performance of revenue from export duties in the period 
1988–1991 consisted of the elimination of most export restrictions, the 
introduction of a tax on profits from export and on exploitation of natural 
resources, the primary sector development, and improved tax collection. 
 
Sources:  Author’s compilation from World Bank ‘Lao PDR Country Economic 
Memorandum (various issues)’,  and BOL ‘Annual Reports (various issues)’.   
Diagram  1.2: Fiscal revenue and openness index in Lao PDR, 1980–2011 
 
  The openness index, measured as the percentage share of trade tax in 
total trade, follows the same pattern as the trade tax revenue. The greater the 
openness index is, the less open the Lao economy is. As can be seen from 
Diagram  1.2, the openness index fell from 8.4% in 1991 to 2.7% in 2011, 
implying that Lao PDR’ foreign trade has been gradually liberalized. Trade 
liberalization has been rapid since 1997 due to the membership of the 
Association of South East Asian Nations and the preparation for the World 
Trade Organization membership.  
  In response to the need to compensate for the losses of transfers from 
public enterprises and the growing trade liberalization and to finance the 
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public expenditure, the Lao government in March 1988 established a 
turnover tax on service enterprises in the range of 1–15%. In June 1989, this 
tax was broadened to include not only services, but also wholesale trade and 
imports, with five rates in the range 3–20%. In February 1991, number of 
turnover tax rates in the range of 5–10% decreased from five to two and 
excise taxes on petroleum products and luxury goods were introduced. In 
1995/96, specific excise duties—including gasoline, vehicles, alcoholic 
drinks, cigarettes—were replaced by ad valorem excise duties. The value 
added tax has also been introduced since 2010. The revenue generated by 
turnover and excise taxes increased gradually and exceeded the trade tax 
revenue in 1996 (see Diagram 1.2). The domestic taxes on goods and 
services accounted for 6.9% of GDP or 47.8% of total tax revenue in 2011, 
which rose from 1.1% of GDP or 19% of total tax revenue in 1990. At 
present, both turnover and excise taxes constitute the main source of 
government revenue. 
  Between 1986 and 2011, fiscal revenue grew significantly, but took 
the sole form of raising domestic indirect taxes. The analysis provided in the 
study suggests that this strategy had a low pay-off in terms of reduced trade 
tax revenue. This implies that further reduction of tariff rates offers the 
opportunity for further enhancing production efficiency through greater 
importation of capital goods and intermediate inputs as well as improving 
consumer welfare through greater access to a variety of consumer goods. 
Over time, the structure of domestic production would be affected as trade 
provides channels of communication that stimulate cross-border learning of 
production methods, product design, organization methods, and market 
conditions. The resulting expansion of industrial sector should provide more 
sources for taxation. 
1.3 Main development of Lao PDR’s balance of payments 
This section outlines the trends in Lao PDR’s balance of payments 
over the three decades from 1982 to 2011. As it is somewhat difficult to 
review such a sequence of developments which spans over a relatively long 
period of time all the same, it is important to highlight the salient features 
and pinpoint the principal changes. 
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1.3.1 Lao PDR’s balance of payments during 1982-1995 
Table 1.3 provides a statement of the available evidence on Lao 
PDR’s balance of payments for the period 1982-1995, the 10 years (1986 
onwards) that followed the market-oriented economic development.5 In order 
to reduce the volume of data to manageable proportions, only the net figures, 
which are the difference between credits and debits on each category of 
transactions in the balance of payments, are presented. Moreover, instead of 
a complete time series, which would make for a cumbersome table, annual 
average figures for five-year periods are calculated. Such annual averages 
constitute a reasonable measure insofar as there were no sharp fluctuations 
from year to year, for most of this period. 
I divided the period under review into two phases: (a) The period of 
planning from 1982-1985: it  is worth noting that this phase did not 
experience any changes in the exchange rate. (b) The period since 1986, in 
which the role of economic planning has been steadily eroded by a major 
economic reform toward a more market-oriented economy: in this phase, 
long term perspectives were replaced by short-term responses to crisis 
situations, with reference to the balance of payments in particular and the 
economy in general. 
1.3.1.1 Lao PDR’s balance of payment during planning period from 1982-
1985 
From 1981 to 1985, the evidence in Table 1.3 relates to the first Five 
Year Plan period which aimed at reaching food self-sufficiency and 
promoting a balanced and diversified agricultural structure. The evolution 
of the balance of payments in this period was characterized by the large 
current account deficit of $85.2 million per annum (Table 1.3). The main 
factor accounting for this trend was the continued increase in imports.  
 
                                                     
5  Ideally, the period under review should be extended back to 1975, the year of the 
declarat ion of independence of Lao PDR. However,  data on balance of payments prior to  
1982 are rare and the classification of payments is  different from 1982 onwards. For  
instance, the capital account includes transfers. Therefore, we review Lao PDR’s balance 
of payments since 1982.  
21 
 
Table 1.3: Lao PDR’s Balance of Payments, 1982-1995 
(In millions of US$) 
 
Note :  Private transact ion includes foreign direct investment and portfol io investment.  
Bilateral  clearing arrangements refer to  government-to-government reciprocal  trade 
agreement up to  a specific amount and for a l imited period. Invisibles include income 
balance and services balance.  
Source :  Figures from 1982 to 1990 were collected from World Bank (various issues) , while 
those from 1991 to  1995 were compiled from BOL (1997).   
 
Large imports could not be covered by transfers. In the period 1981-
1985, there was a small increase in private transfers, primarily as a 
consequence of the introduction of a preferential exchange rate for private 
remittances. Official transfers, in the form of technical assistance, were 
large relative to private transfers.  
Reflecting developments in the current account, net capital inflows 
have increased steadily with $84.5 per annum. This was due mainly to an 
increase in financing provided under loans and bilateral clearing 
1982–1985 1986–1990 1991–1995
I. Current Account
1. Exports f.o.b. 44.6 59.6 218.7
2. Imports c.i.f. −159.2 −177.9 −413.1
A. Balance of Trade −114.6 −118.3 −194.4
B. Net Invisibles, excluding transfers −9.2 5.9 26.3
3. Transfer payments:
   (i) Official 36.9 23.1 97.1
   (ii) Private 1.7 6.6 12.0
C. Balance on Current Account −85.2 −82.6 −59.0
II. Capital and Financial Account
4. Private transactions 3.8 3.8 47.7
5. Banking transactions, increase (-) — — 0.3
6. Official transactions:
   (i) Loans 47.5 46.1 71.3
   (ii) Amortization −7.2 −9.5 −10.7
   (iii) Bilateral clearing arragements 37.0 43.3 —
7. Movements in reserves −5.1 −6.5 −12.2
    decrease (+) or increase (-)
D. Balance on Capital and 76.1 77.2 96.5
  Financial Account
III. Errors and Omissions 9.1 5.4 −37.5
22 
 
arrangements, averaged of $47.5 million per annum and $37 million, 
respectively.  
1.3.1.2 Lao PDR’s balance of payment during market-based period from 
1986-1995 
From 1986 to 1990, export growth had been positive despite external  
shocks. Exports of hydroelectricity, providing about two-thirds of export  
earnings in 1987 dropped from 683 Mwh to 373.5 Mwh in 1988 as a result of 
the reduced capacity of the Nam Ngum Dam (World Bank, 1990, p. 22). The 
impact of the drought on export earnings was further aggravated by the 
reduction of the contractual price at which Thailand, the sole purchaser, 
bought Lao electricity, reflecting the evolution of the world market price of 
oil. This adverse development was more than offset, however, by the 
dramatic increase in wood and wood products exports and the rapid increase 
in manufactured goods exports, albeit from a negligible level. Easing of 
political tensions with Thailand and the consequent opening up of the border 
induced a sharp increase in border transactions, basically an exchange of 
logs and livestock from Lao PDR for Thai manufactured goods. Exports of 
services improved slightly, rising from the deficit of $9.2 million per annum 
to the surplus of $5.9 million per annum (Table 1.3).  
The country’s capacity to import depends on its export revenues and 
to a larger extent on the availability of foreign aid and bilateral clearing 
arrangements. While foreign assistance fell from $36.9 million per annum 
during 1982-1985 to $23.1 million per annum during 1986-1990, bilateral 
clearing arrangements increased from $37 million per annum to $43.3 
million over the corresponding periods. The positive growth private transfer 
payments, invisibles, and bilateral clearing arrangements resulted in an 
expansion of imports over this period at an annual average value of $178 
million. 
From 1991-1995, rapid economic liberalization and growth in 
neighboring countries, particularly, China, Thailand, and Vietnam, provided 
ready markets for many products. These developments coupled with the 
continued domestic economic decentralization and the improvements in 
infrastructure and border access—especially, the completion in early 1994 of 
the first bridge across the Mekong, which provided an overland shipping 
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route from Thailand to Vientiane—stimulated large increases in recorded 
trade volume.  
In spite of the rapid growth in export earnings, which constituted a 
distinct break from the stagnation in exports during the 1980s, the balance of 
trade deficit was more severe than the earlier levels and averaged at $194.4 
million per annum. Part of the increase in export was due to a considerable 
expansion in wood exports. Increases in imports were fuelled by rising 
exports, as well as by very high levels of FDI; in addition, grants and project  
aid from industrial countries rose substantially, financing primarily inputs 
for infrastructural investment projects.  
In this period, there was some surplus on account of invisibles and 
private transfers, taken together, averaged at $38.3 million per annum. 
Moreover, for the first time there were large FDI inflows, while official 
transfer payments rose more than triple from $23.1 million in 1986-1990 to 
$97.1 million in 1991-1995. Nonetheless, part of the current account deficit 
was financed by foreign aid inflows in the form of loans. 
1.3.2 Lao PDR’s balance of payments during 1996-2011 
Annual average figures conceal important and substantial variations 
from year to year, because there were dramatic changes in the payments 
situation during the late 1990s which followed the Asian financial crisis. In 
an attempt to overcome this problem, the trends in the balance on current 
account and its components – the trade balance, net invisibles and transfer 
payments – are plotted in Diagram 2.1.  
 
Source: IMF, Country Report (various issues) .  
Diagram 1.3: Lao PDR’s current account and its components 
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Diagram 1.3 shows that, from 1986 to 1989, the balance of trade and 
the balance on current account moved in tandem, as the surplus on transfer 
payments, accounting for about 25% of the trade balance averaged over the 
period 1986-1989, were quite stable in the range of $86-147 million. 
Between 1990 and 2011, the trade balance and the current account balance 
not only diverged from each other but also experienced massive fluctuations. 
Net invisibles gradually increased, though moderately fluctuated, while there 
was a dramatic jump in transfer payments.  
This evidence can be substantiated further by an examination of the 
statistical evidence, some of which is presented in Table 1.4. During the 
period 1986 to 1989, the average annual inflow on account of invisibles 
(excluding transfers) was $4.8 million; this rose at a dramatic pace to $102 
million in 2011. Table 1.4 reveals that this trend was largely attributable to 
travel, i .e., foreign exchange earnings from tourism, although to some extent 
it was offset by a steady and substantial increase in outflows on account of 
investment income from the mining sector. Beginning in 1990, private 
transfer payments also increased by leaps and bounds: from about $10 
million per annum in the early 1990s to more than $80 million in 2011. The 
huge surplus on account of transfer payments, which followed from this 
development, was attributable largely to the increase in remittances from 
Laotians overseas.  
In the early 2000s, the current account deficit, as also the trade 
deficit, was slightly higher than it had been during the preceding years. The 
current account deficit and the trade deficit sharply increased from $176 
million and $244 million in 2003 to $1,529 million and $1,848 million, 
respectively, in 2011. One of the key factors driving imports is the imports 
of capital goods needed by the mining sector.    
The trends in foreign aid inflows in the period 1986-2011 are also 
worth noting. During 1986-1990, gross aid inflows on account of loans 
averaged about $46 million per annum; in the years that followed the 
structural reform in the first five year plan (1986-1990), it  reached $155 
million in 1996. In the years that followed the Asian financial crisis, 1999-
2000, these loans plummeted to an average level of roughly $96 million.
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Table 1.4: Lao PDR’s balance of payments, 1996-2011 
 
Source :  IMF, Country Report (various issues) .  
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
I. Current Account
1. Exports f.o.b. 323 317 341 342 351 334 340 450 500 646 1,133 1,321 1,609 1,521 2,217 2,801
2. Imports c.i.f. −690 −648 −553 −554 −569 −542 −570 −694 −977 −1,206 −1,589 −2,156 −2,837 −2,893 −3,582 −4,649
A. Balance of Trade −367 −331 −212 −212 −218 −208 −230 −244 −477 −560 −456 −835 −1,228 −1,372 −1,365 −1,848
B. Net Invisibles, excluding transfers 19 7 34 53 53 58 61 −18 34 −108 −55 61 105 65 13 102
3. Transfer payments:
   (i) Official 82 97 74 70 121 63 48 62 60 57 85 63 77 97 109 133
   (ii) Private 43 43 49 30 21 22 23 24 26 28 59 51 64 35 70 84
C. Balance on Current Account −223 −184 −55 −59 −23 −65 −98 −176 −357 −583 −367 −660 −982 −1,175 −1,173 −1,529
II. Capital and Financial Account
4. Private transactions 176 104 46 82 31 24 60 42 234 349 335 779 921 785 692 1,071
5. Banking transactions (increase -) −8 14 −18 −47 25 28 −7 −21 −39 22 −93 −117 65 140 −26 −17
6. Official transactions:
   (i) Loans 155 179 150 94 98 105 165 146 147 156 162 185 185 229 238 287
   (ii) Amortization −19 −18 −25 −29 −36 −39 −38 −28 −29 −41 −32 −45 −61 −67 −78 −97
   (iii) Bilateral clearing arragements
   (iv) Miscellaneous
7. Movements in reserves −73 30 −7 −4 −44 0 −55 −21 −19 −16 −100 −202 −105 79 −101 −91
    decrease (+) or increase (-)
D. Balance on Capital and Financial Account 231 309 145 96 74 118 125 118 294 470 272 600 1,005 1,166 725 1,153
III. Errors and Omissions −8 −125 −90 −37 −51 −53 −27 58 63 113 95 60 −23 9 448 376
26 
 
Since then, gross aid inflows gradually increased $105 million in 1991 to 
$287 million in 2011. 
One of major developments towards the period under review was the 
rapid accumulation of foreign exchange reserves which averaged $87 million 
per annum during 2006-2011. Insofar as this coincided with large trade 
deficits and substantial repayments of foreign debts —amortizations rose 
from $32 million in 2006 to $97 million in 2011, the unprecedented 
accumulation of foreign exchange reserves is attributable to the high levels 
of foreign aid inflows, the rapid increase in net invisibles, and the most 
important perhaps the change in FDI inflows, all of which coincided in the 
late 2000s.  
  
 
Source: Trade balance from 1986 to  1990 were obtained from World Bank (various issues),  
while those from 1991 to  1995 were compiled from BOL (1997).  Diagram s from 1996 to  
2015 were obtained from IMF Staff Report  (various issues) . Aid inflows and net  
remit tances were col lected from World Development Indicators.  
Diagram 1.4: Balance of trade, remittances, FDI, and net aid inflows 
 
Aid inflows from 1986 to 2005 were a reflection of the trade balance 
and, given a level of FDI, were the principle sources of financing trade 
deficits (Diagram, 1.4). However, there was a marked change in the situation 
as FDI inflows, for the first time in the period under review, surpassed aid 
inflows in 2006. An increase in FDI was short lived as FDI inflows dropped 
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from $324 million in 2006 to $301 million in 2011. The downward trend of 
FDI was compensated by the upward trend of aid inflows in this period. In 
addition, in 2010, there was an unprecedented trade deficit which became 
massive in 2011. The export-import ratio dropped from 0.71 in 2006 to 0.62 
in 2010 and 0.60 in 2011. For the first time since 1986, the trade deficit was 
much larger than aid inflows, FDI inflows, and remittances taken together. 
Net remittances refer to the difference between personal remittances 
received and personal remittances paid. Personal remittances comprise 
personal transfers and compensation of employees. Personal transfers consist  
of all current transfers in cash or in kind made or received by resident 
households to or from nonresident households. Personal transfers thus 
include all current transfers between resident and nonresident individuals. 
Compensation of employees refers to the income of border, seasonal, and 
other short-term workers who are employed in an economy where they are 
not resident and of residents employed by nonresident entities. 
1.3.3 Recovery from the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998 
Inappropriate policy responses by the Lao government had increased 
the negative impact of the Asian financial crisis on the Lao economy. The 
Lao kip, given its close link to the Thai baht, was particularly vulnerable to 
the exchange rate volatility that rocked the region. Between July 1997 and 
June 1998, the kip lost 70% of its value against the dollar, resulting in 
hyperinflation. Weakening confidence in the economy as a whole as well as 
in the currency triggered an outflow of funds from the banking system.  
Inappropriate monetary and fiscal policies have multiplied the 
negative effects of the crisis on domestic macroeconomic stability. A 
tightening of macroeconomic policy, particularly monetary policy, was 
needed to reverse or at least stem the loss of confidence in the currency and 
the economy. Instead, a focus on achieving food self-sufficiency led to extra 
expenditures through rapid monetary expansion, which further eroded 
investor confidence and accelerated the flight out of the kip. 
Although the Lao economy had been severely affected by the crisis, it  
had experienced an annual average growth rate of around 6% over the period 
2000-2003 and at least tided over balance of payments difficulties. There 
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were a number of underlying factors which, taken together, constitute an 
explanation.  
 
Note: Terms of t rade is defined as the rat io of exportable goods price to importable goods 
price. Here, the net terms of trade is defined by the rat io of export volume index to import  
volume index.   
Source: World Development Indicator, 2013.  
Diagram 1.5: The value index of exports and imports and the net terms of 
trade index (2000 = 100) 
 
The first factor contributed to economic growth was an improved 
export performance, rising from $450 million in 2003 to $2,801 million in 
2011 (Table 1.4). The growth in exports in real terms was also impressive, as 
reflected in the movement of the export volume index in Diagram 1.5. The 
export performance was unprecedented by previous standards though modest  
in the international context. The principal factors underlying the growth in 
exports were the mining sector boom and the production of electricity by the 
new hydropower dam, such as Nam Thern II, for exports. 
The second factor contributed to economic growth was a slow 
expansion in imports, which saved the balance of payments situation from 
getting worse, as there was an improvement in the terms of trade in 2006 and 
once again during 2006-2009. The volume index of imports, for instance, 
rose slower than that of exports in the period 2009-2011. That was apparent 
from a mere glance at Diagram  1.5. Among other things, this was 
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attributable to the low level of capital goods due to the completion of 
hydropower dams.   
The third factor contributed to economic growth is the huge deficit in 
trade and payments that prompted the government into large scale borrowing 
from abroad. Loans recorded in the capital and financial account increased 
almost triple, from $98 million in 2000 to $287 million in 2011 (Table 1.4).  
This trend is confirmed by Diagram 1.5. 
 
Table 1.5: Lao PDR’s foreign exchange reserves 
 
Source: IMF CD (2011), ‘International Financial Statist ics’.  
 
The fourth factor contributed to economic growth was a dramatic 
increase in FDI inflows. It should be said that FDI inflows were not entirely 
new and had been significant during the early 1990s. Following the Asian 
financial crisis in 1997-1998, FDI inflows declines to $45 million in 1998 
from $160 million in 1996 as the crisis severely affected the Thailand 
economy which is the main source of FDI inflows into Lao PDR. Since 2004, 
FDI began to rise rapidly. The trends and the possible reasons responsible 
for this change are outlined below. 
 
 
Year Foreign exchange Gold SDRs
1990 1.8 6.6 0.0
1995 78.0 6.6 14.1
2000 138.9 4.6 0.1
2001 127.5 20.0 3.4
2002 185.5 24.8 6.1
2003 189.5 48.9 19.1
2004 207.9 51.3 15.4
2005 220.2 74.8 14.1
2006 313.7 133.5 14.7
2007 517.1 175.1 15.5
2008 613.6 248.3 15.1
2009 528.5 310.4 80.1
2010 624.7 401.2 78.7
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1.3.4 The main problem of the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves 
Foreign exchange reserves began to grow at a rapid rate to reach high 
levels within a short span of 10 years. Foreign exchange rose from $139 
million in 2000 to $625 million in 2010 (Table 1.5). This favorable outcome 
was attributable to: (i) the high levels of foreign aid inflows; (ii) the change 
in FDI inflows; (iii) the dramatic increase in net invisibles constituted 
mostly by earnings from tourism; and (iv) the phenomenal growth in private 
transfer payments which were a manifestation of the sharp and sustained 
increase in remittances from Laotians resident abroad. These developments 
coincided with each other and were collectively more than enough to offset 
the deterioration of trade balance. Of these factors, FDI inflows were 
perhaps the most important factor. 
 
Table 1.6: Trends in FDI during the 2000s 
 
Source :  Author’s compilat ion.  Data of FDI and aid inflows were obtained from World 
Bank database ‘World Development Indicator’ .  Data of exports and trade defici t  were 
collected from IMF Staff Report  (various issues).  
 
It  is, therefore, necessary to examine the trend in inward FDI flows 
into Lao PDR and to analyze the underlying factors. The trends in FDI for 
the period 2000-2011 are outlined in Table 1.6, which confirms the large 
increase in FDI inflows beginning in the mid-2000s. The table also, relates 
FDI to the other important components of the balance of payments—export 
earnings, aid inflows, and the trade deficit—to reveal the substantial and 
Year FDI
(US$, million) Exports Aid inflows Trade deficit
2000-2005
(annual average) 21.1 4.8 10.6 −6.5
2006 187.3 16.5 79.9 −41.1
2007 323.5 24.5 118.3 −38.7
2008 227.8 14.2 68.7 −18.5
2009 318.6 20.9 86.2 −23.2
2010 278.8 12.6 71.7 −20.4
2011 300.7 10.7 73.2 −16.3
FDI as a percentage of
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growing significance of FDI as a means of financing the trade deficit in Lao 
PDR. 
1.4 Development of flow of funds account of the Lao economy 
Flows of funds (FOF) accounts illustrate the transactions in financial 
instruments among major sectors of the economy. These accounts provide a 
broad framework for analysing issues related to financial sector and its 
relationships with the real economy and thereby facilitate insights into the 
role of the financial sector in the development process. Keeping in view the 
analytical uses of the FOF, I have compiled a simplified version of the FOF 
accounts for Lao PDR during 1990–2010.  
 The period 1990–2010 witnessed the growing integration of Lao 
economy with the global financial sector. Measures taken in pursuance of 
economic reforms that assigned greater role to the private sector in economic 
activities, enabled entry of variety of domestic and external players 
imparting depth and liquidity to the financial markets. While these dynamics 
reflect in enhanced role of external capital, the banking sector, however,  
continued to play a dominant role in meeting the financing needs of the 
deficit sectors. The FOF accounts presented in the ensuing sections have 
inter alia attempted to capture these developments. 
Following Dawson (2004) and Suvannaphakdy (2013), I used data on 
the balance of payments, the banking sectors, and the government sector 
from the International Financial Statistics of IMF (2011), ADB (2012), and 
UNCTAD (2012). All financial data are expressed in real terms using the 
Lao GDP deflator with 2002 as the base year. This simple FOF system 
provides an integrated view of the entire financial system.  
I compared the structure of FOF account in 1990 and 2010 to provide 
insight about financial development in Lao PDR. The line references in the 
‘source’ column on each worksheet provide some guides on how Diagram s 
are derived. The worksheets are in the form of sector sources (S) and uses 
(U) of funds accounts, each headed by a sector’s gross capital formation (U), 
gross saving (S), and net lending/borrowing (U/S). Then each sector’s net 
lending/borrowing is analysed into five financial market flows: foreign 
claims, interbank claims, central government debt, private credit,
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Table 1.7: Lao PDR’s flow of funds matrix 1990 (billions of kip) 
 
Notes :   The en-dash (–) indicates that  data are unavailable.  
S = Sources,  which are equal  to  saving of each sector plus net incurrence of financial liabil it ies.  
U = Uses,  which are equal  to capital formation and net  acquisit ion of financial assets.  
Source :  Author’s calculat ion based on data from IMF (2011), ADB (2012), and UNCTAD (2012).  
U S U S U S U S U S U S
2 Gross capital formation 1,004 – – −57 947
4 Gross saving 192 – – −315 1,070 947
6 Net lending (+) or borrowing (-) −813 – – −258 1,070 0
9 ∆ Foreign claims, net 8 0 −1164 1,172 8 8
11 ∆ Foreign assets 28 5 −1173 1,206 33 33
12 ∆ Foreign liabilities 20 6 −9 −34 −9 −9
14 ∆ Interbank claims 227 230 −3 227 227
16 ∆ Central bank credit to commercial banks −234 −229 5 −229 −229
17 ∆ Bank reserves −8 1 −9 −8 −8
19 ∆ Central government debt 813 9 −14 79 −71 −810 3 3
21 ∆ Claims on central government 893 8 −16 79 −71 −894 −1 −1
22 ∆ Central government deposits 81 −1 −3 85 81 81
24 ∆ Private credit, net 0 193 −130 322 260 322 322
26 ∆ Claims on nonbank financial institution 155 −130 25 25 25
27 ∆ Other private credit 0 38 298 260 298 298
29 ∆ Money and quasi money 38 24 61 61 61
31 ∆ Currency and demand deposits −8 24 16 16 16
32 ∆ Time, savings deposits 46 46 46 46
34 ∆ Miscellaneous & discrepancies, net 0 398 −398 75 −283 −359 −283 −283
37 Total 1,004 1,004 436 436 −144 −144 83 83 −94 −94 038
Total
Account
Central Government Commercial Banks Central Bank Private Sector Rest of the World Discrepancy 
Sources 
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and money and quasi-money. Finally, the flows for 1990 are assembled into 
separate matrix format which is Table 1.7. The FOF matrix shown in Table 
1.7 contained five sectors: central government, commercial banks, central  
bank, private sector, and foreign sector (rest of the world). The private 
sector includes provincial and local government, nonbank financial  
institutions, nonprofit institutions, all nonfinancial business including 
government enterprises, and households. This table will be the foundation 
for the analysis that follows. 
The 1990 gross capital formation in the private sector of 1,004 6 
(Table 1.7, line 2) is financed by three means: first, a capital inflow from 
abroad; second, domestic savings; and third, private credit. To investigate 
the inflow of capital from abroad we refer to the rest of the world account on 
the matrix and to the breakdown in the placement of its surplus, 1,070 (Table 
1.6, line 6). 7  There are three main inflows from abroad: (1) a central 
government debt flow of −71 (line 21) received by the central government, 
where negative sign indicates the lower indebtedness of the Lao government; 
(2) a private credit flow of 260 (line 278) received by the private sector; and 
(3) a foreign claims flow of −9 (line 12) received by the commercial banks, 
where the negative sign indicates the capital outflow. If the third of these 
flows were positive, it  should become embedded in the intermediary process 
of the banking system. 
The flow of private credit from the commercial banks in 1990 was 
recorded at 38 (line 27). Nonetheless, they were able to supply more credit 
as the central bank reduced the bank reserves of 8 (line 17). The growth in 
money and especially quasi-money of 38 (line 29) was the source of funds in 
the banking sector accounting for 13% of the private credit extension. So, all 
told, a private credit total of 38 is provided (line 27). Together with the 
inflow of private credit from abroad (260, line 27), the private sector 
obtained the substantial total of 298 in private credit (line 27). 
 
                                                     
6  Unless otherwise indicated data are expressed in bil lions of kip.  
7  The surplus is  the Lao current account deficit  as viewed from a rest-of-world perspective.  
8  Except  as noted,  l ine references are to Table 1.7.  
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Table 1.8: Lao PDR’s flow of funds matrix 2010 (billions of kip) 
 
Notes:  The en-dash (–) indicates that data are unavailable. 
S = Sources, which are equal to saving of each sector plus net incurrence of financial liabilities. 
U = Uses, which are equal to capital formation and net acquisition of financial assets. 
Source: Author’s calculation based on data from IMF (2012), ADB (2012), and UNCTAD (2012). 
U S U S U S U S U S U S
2 Gross capital formation 3,646 – – 7,440 11,086
4 Gross saving 2,954 – – 8,267 −135 11,086
6 Net lending (+) or borrowing (-) −692 – – 827 −135 0
9 ∆ Foreign claims, net 91 332 336 87 423 423
11 ∆ Foreign assets 949 277 1,272 −46 1,226 1,226
12 ∆ Foreign liabilities 859 −55 936 133 936 936
14 ∆ Interbank claims 1,086 875 210 1,086 1,086
16 ∆ Central bank credit to commercial banks 182 442 260 442 442
17 ∆ Bank reserves 1,268 1,317 −49 1,268 1,268
19 ∆ Central government debt 615 74 55 −215 526 −174 440 440
21 ∆ Claims on central government 615 173 0 −215 526 −131 484 484
22 ∆ Central government deposits 0 98 −55 −44 0 0
24 ∆ Private credit, net −78 2,269 588 4,309 1,530 4,309 4,309
26 ∆ Claims on nonbank financial institution 180 588 767 767 767
27 ∆ Other private credit −78 2,089 3,542 1,530 3,542 3,542
29 ∆ Money and quasi money 2,912 393 3,305 3,305 3,305
31 ∆ Currency and demand deposits 474 393 867 867 867
32 ∆ Time, savings deposits 2,438 2,438 2,438 2,438
34 ∆ Miscellaneous & discrepancies, net 0 607 −293 −2046 −1855 −123 −1855 −1855
37 Total 3,568 3,568 3,519 3,519 975 975 10,530 10,530 201 201 038
Total
Account
Central Government Commercial Banks Central Bank Private Sector Rest of the World Discrepancy 
Sources 
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It is worth considering how the government sector financed its gross 
capital formation, 1,004 (Table 1.7, line 2). The public investment was 
financed by the small volume of public saving of 192 (line 4). The rest of 
the capital formation might be financed by 79 from the domestic private 
sector and 9 from the commercial bank. Here we see the small contribution 
of the foreign credit to public capital formation. 
As of 2010, the financial flows in Lao PDR were substantially 
improved relative to those in 1990, due mainly to the better functioning of 
the banking system and the expansion of businesses. Although the 
government sector was still  the net borrower, the private sector turned to be 
a net lender and Lao PDR was also a net lender to the rest of the world (see 
Table 1.8). 
In 2010, the flow of private credit received 2,089 from the 
commercial banks (Table 1.8, line 27). Nonetheless, they were able to supply 
more credit as the central bank reduced the bank reserves of 1,286 (line 17). 
The growth in money and especially quasi-money of 2,912 (line 29) was the 
source of funds in the banking sector accounting for 85% of the private 
credit extension. But the banking sector was able to advance to the private 
sector much more than its deposit expansion, partly by means of its foreign 
borrowing, 859 (line 12), but also by an increase of foreign assets, 947 (line 
11), and an expansion of its net holding of government debt, 74 (line 19). So, 
all told, a private credit total of 2,089 is provided (line 27). Together with 
the inflow of private credit from abroad, the private sector obtained the 
substantial total of 3,542 in private credit (line 27). 
Based on Tables 1.7 and 1.8, I found the following conclusions. First, 
the foreign sector is a net lender to the government in the Lao PDR; second, 
gross capital formation is largely financed by domestic sources of funds; and 
finally, the foreign sector did show some significant contribution as a source 
of capital for the government. Consequently, a shortfall in foreign finance 
can cause the government sector to cut down its investment dramatically. In 
contrast, there is no clear sign that the private sector would reduce its 
investment due to a shortfall in foreign finance because it is largely financed 
by domestic savings. 
36 
 
Chapter 2 Macroeconomic Management and Performance in Lao 
PDR 
 
The aim of this chapter is to answer the question whether the present 
institutional arrangements and the implementations of macroeconomic 
policies in Laos promote macroeconomic stability. It describes the 
institutional and macroeconomic policies framework for the Lao economy. 
The structures of two macroeconomic institutions have been investigated, 
including the Bank of Lao PDR, and the Ministry of Finance. Three 
macroeconomic policies, including monetary policy, exchange rate policy, 
and fiscal policy, are also reviewed. The chapter ends with the review of 
macroeconomic performance in Lao PDR. 
2.1 Macroeconomic policy institutions in Lao PDR 
 Successful macroeconomic policy implementation requires well-
functioning institutions and feasible coordination mechanisms at the two 
levels of the policy process, namely policy-making and policy 
implementation. As in many developing countries, two institutions play a 
crucial role in macroeconomic policy formulation and implementation: the 
Bank of the Lao PDR (BOL) and the Ministry of Finance (MOF).  
2.1.1 Development of financial institutions in Lao PDR  
Prior to 1988 the banking system of Lao PDR consisted of a single 
financial institution, the State Bank of Lao PDR and its provincial and 
district branches, which performed both central and commercial banking 
functions. It issued banknote, regulated currency in circulation, handled 
payment system and served as a national treasury. It also accepted some 
deposits from public and lent money to state-owned enterprises according to 
central planner’s instruction. 
The financial institutions in Lao PDR have evolved with reforms in 
the Lao economy. Between 1975 and 1989, the banking system of Lao PDR 
was one tier banking system which was known as National Bank from 1975 
to 1981 and then called State Bank of Lao PDR between 1981 and 1989.  
The State Bank of Lao PDR had a headquarter in Vientiane capital 
and 19 regional branches nationwide performed both central and commercial  
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banking functions. It issued banknotes, regulated currency in circulation, 
handled payment system, and served as a national treasury. It also accepted 
some deposits from public and lent money to state-owned enterprises 
according to central planner’s instruction. However, the banking sector 
during this period was unable to effectively perform its tasks, resulting in 
liquidity shortage, lack of efficiency and weak governance. 
In 1989, the banking system had been transformed from a mono-
banking system into a two-tier banking system and officially established the 
central bank called Bank of the Lao PDR. Consequently, the role of the 
central bank and the role of commercial banks were clearly separated. The 
rules and regulations on doing banking business have also been amended and 
created, and thereby improving business environment in the banking sector. 
From 1989 to 1995, private banks, joint-venture banks, branches of foreign 
banks and specialized banks were licensed to operate extensively, while 
other types of financial institutions, particularly insurance companies and 
micro-finance institutions were established.  
At the end of 2011, the financial institutions in Lao PDR consisted of 
the central bank, commercial banks, non-banking financial institutions, 
micro-finance institutions, money markets and capital markets. Commercial 
banks include 4 state-owned commercial banks, 5 private banks, 2 joint 
venture banks, 2 affiliated banks, 8 foreign bank branches, and 2 
representative offices of foreign bank. The non-banking financial institutions 
comprised of 3 insurance companies, one social security fund, postal saving 
institutions with 16 branches and 28 pawn shops. For the micro-finance 
institutions, there were 4 micro finance institutions accepting deposits, five 
credit cooperatives and 190 micro funds nationwide. Regarding to the money 
market and capital market, recently, there are foreign exchange inter-bank 
market and secondary T-bills market which are not very active, and the 
capital market was just created in 2010 under the supervision of the BOL 
(Diagram 2.1).  
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Source: Author’s compilation using data from BOL.  
Diagram 2.1: Structure of the financial institutions in Lao PDR, 2011 
Micro-finance 
institutions 
State-owned 
commercial banks 
(4) 
Commercial Banks Non-bank financial 
institutions 
Money markets Capital markets 
Private banks (5) 
Joint venture banks (2) 
Foreign banks’ branches 
(9)  
Representative office of 
foreign banks (2) 
Insurance companies 
(3) 
Postal saving 
institution (1) 
Social security 
organization (1) 
Credit 
cooperatives 
Saving deposits 
Village funds 
Saving and credit 
units 
Lao stock market Foreign exchange 
inter-bank market 
Secondary T-bills 
market 
Affiliated banks (4) 
Bank of Lao PDR 
39 
 
Although Lao PDR’s financial institutions has been gradually 
improved, they are still  at an early stage of development and thus, providing 
limited supply of credit to private sector. As shown in Table 2.1, total assets 
of commercial banks as percentage of GDP accounted for 25.2% in 2005–
2007 and 40.8% in 2008–2010. The rate of financial assets growth was 
averaged at 29% per year. About two-thirds of this rapid growth of assets 
has been accounted for by the state owned commercial banks (SOCBs). More 
precisely, the assets expansion of SOCBs accounted for 61.5% of total assets 
growth, followed by the joint-venture banks and private banks (24.8%) and 
branches of foreign banks (13.8%).   
 
Table 2.1: Lao PDR’s financial developments in the fast growth period, 
period averages 
 
Source :  Author’s compilation based on data from the Bank of Lao PDR ‘Lao Monetary 
Stat ist ics’ (various issues).  
 
As income per capita increases, Lao people save more money that 
they earn. As shown in Table 2.1, the ratio of total deposits to GDP rose by 
10 percentage points from 19.6% in 2005–2007 to 26.6% in 2008–2010. 
About 70% of money has been saved in SOCBs, 20% in the joint-venture and 
private banks, and the rest 9.6% in the branches of foreign banks. 
Nonetheless, savings in Lao PDR is low relative to the size of its GDP. 
There are three main reasons for this. First, People have limited access to the 
banking sector in the rural areas (Kyophilavong, 2010). Second, they have 
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low incomes (BOL et al., 2002). Finally, the majority of people living in the 
rural areas save in the form of gold and silver (Toyoda and Kyophilavong, 
2005).  
Total loans provided by the commercial banks account for an even 
small share of total deposits (55%) and GDP (12.8%), but the performance 
has been substantially strong, with growth around 39.6% on average (see 
Table 1.3). The bulk of the growth contribution has come from the SOCBs, 
which account for over 64% of total credits and more than 8% of total GDP, 
and has grown about 40% on average.  
Total loans provided by the commercial banks are very small relative 
to the total deposits and the size of the economy. This implies that the 
financial market in Lao PDR is still  at its early stage of the development, 
and relying on the banking sector as the only source of funding may not be 
sufficient to boost domestic investment. There are three main reasons for the 
low ratio of credit to GDP: lack of skilled workers in the banking sector, 
discouraging corporate access to banking services due to distort price signals, 
and lack of strong legal enforcement of non-performing loans (NPLs) to 
prevent credit risk (Kyophilavong, 2010). 
In contrast, the non-banking financial institutions are still  
underdeveloped and there are only few non-banking fiancial institutions 
providing long term capital and life insurance. At present, Assurances 
Generales de France and Toko Assurance are only two insurance companies 
providing general insurance and life insurance while another company, Lao-
Viet insurance company, is providing only financial and investment 
insurances.  
Furthermore, the social security and pension systems were just 
introduced few years ago and these services are applied for civil servants 
only. Since 1989, all civil servants are required to contribute 6 percent of 
their salary to the “Social Security Fund” which provide protection including 
pension, child allowance, invalidity from war, medical care, death, maternity 
and sickness. This fund is managed by the Social Security Department, 
Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare. 
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2.1.2 Performance of the Central Bank of Lao PDR and its responsibility 
of conducting monetary policy  
Bank of Lao PDR was formally established in June 1990, following 
the Central Bank Law No.4. Its rights and duties are to promote and maintain 
internal and external monetary stability, an efficient payments mechanism 
and the liquidity, solvency and proper functioning of a soundly based 
monetary, credit and financial system; and to foster conditions conducive to 
orderly, balanced and sustained economic growth for the prosperity of the 
Lao people. Moreover, only the BOL is authorized to grant or reject a 
license for establishing a bank or financial institution. 
The BOL Law No.5 promulgated in October 1995 and amended in 
October 1999 forms the governance structure of BOL with an equivalent 
status to a ministry within the government. Its highest authority is the Board 
of Governors which consists of seven to nine members with a deputy prime 
minister as its chairman, the Governor of the BOL and Minister of Finance 
as co-vice-chairmen, a deputy governor, as well as three to five other 
members from various sectors of the national economy who are appointed by 
the Prime Minister. The Board of Governors plays a crucial role in 
determining money supply, credit and financial sector supervisory policies 
while leaving the day-to-day operations to the governor and deputy 
governors. 
For the implementation of monetary policy, from 1990 to 1995, the 
central bank aimed at achieving the target of bank credits such as, setting an 
annual credit increase target, setting a ceiling for interest rates, and 
providing direct lending to major state-owned enterprises as well as the 
commercial banks. After the amendment of the Law on the Bank of Lao PDR 
in 1995, the objective of monetary policy was emphasized on maintaining 
the stability of the local currency and using indirect monetary policy such as 
defining the level money supply and reserve requirements, setting central 
bank rate, discount rate of the bills and reference rate of exchange rate, 
selling central bank bills, and lending the short-term credits to commercial  
banks. After the amendment of the law in 1999, the ceiling on interest rate 
was eliminated, and the role of the central bank has focused on the 
macroeconomic management by maintaining the stability of local currency to 
promote economic development as well as the development of commercial 
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banks and financial institutions without interfering in the management of 
state-owned commercial banks. 
However, the current institutional arrangements of the BOL do not 
support the financial sector stability because of its lack of autonomy. 
Moreover, the BOL has not been very effective in conducting the monetary 
policy in Lao PDR because of four major reasons. First, the Lao economy is 
characterized by dollarization, with the ratio of foreign currency deposit to 
M2 of more than 50%. Second, the lack of autonomy of the BOL results in a 
long policy making process because of its consulting and seeking approval 
from the ministry of finance. Third, policy lending is used to finance the 
government investments or SOEs. As the BOL uses interest rates to constrain 
credit availability to high return projects, efficiency of the policy decision 
decreases as policy lending can affect the normal market credit allocation. 
Fourth, the BOL has limited financial resources which make it difficult to 
conduct appropriate monetary policies. Finally, the BOL’s banking 
supervision is weak, particularly in the enforcement area (ADB and World 
Bank, 2002, pp. 14–17). 
2.1.3 Performance of Ministry of Finance and its responsibility of 
conducting fiscal policy 
 The Ministry of Finance plays an important role in the management of 
financial system in Lao PDR. According to the Decree 80/PM dated on 
February 28 2007, “The Ministry of Finance is a public administrative 
organization within the Government’s machinery, playing an important role 
in ensuring the management of public finance, accounting, government 
budget and asset and land areas for the whole country in a uniform manner, 
in line with the Party-Government policy/guidelines to serve the tasks of 
protection and socio-economic development of the country, ensuring its 
stability and strength in line with the Renovation Policy.” The MOF was 
founded in 1988, and worked closely with the Committee for Planning under 
the same ministry, called ‘Ministry for Economic Planning and Finance’. In 
1993, this merger was dismantled, resulting in two separate ministries, the 
Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Planning and Investment. At present, 
12 departments have been created within the Ministry of Finance to 
implement fiscal policy and management. Four of them are responsibility of 
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revenue collection: the Customs Department, the Tax Department, the State 
Property Management Department and the Land and Housing Management 
Department. 
 The roles played by the MOF have two significant aspects for the 
financial sector development. The first aspect is that the MOF dominates 
policy making and decisions associated with the financial sector. It is  
responsible for the formulation and implementation of fiscal policies. It 
prepares the government budget to be submitted to the National Assembly 
and administers the approved budget, including inspection of state-owned 
enterprises and government ministries for compliance. In particular, the 
MOF deals with tax administration, customs duties, management of the 
investments of SOEs and state property, and government procurement 
guidelines and regulations.      
 The second aspect is that the MOF can enhance or restrict the financial 
sector development depending on its financing methods. By using the 
Treasury-bills (T-bills) as a source of financing, the MOF provides relatively 
liquid financial instruments to the financial sector. While the MOF 
determines the volume of T-bills to be issued, the BOL serves as manager of 
T-bills and other government security issues. T-bills are sold at a discount in 
certificate form in units of 10 million kip with the maturity of six months. 
Starting in March 1994, T-bills were auctioned by the BOL twice a month 
and the rate at auctions was used as reference for determining lending rates 
of commercial banks.    
 However, the MOF has not been very effective in implementing fiscal 
policy and management due to several limitations. It has limited capability 
in formulating and implementing policy. With low research capacity, it  
cannot provide a comprehensive revenue planning. Furthermore, tax rates are 
often discretionary (Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the 
Pacific, 1997, p.22).   
 At the policy level, the coordination mechanisms between the Bank of 
Lao PDR and the Ministry of Finance are obvious since the Minister of 
Finance serves as a vice-chairman of the Board of Governor of the BOL. The 
coordination between two institutions can be strengthened through monthly 
meeting of the Board of Governor. At the implementation level, much 
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progress needs to be made as there is currently lack of any joint committee 
activity on undertaking regular discussions on technical matters. 
Establishing permanent joint committees can enhance the efficiency of many 
areas of macroeconomic policy implementation, including the determination 
of T-bill auction quantities, the monitoring of the programmes agreed upon 
with international agencies, the coordination of debt management and 
monetary policy, particularly the interest rate policy for government 
borrowing, and characteristics and operational aspects of government 
securities. 
2.2 Development of macroeconomic policies in Lao PDR from 1988–2011 
2.2.1 The operation of monetary policy in Lao PDR 
The monetary policy framework in Laos has evolved with changing 
economic and financial environment, but the price stability continued to 
remain paramount. It can be roughly classified into two strategies: a strategy 
of targeting the growth in net domestic assets of the banking system—the 
initial period of the transition (1988–1994); and a strategy of targeting the 
growth of broad money―more developed banking system (1995–2012). The 
strategy of targeting the growth in net domestic assets of the banking system 
was adopted, taking into account the balance of payments objective and the 
expected demand for money. The main reason for adopting this strategy was 
due to a rudimentary monetary system and the lack of fully effective indirect 
policy instruments. Thus the authorities relied on direct instruments,  
including limits on currency issue and instructions to state-owned banks to 
reduce credit to state enterprises. These policies, coupled with the 
government’s low level of bank borrowing, were successful in reducing 
credit and broad money growth, resulting in a decline of inflation rate from 
35.6% in 1990 to 6.3% in 1993 (Table 2.2). However, the direct controls 
became less effective as the private sector has increasingly accounted for 
total credit. This entailed the change from net domestic asset targeting to 
monetary targeting, while developing indirect instruments for monetary 
management. 
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Table 2.2: Monetary survey in Lao PDR, 1990–2010 
(In billions of kip) 
 
Notes :  1Nominal GDP divided by broad money.  2Broad money divided by reserve money.  
Source :  Author’s calculat ion based on data from International Financial Statist ics of the IMF. 
1990 1993 1996 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Net foreign assets 11.5 63.6 143.9 1,162.0 1,424.1 1,288.2 2,184.7 2,577.0 3,094.8 3,321.4 4,775.8 7,641.3 7,251.3 5,505.9 6,264.7
Net domestic assets 15.5 10.6 40.2 432.8 428.9 1,270.1 773.5 1,163.2 1,386.7 1,959.5 1,733.2 1,923.8 3,992.1 8,256.1 11,506.4
  Domestic Credit 30.6 56.5 131.6 957.8 1,230.2 2,057.3 1,831.1 1,943.8 2,166.5 2,348.8 2,251.4 2,670.9 5,018.0 10,353.9 15,712.7
    Net credit to Government −15.0 −27.8 −61.0 −359.5 −630.6 −464.7 −807.0 −454.5 −513.7 −531.4 −365.5 −495.5 −826.6 −789.2 −557.4
      Credit to nongovernment sector 45.6 84.2 192.6 1,317.3 1,860.8 2,522.0 2,638.1 2,398.3 2,680.2 2,880.2 2,616.9 3,166.4 5,844.6 11,143.1 16,270.2
        Public enterprises 39.7 18.3 36.9 445.4 642.6 1,016.7 1,133.0 926.1 998.6 736.5 556.3 512.9 1,290.7 2,578.5 3,955.7
        Private enterprises 5.9 65.9 155.7 871.9 1,218.1 1,505.3 1,505.1 1,472.2 1,681.6 2,143.8 2,060.6 2,653.5 4,553.8 8,564.6 12,314.5
  BOL securities 0.0 −0.1 −20.7 −141.6 −159.0 −199.9 −165.5 −45.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 −12.2 −14.5 −187.4
  Other items (net) −15.1 −45.8 −70.7 −383.4 −642.3 −587.4 −892.1 −735.2 −779.8 −389.3 −518.2 −747.1 −1013.7 −2083.4 −4018.9
Broad money 44.3 125.9 244.9 1,544.5 2,255.6 2,565.0 3,529.4 4,237.9 5,154.9 5,560.3 7,046.1 9,774.2 11,564.0 15,311.4 21,302.6
  Narrow money 25.1 52.2 75.6 219.0 344.4 371.8 587.0 836.5 1,207.3 1,558.9 1,998.3 3,064.7 3,715.3 4,790.5 6,349.8
  Quasi-money 19.3 73.6 169.4 1,325.5 1,911.3 2,193.2 2,942.4 3,401.4 3,947.6 4,001.4 5,047.8 6,709.5 7,848.6 10,520.9 14,952.8
Domestic credit 15.9 41.5 −6.8 47.3 28.4 67.2 −11.0 6.2 11.5 8.4 −4.1 18.6 87.9 106.3 51.8
Net credit to nongovernment sector 11.2 51.7 23.1 74.2 41.3 35.5 4.6 −9.1 11.8 7.5 −9.1 21.0 84.6 90.7 46.0
  Of which: Net credit to 
    private sector 34.1 74.9 20.8 63.6 39.7 23.6 0.0 −2.2 14.2 27.5 −3.9 28.8 71.6 88.1 43.8
Broad money 7.9 64.6 26.7 78.4 46.0 13.7 37.6 20.1 21.6 7.9 26.7 38.7 18.3 32.4 39.1
Memorandum items
  Velocity of money1 13.8 7.6 7.0 6.7 6.1 6.1 5.2 4.8 5.2 5.5 5.0 4.0 3.9 3.1 2.5
  Reserve money 22.0 60.7 104.4 481.8 766.7 822.5 1,079.1 1,329.9 1,545.3 1,823.2 2,502.0 3,973.6 4,776.0 6,302.2 9,371.8
  Money multiplier2 2.0 2.1 2.3 3.2 2.9 3.1 3.3 3.2 3.3 3.0 2.8 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.3
  Inflation rate, 2005 = 100 35.6 6.3 12.9 128.5 25.1 7.8 10.6 15.5 10.5 7.2 6.8 4.5 7.6 0.0 6.0
(Percentage change)
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However, it is unclear whether these two strategies can be used to fight 
inflation in Lao PDR because the relationship between monetary aggregates 
and economic activity was unstable and the high CS degree. As shown in 
Table 2.2, the velocity of money gradually fell, from 13.8 in 1990 to 6.1 in 
2000 and to 2.5 in 2010. This indicates that in recent decades more money 
per unit of nominal GDP has been required for, in spite of massive 
innovation in financial technology. Meanwhile, the authorities floated the 
exchange rate in 1988 in view of finding a rate that reflected market forces 
more accurately than the fixed or managed float system, and of unifying the 
official system when financial imbalanced were reduced. From 1990 to 2010, 
the two approaches taken by the Lao authorities tend to be effective in 
reducing inflation from 35.6% in 1990 to 6% in 2010 while avoiding the 
significant decline in output that is often experienced in transition 
economies. This favourable outcome can be largely contributed by indirect  
monetary instruments. 
BOL has gradually developed indirect instruments of monetary 
management. First, a minimum reserve requirement of 5% for both kip and 
US dollar was introduced in 1989. This requirement was doubled to 10% in 
1994 in order to absorb excess liquidity in the banking system. Since 
January 2002, the BOL maintained the reserve requirement rate for the US 
dollar about twice higher than the kip in order to reduce dollarization in the 
Lao economy. Second, a formal credit window was opened at the central 
bank in January 1992, allowing commercial banks to borrow to meet their 
short-term liquidity needs. Nevertheless, the credit window was replaced by 
a discount facility at the BOL in May 1994 to strengthen monetary control 
and tighten the provision of central bank credit. Third, treasury bill auctions 
were commenced on a regular basis since March 1994. The introduction of 
the discount facility and treasury bill, together with allowing market forces 
to determine interest rates, constituted an important step for liquidity 
management through market operations and contributed to the development 
of an interbank money market. 
2.2.2 The operation of exchange rate policy in Lao PDR 
Since the declaration of its independence in 1975, the Lao PDR has 
experienced two exchange rate regimes, multiple exchange rate system 
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during 1975–1987 on the one hand and managed-float regime afterwards on 
the other. During 1975–1987, the Lao government had operated seven 
exchange rates for many different purposes. The first exchange rate is called 
‘official exchange rate’, which was used to convert loans from international 
organizations, namely ADB, IMF, and the World Bank or foreign loans and 
grants, into kip, as well as kip into the US dollar (USD). In 1986, this 
official exchange rate was 10 kip per USD.  
The second exchange rate was used for diplomats and expenditures of 
the embassies. This rate was set at 35 kip per USD. The third exchange rate 
served as a means to protect the State Owned-enterprises. By doing so, the 
official commercial exchange rate was set to be 95 kip per USD, which was 
much lower level than the market rate. In 1987, the government limited the 
amount of foreign currency to be sold to SOEs. As a result, many of them 
had to buy it in the apparel market; those who could not do so, for whatever 
reason, were forced to produce much below their capacity because of a lack 
of raw materials or spare parts for their machinery.  
 
 
Note :  The exchange rates are annual diagrams during 1980–1991 and quarterly Diagram s 
during 1992–2011.  
Source :  Bank of Lao PDR, Financial  Stat istics  (various issues)  
Diagram 2.2: Kip/USD exchange rate in the parallel and the official market, 
1980–2011 
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The fourth exchange rate served as a means for transforming tourist 
receipts and inward remittances to non-Lao nationals of the residents of the 
country, which was set at 350 kip per USD. The fifth exchange rate was used 
as a means for transforming inward remittances to Lao nationals, which was 
set at 350 kip per USD. The sixth exchange rate served as a means for 
export-import mixed companies to do business with foreign partners during 
1986 and 1987. The seventh exchange rate existed in the apparel or free 
market. During the period of 1985 to 1987, this exchange rate was around 
390–420 kip per USD, which was very high relative to the official market 
(Diagram 2.2).  
 
Source :  Bank of Lao PDR, Financial  Stat istics  (various issues).   
Diagram 2.3: Kip/baht exchange rate in the parallel and the official market, 
1992–2011 
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below 10% of the official rate until the second quarter of 1997. A similar 
stable trend is also true for the kip/baht rate (Diagram 2.3). These favorable 
outcomes were due to the liberal access to foreign exchange as well as a 
continued rise in the number of authorized banks and foreign exchange 
bureaus.  
However, the monetary management in Lao PDR was not very 
effective once the economy was affected by external shock. For instance, the 
Asian financial crisis in July 1997 resulted in considerable depreciations of 
both kip per USD and kip per baht rates, increasing from 1027 for the 
kip/USD and 70 for the kip/baht in the second quarter of 1997 to 8913 and 
240 in the third quarter of 1999, respectively. During this period, the 
disparity between the parallel and the official rate was quite high, recorded 
on average at 10.32% for the kip/USD and 11.2% for the kip/baht. Both the 
kip/USD and kip/baht rates stood at new values in the post-crisis, which 
were much higher than the initial values in the pre-crisis.  
Under the managed-floating exchange rate regime, the BOL determines 
the daily reference rate for the kip against the USD or the baht. It calculates 
this reference rate by using a weighted average of the previous foreign 
exchange transactions of commercial banks and market rates. This reference 
rate has been modified from time to time in response to market conditions. 
For instance, in 2006 commercial banks were required to adjust their buying 
and selling rates by ± 0.3% of the reference rate to narrow the spread of 
exchange rates and reduce the gap between official rates and market rates. In 
2009, commercial banks were required to adjust their daily selling exchange 
rates within the range ± 0.25% for the kip/USD, 0.5% for kip/baht and 
kip/EUR, and less than 2% for other currencies.  
2.2.3 The operation of fiscal policy in Lao PDR 
2.2.3.1 The operation of fiscal policy under a centrally-planned economic 
system, 1975-1985 
Since the formation of Lao PDR in 1975, the Lao government has 
taken an increasingly active role in economic matters in the form of both 
policy interventions and growth in financial and economic activities in the 
state sector. This section examines trends in the state budget over the period 
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1977-1985 and the impact of government’s efforts to provide economic and 
social services, expand investments in infrastructure and productive 
facilities and raise domestic resources through taxation to finance these 
expenditures. 
 
Table 2.3: Lao PDR’s government revenue and expenditure, 1977-1985 
(In millions of kip) 
 
Source :  World Bank,  Country Economic Memorandum,  various issues.  
 
There were limited statistics on Lao PDR’s public finance between 
1975 and 1977. The Lao government started to collect fiscal statistics since 
1977 when a formal budget was operated for the first time. Nonetheless, 
even with the statistical limitations, it is possible to sketch the budgetary 
position between 1975 and 1977 based on the World Bank’s documents, and 
to indicate trends in public finance over the period 1978-1985. According to 
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Revenue 83 106 268 748 989 2,755 3,495 4,948 10,299
Tax revenue 30 55 48 300 396 775 1,056 1,669 1,397
Tax on industrial and 
commercial profits — — — 15 31 60 125 250 170
Agricultural tax — — — 31 55 117 157 228 250
Turnover tax — — — 91 195 383 565 960 786
Of which: State enterprises — — — 81 119 223 232 453 424
Tax on international trade — — — 155 109 205 172 181 160
Import tax — — — — 84 142 152 150 124
   Of which: state enterprises — — — — 55 84 82 70 66
Export tax — — — — 25 63 20 31 36
   Of which: state enterprises — — — — 21 53 14 24 30
Other — — — 8 6 10 37 50 31
Nontax revenue 53 51 220 448 593 1,980 2,439 3,279 8,902
Transfers from state enterprises 51 33 184 365 520 1,895 2,112 2,962 7,761
Other 2 18 35 83 73 85 327 317 1,141
Expenditures 490 573 636 1,777 1,956 5,475 6,695 8,384 20,806
Current expenditures 329 384 394 1,028 1,028 2,259 2,945 4,126 10,624
Wages and salaries — 105 114 269 200 280 320 580 2,520
Materials and supplies — — — 668 725 1,798 2,145 3,419 6,810
Subsidies and transfers — 168 165 68 59 85 380 10 2
Debt service — 24 19 23 44 96 100 117 1,267
Capital expenditures 162 189 242 749 928 3,216 3,750 4,258 10,182
Education — 4 4 24 21 77 100 90 265
Health — 4 2 112 67 254 280 170 600
Agriculture and forestry — 25 74 179 283 955 980 1,010 1,549
Industry and commerce — 78 25 43 149 573 920 1,537 2,045
Transport, communications, and
 public works — 64 113 283 373 1,237 1,250 1,256 4,212
Other — 14 24 108 35 120 220 195 1,511
Deficit −408 −467 −368 −1,029 −967 −2,720 −3,200 −3,436 −10,507
Financing 408 467 368 1,029 967 2,720 3,199 3,437 10,507
External resources 357 431 355 1,033 967 2,720 3,199 3,533 10,671
Domestic resources 51 36 14 −4 0 0 0 −96 −164
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the World Bank (1983, pp. 30-31), expenditures grew much faster than 
domestic revenues. The underlying factors behind a rapid increase in 
expenditures included the resettlement program, food distribution and 
subsidies to the state enterprises and trading agencies, as well as the rising 
costs of development projects resulting from the inflation that was triggered 
by the tight supply situation and the government’s liquidity expansion. 
Meanwhile, the Lao government was lack of the manpower as well as a well-
established system to manage the public finance.  
There were limited sources for domestic revenue. Public savings had 
been declining and the country’s low income and dependence on foreign aids 
had constrained the development of other tax bases, particularly the 
industrial sector. While the financial of state enterprises were too weak to 
pay tax, relatively limited tax revenue was created by agriculture. The 
reduction in foreign trade had reduced tax proceeds from customs duties. 
Substantial improvements in the budgetary situation have been made 
since 1977. The key changes in the state budget since 1977 included an 
increase in the share of expenditures, a shift in expenditures in expenditures 
towards development and the termination of government borrowing from the 
National Bank to finance part of the deficit. In 1985, domestic revenue 
(10,299 million kips) accounted for 50% of total expenditures (20,806 
million kips) and almost all of current expenditures, compared with only 
17% and 45% respectively in 1977, while capital expenditures comprised 
49% of total expenditures in 1985 compared with 33% in 1978 (Table 2.3).  
These improvements were brought about partly by a broadening of the tax 
base, particularly the reform of agricultural taxation and improved financial 
performance of state enterprises, but also by stringent control of budgetary 
expenditures. 
The data in Table 2.3 suggest that the budget expanded very rapidly over 
the period 1977-1985, but these are presented in nominal terms and much of 
the increase reflects price changes, particularly in 1980. No deflators of 
overall categories or subcategories of the budget are available to convert  
these nominal figures into real terms. However, it is possible to form some 
idea of the magnitude of real expenditures and revenues by converting 
revenues and expenditures into dollars at the official exchange rate. On this 
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basis, revenues in nominal dollars rose by 484% from $32 million in 1978 to 
$187 million in 1985 and expenditures rose by 120% from $172 million in 
1978 to $378 million in 1985 (Diagram 2.4). Nonetheless, budget deficit was 
still large, given the low initial level of revenues. 
 
 
Source :  World Bank,  Country Economic Memorandum (various issues).  
Diagram 2.4: Lao PDR’s government revenues and expenditures, 1977-1985 
 
A breakdown of expenditures into current and capital expenditures using 
the same methodology of deflation indicates clearly that the low level of real 
growth of overall expenditures was to a significant reduction in the real  
level of current expenditures, which in nominal dollar terms increased only 
from $115 million to $193 million between 1978 and 1985 (Table 2.4). In 
nominal dollar terms, public sector salaries increased from $31 million in 
1978 to $46 million in 1985. On the other hand, capital expenditures rose in 
nominal dollar terms from $47 million in 1978 to $185 million in 1985 and 
clearly rose in real terms in spite of substantial international inflation during 
the period. The data in Table 2.4 also show the heavy concentration of 
investment in the three ministries covering agriculture, forestry, mining, 
industry, and communications. 
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Table 2.4: Economic classification of government expenditures 
(In US$ million) 
 
Source :  World Bank’s Country Economic Memorandum, various issues.  
 
The improvements in the budgetary position through control of 
expenditures and their restructuring towards development were 
complemented by improvements in revenue generation which rose in parallel 
with expenditures (Diagram 2.4). The key feature of the government’s 
revenue mobilization effort has been the increasing reliance on state 
enterprises as the major vehicle for generating taxes and collecting them 
from the population; between 1978 and 1985, the share of revenue generated 
by state enterprises (tax revenue and transfers) rose from 31% in 1978 to 
80% in 1985. Therefore, the financial performance of the state enterprises, 
which comprised a small share of GDP, had become significant over the 
period for the government in its budget planning and execution. It is worth 
noting that the revenue growth depended on the growth of domestic 
production of rice and electricity and the expansion of imports. The 
government had successfully converted imports into budgetary resources 
either by selling them directly to the population or by selling them after 
processing in state enterprises. With the exception of electricity, exports had 
contributed little to state revenues. 
2.2.3.2 The operation of fiscal policy under market-oriented economic 
system, 1986-2011 
  Fiscal policy has three principal functions that are interrelated. The 
first function is to secure some form of adjustment in the resource allocation. 
This involves minor changes in the resource allocation affected by the 
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Current expenditures 164 115 107 103 47 65 84 118 193
Wages and salaries — 31 31 27 9 8 9 17 46
Materials and supplies — — — 67 33 51 61 98 124
Subsidies and transfers — 50 45 7 3 2 11 0 0
Debt service — 7 5 2 2 3 3 3 23
Capital expenditures 81 57 66 75 43 92 107 122 185
Education — 1 1 2 1 2 3 3 5
Health — 1 1 11 3 7 8 5 11
Agriculture and forestry — 8 20 18 13 27 28 29 28
Industry and commerce — 23 7 4 7 16 26 44 37
Transport, communications, and 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 public works — 19 31 28 17 35 36 36 77
Other — 4 7 11 2 3 6 6 27
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market. The second function is to influence the distribution of income and 
wealth so as to achieve a politically desired distribution. This objective can 
be attained by the mobilization of the tax and transfer system. The third 
function of fiscal policy aims to maintain macroeconomic stability, a high 
level of capacity utilization, and macroeconomic balance. 
  The three main functions of fiscal policy play variant roles according 
to the kind of economic system, the development strategy, and historical and 
political factors. In market economies, most resource allocation is 
determined by the market, as is the distribution of income. While the fiscal 
policy plays a limited role in securing adjustments in the resource allocation 
and income distribution, it  also plays a significant role as a stabilization 
policy with price stability and a high level of employment.  
  Since 1986 Lao PDR has implemented an ambitious reform 
programme in order to transform the Lao economy into a market economy. 
The fiscal reform that accompanied the reform programme in Lao PDR has 
addressed the revenue and expenditure sides of the budget. It comprises 
three key components. The first and most important component is the reform 
of the tax system. The second is the establishment of an allocation and total  
level of public expenditures that should be compatible with the objectives of 
overall reform policy and the magnitude of external assistance to Lao PDR. 
The third component is the reform of the institutional framework and an 
upgrading of administrative capacity and procedures to facilitate the 
implementation of the revised fiscal policy. 
  The first reforms occurred at the end of the 1980s and extended over 
a three-year period, although some small changes occurred in early 1993. 
The main objective was to generate sufficient revenue at the beginning of the 
reform process when the key source of revenue, transfers from public 
enterprises, diminished due to the autonomy provided to state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) and the privatization of some of them, to the price reform, 
and to the tightening of bank credits. To compensate for the losses of 
transfers from public enterprises, the government in 1988 introduced a 
company profit tax with varying rates between economic sectors. In June 
1989, this tax was replaced by a uniform tax rate of 45% on the net profits of 
industrial enterprises in order to avoid the distortions on resource allocation
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Table 2.5: Lao PDR’s real government revenues, 1993-2011 
 
Notes :  # Figures are in fiscal  year, starting from 1 October and ending on 30 September. *include natural resources taxes during 1992–1994.  
Source :  Author’s compilation based on data from ‘Annual Economic Report’  of the Bank of the Lao PDR, various issues.    
 
Description Share of GDP Growth rates Contribution to total revenue growth
1993–1997 1998–2002 2003–2007 2008–2011 1993–1997 1998–2002 2003–2007 2008–2011 1993–1997 1998–2002 2003–2007 2008–2011
Revenue 13.4 11.1 12.1 15.4 5.3 12.2 7.9 11.9 4.2 5.2 40.3 12.1
Non-tax revenue 2.7 2.2 1.9 1.8 0.6 10.9 −2.4 9.8 0.9 1.0 5.8 1.5
Tax revenue 10.6 8.9 10.2 13.6 6.9 12.7 9.9 12.3 3.3 4.2 34.5 10.7
   Profit tax 1.2 1.1 1.4 2.6 14.9 15.6 24.4 11.6 0.3 0.5 5.0 1.9
   Income tax 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 12.3 16.1 4.8 16.2 0.2 0.4 2.2 0.7
   Agricultural/Land tax 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 8.1 15.7 9.9 17.5 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.1
   Turnover tax 2.0 1.8 2.4 2.5 13.0 11.4 11.8 −5.9 0.5 0.9 8.1 2.4
   Excise tax 0.6 1.7 2.0 3.0 34.1 28.8 18.7 12.8 0.1 0.8 7.3 2.4
   Import duties 2.6 1.1 1.5 1.5 4.6 0.5 8.3 8.6 0.7 0.5 4.7 1.2
   Export duties 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.1 13.6 7.0 −13.4 49.9 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.1
Timber royalties 2.4 1.4 0.7 0.2 −3.6 32.7 −15.5 −11.2 1.1 0.6 1.7 0.1
Hydropower royalties 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.0 42.2 −4.7 39.9 0.0 0.1 0.5 0.1
Natural resources taxes 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.7 31.8 31.2 68.1 18.9 0.0 0.0 1.9 0.6
Other taxes* 0.5 0.5 0.7 1.8 5.6 19.2 15.9 74.4 0.2 0.2 2.5 1.1
Grants 4.8 3.5 2.2 4.5 15.2 −2.1 34.1 45.6 2.1 2.3 8.1 3.8
Revenue and grants 18.1 14.7 14.3 19.8 6.3 7.5 9.7 16.0 6.3 7.5 48.4 16.0
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resulted from different sector rates. The first wave served as the foundation 
for the development of the current tax system. 
  The second reform is associated with the tax law of 1995, aiming to 
broaden the tax base in order to finance increased development expenditures. 
The most important changes introduced by the 1995 tax law involved key 
areas: first, the broadening of the turnover tax, that currently covers most 
domestically produced goods and imported goods; second, the reduction and 
the standardization of the profit tax; third, the replacement of specific excise 
duties by ad valorem excise duties; and finally, the increase of income tax 
for the lowest bracket from 2 to 10%. Parallel to the 1995 tax law, trade 
liberalization measures were introduced with a simplification and lowering 
of import duties and the elimination of most export duties. 
  As shown in Table 2.5, the tax reforms have contributed positively to 
the tax revenues, rising from 10.6% of GDP in 1993–1997 to 13.6% of GDP 
in 2008–2011. The average growth rate of the tax revenues over the period 
1993–2011 was recorded about 10.4%, which was much higher than the 6.9% 
tax revenue growth in the initial reform in 1993–1997. While tax revenues 
constitute about 65% of total revenue over the period 1993–1997, grants and 
non-tax revenues account for about 22% and 13%, respectively, of total  
government revenues. Among these three sources of government revenues, 
tax revenues have been increasingly contributing to growth of total public 
revenues, accounting for about half of the growth rate of total public 
revenues in 1993–1997 and more than two-thirds in 2008–2011. 
  The privatization of SOEs in the 1990s and the expansion of 
businesses have resulted in an increase in revenues from turnover and profit 
taxes. Table 2.5 illustrates that over the period 1993–2011, revenues 
generated from turnover tax were averaged about 2.2% of GDP with the 
annual growth of 7.6%, while those from profit tax were about 1.6% with the 
annual growth of 16.6%. Both turnover and profit taxes have played an 
increasingly significant role in raising total government revenues. Their  
combined growth rates contributed to the growth of total public revenues 
about 12.7% in 1993–1997 and 27% in 2008–2011. In addition, revenues 
from excise tax were also significant which recorded about 1.8% of GDP, 
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and performance has been substantially strong relative to those from 
turnover and profit taxes, with growth around 23.6% on average. 
  Tax revenues from the resource sector, namely timber, hydropower, 
and natural resources, accounted for 1.6% of GDP and 9.6% of total public 
revenues (Table 2.5). While revenues from timber royalties have trended 
downward, both hydropower royalties and natural resources taxes have 
shown upward trends. Nonetheless, increased tax revenues from hydropower 
and natural resources were insufficient to compensate for the decreased tax 
revenues from timber. As a result, contribution of the resource sector to the 
growth of total public revenues was only 5.3% in 2008–2011, declining from 
16.7% in 1993–1997.  
Fiscal adjustment in a transition to market economy cannot be carried 
out by relying exclusively on a reform of the tax system. A contraction of 
public expenditure should be associated with the tax reform in order to 
contain fiscal imbalances within manageable limits. Nonetheless, the 
reduction of public expenditures is difficult since some of the adjustment 
costs are taken up by the budget (severance payments, wage increases to 
compensate for the suppression of subsidies, etc.) and also due to resistance 
on the part of those affected by economic restructuring. Such problems 
existed in Lao PDR, where the combined impact of the reform of current and 
capital expenditures on total budget expenditures were relatively small. 
Total public expenditures account for an even greater share of GDP 
(over 20.5%), and its growth has been moderately strong which was around 
9.7% on average (Table 2.6). The bulk of the growth contribution has come 
from current expenditures, which accounts for half of total government 
expenditures and about 10.1% of total GDP, and has grown at over 8.8% on 
average. The share of current expenditures in GDP has grown rapidly, rising 
from 11.4% in 1993–1997 to 12.8% in 2007–2011. The most important 
contributor to the rising current expenditures is the expenditure for wage and 
salaries, which accounts for about 20.2% of total public expenditures and 
4.1% of GDP. It has increasingly contributed to the growth of total public 
expenditures, accounting for about 20.6% of public expenditure growth in 
1993–1997 and 23.2% in 2007–2011. Another is the rising debt payment,  
increasing from 0.8% of GDP in 1993–1997 to 1.8% in 2007–2011. This can
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Table 2.6: Lao PDR’s real government expenditure, 1993-2011 
 
Source :  Author’s compilation based on data from ‘Annual Economic Report’ of the Bank of the Lao PDR, various issues.   
Sector Share of GDP Growth rates Contribution to total expenditure growth
1993–1997 1998–2002 2003–2007 2008–2011 1993–1997 1998–2002 2003–2007 2008–2011 1993–1997 1998–2002 2003–2007 2008–2011
  Current expenditure 11.4 6.4 9.6 12.8 1.4 8.0 14.2 11.7 4.8 2.0 4.9 7.5
     Wages and salaries 5.2 2.5 3.7 5.1 4.7 4.8 12.7 12.7 2.1 0.8 1.7 3.0
     Materials and supplies 3.7 1.6 1.8 2.2 −4.3 4.9 8.2 14.5 1.7 0.5 1.0 1.3
Transfers 1.5 1.2 2.0 2.5 5.0 28.8 4.0 20.8 0.6 0.2 0.8 1.4
     Debt payment 0.8 1.0 1.5 1.8 9.6 22.3 43.4 4.0 0.3 0.5 1.0 1.1
Others 0.2 0.1 0.6 1.2 −14.7 142.2 331.9 7.2 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.7
  Capital and net lending 11.5 12.1 8.7 9.6 24.1 8.5 6.2 18.6 5.4 4.1 4.5 5.6
Total expenditure and net lending 22.9 18.4 18.3 22.5 10.3 6.1 9.4 13.1 10.3 6.1 9.4 13.1
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be one of the great challenges for future development of Lao economy as 
resources have been diverted away from the socio-economic development 
plan. 
Given the constant share of total public expenditures in GDP, the 
rising current expenditures were compensated by the gradual reduction of the 
capital expenditure and net lending. While both current and capital 
expenditures accounted for an equivalent share in total public expenditures 
in 1993, the latter has been dominated by the former since 2003–2007 (Table 
2.6). As of 2008–2011, the capital expenditures and net lending accounted 
for about 43% of total public expenditures and 9.6% of GDP, whereas the 
current expenditures accounted for 57% of total public expenditures and 
12.8% of GDP.    
  Having explained the developments of public revenues and 
expenditures, it is useful to consider the evolution of budget outcome. To do 
so, it  is important to note that the development of budget policy in Lao PDR 
has not been occurring in a vacuum, but by interacting with the 
developments of other macroeconomic variables, namely prices and outputs. 
Therefore, the fiscal balance should not be viewed as the exclusive result of 
fiscal reforms beginning in the late 1980s and some subsequent fiscal 
reforms.  
  A comprehensive fiscal reform of the kind implemented in Lao PDR 
takes a fair time to work through the system. In the short-run, the impact of 
the fiscal policy reform on the budget situation should be much less 
favorable due to the difficulties in controlling public expenditures in at the 
beginning of the transition period. The difficulties in expenditure control 
include severe adjustment problems coupled with the time needed for revised 
tax system. The privatization of the SOEs may also bring about a rapid 
erosion of non-tax revenue. In the long-run, however, improved economic 
conditions and a more effective tax administration should result in a better 
budget outcome (less budget deficit). In other words, the pattern of fiscal 
developments exhibits an inverted J-curve with a fast growing budget deficit 
in the years following the beginning of the reform process, and a slow and 
continuous improvement afterward. 
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Source :  Author’s compilat ion based on data from ‘Annual  Economic Report’ of the 
BOL(various issues).  
Diagram 2.5: Fiscal account in Lao PDR, 1993–2011 (% of GDP) 
 
  This conjecture is partly supported by the fiscal developments in Lao 
PDR, where fiscal transition follows more a U-curve than an inverted J-
curve. The transition period can be divided into three sub-periods. In the 
first years of transition, between 1987 and 1994, the budget situation 
deteriorated dramatically following the introduction of the new tax system 
and the structural reforms. The overall budget deficit (including grants) 
reached 5.9% of GDP in 1994 (Diagram 2.5). The second sub-period 
stretches over the period 1995–1996. Both public expenditures and revenues 
decreased, but former dominated the latter. Therefore, there was minor 
improvement in the budget deficit, falling from 5.9% of GDP in 1994 to 
5.2% in 1996. The third sub-period covers the period 1997–2011. There has 
been a gradual improvement in the budget situation. Similar patterns are also 
true for the budget deficit when grants are excluded.  
  Since the volume of foreign assistance accounts for the large share of 
capital expenditures in Lao PDR, it may be more useful to exclude capital 
expenditures when assessing the impact of fiscal reform on the budget 
deficit. The development of the budget deficit, capital expenditures excluded, 
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is illustrated in Diagram 2.5. To a large extent, it confirms the pattern that  
emerges when concentrating on the overall budget deficit. Following the 
introduction of the new tax system in the late 1980s, the budget balance 
deteriorated rapidly. Since 1994, the budget deficit has steadily improved. 
Over the period 1993–2011, domestic tax and non-tax revenue has covered 
all current expenditures.   
  The institutional changes in the early 1990s coupled with the tax 
reforms and expenditures control beginning in the late 1980s in Lao PDR 
may explain the limited effect of the fiscal reforms on public finance in first 
half of the 1990s. This result emphasizes the role of institutional changes 
needed for the successful fiscal reforms. The slower progress of 
administrative and institutional change in Lao PDR can be due largely to 
political system, the lack of trained officials in the remote areas, and the 
time required to develop such skills.  
2.3 Lao macroeconomic performance  
  To review the Lao macroeconomic performance, I first discussed the 
macroeconomic development of Lao PDR by comparing with countries in the 
region. Second, I reviewed the financial sector development in Lao PDR. 
Finally, I explained the development of CS in Lao PDR. 
2.3.1 Comparative macroeconomic performance in Lao PDR  
 I discussed the macroeconomic development of Lao PDR by 
comparing with two countries, namely Cambodia and Vietnam. These two 
countries represent two polar cases in respect of CS degree. While the CS 
degree is about 25% in Vietnam, it is about 90% in Cambodia.  
  Lao PDR’s GDP growth is relatively slow but quite stable compared 
to Cambodia and Vietnam. Real GDP growth was averaged at 6.8% per 
annum over the period 1995-2010 for Lao PDR, which was lower than that  
for Cambodia (7.31%) and Vietnam (7.73%). However, the Lao economic 
growth was more stable than Cambodia and Vietnam. The standard deviation 
of Lao real GDP growth was 1.14, which was lower than that of Cambodia 
(3.21) and Vietnam (1.37) (Table 2.7).  
 
62 
 
Table 2.7: Growth rates of selected indicators of Lao PDR, Cambodia and 
Vietnam, 1995–2010 
 
Source :  World Bank,  World Development Indicators, 2012.  
  The monetary expansion in Lao PDR has exceeded that in Cambodia 
and Vietnam, with Vietnam experiencing a more stable monetary growth 
than Lao PDR and Cambodia. More precisely, while the narrow money 
growth in Lao PDR is far larger than that of Cambodia and Vietnam, it has a 
lower standard deviation than that in Cambodia. Moreover, the quasi money 
growth in Lao PDR is almost comparable with that of Cambodia and Vietnam, 
but it is widely unstable as indicated by its standard deviation. This suggests 
that the source of monetary instability in Lao PDR can be the quasi money. 
Similarly, with an annual average growth rate of 4.12% in government 
consumption, Lao PDR has shown a significantly greater fiscal discipline 
than Cambodia and Vietnam where government consumption has grown at a 
much faster pace.  
 In view of their different rates of monetary and fiscal expansion, prices 
varied substantially in three countries. With annual average rate of 23.82%, 
Lao economy has proved an extremely high degree of price instability 
compared to that of Cambodia (5.54%) and Vietnam (6.4%). This 
unfavorable outcome in containing inflation in Lao PDR may be attributed 
mainly to its expansionary monetary policy. As is often the case, an 
expansionary monetary policy in Lao PDR has been made necessary for 
financing the chronic budget deficit. Moreover, the growth rate of exports in 
Lao PDR is substantially lower than that of Cambodia and Vietnam, 
suggesting that there is still  much progress to be made to improve export  
sector. Greater openness in trade and investment can stabilize prices by 
Mean Standard 
deviation
Mean Standard 
deviation
Mean Standard 
deviation
Real GDP 6.80 1.14 7.73 3.21 7.31 1.37
Narrow money (M1) 35.76 26.34 28.12 42.74 24.22 13.51
Quasi-money 39.35 31.92 32.88 20.84 36.61 14.92
Government consumption 4.12 14.93 8.95 22.49 6.39 3.87
Inflation 23.82 34.99 5.54 6.67 6.40 5.62
Exports 7.72 13.18 17.52 18.01 15.37 8.76
Exchange rate 22.41 47.45 3.37 7.25 3.42 3.67
Foreign debt 7.03 11.90 5.86 4.94 3.74 16.43
Growth rates of selected 
variables
Laos Cambodia Vietnam
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generating high rate of growth, making fiscal deficits more sustainable, and 
enhancing productivity growth. 
 Table 2.7 also illustrates different patterns in terms of exchange rates 
and external debts. While both the values of Cambodian Riels and the 
Vietnamese Dong against the U.S. dollar have shown to be stable over the 
period, the Lao Kip has fluctuated widely with a downward trend since 2000. 
In fact, the gradual appreciation of Lao Kip against the U.S. dollar since 
2005 has made its imports cheaper, but it has lowered the country’s 
competitiveness, causing a large current account deficit. Steadily rising 
government financing requirement because of rising expenditure coupled 
with a deteriorating current account has implied a considerable resource gap 
in the case of Lao PDR. This has resulted in growing external debt.  
Therefore, it can be concluded that Lao PDR has suffered from serious 
macroeconomic instability over the period 1995–2010. 9  If a successful  
transmission of monetary policy requires macroeconomic stability, then the 
empirical evidence from Lao PDR should also show a negative relationship 
between monetary aggregates and real output in the short-run. Furthermore, 
if the financial markets in Lao PDR are underdeveloped, changes in money 
supply should have no impact on real output and hence the LRN proposition 
of money holds. 
2.3.2 Financial sector development in Lao PDR 
 Effectiveness of macroeconomic policies may depend on the 
magnitude and pattern of financial sector development. Financial sector 
development generally involves three indicators. First, financial deepening, 
which entails growth of financial instruments, manifests itself in an increase 
in the volume of turnover and is typically measured by the ratio of monetary 
aggregates to GDP. Second, financial broadening, which implies an increase 
in the number of financial institutions and financial instruments. Finally, 
financial liberalization, which means deregulation of interest rates, free 
movement of foreign capital, and removal of other restrictive practices. 
                                                     
9  The similar problem seems to exist in the Lao economy over the period 1980–
1994.  
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 Several aspects of financial sector development in Lao PDR, 
particularly relevant to this study, are provided in Table 2.8. As illustrated 
in Table 2.8, there has been a substantial growth in all monetary aggregates 
in Lao PDR over the period 1980–2011. In nominal terms, M1 has the 
highest growth rate, followed by M2, domestic credit and quasi-money. This 
pattern of monetary growth remains unchanged when expressed in real terms. 
The high rate of growth of M1, which consists of currency in circulation and 
demand deposits, is considered vital for economic growth. In contrast, the 
relatively slower rate of growth of quasi-money, which consists of savings 
and time deposits, may have been resulted from high rate of economic 
growth in Lao PDR. Similarly, the high domestic credit growth, which 
includes mainly loans, purchases of non-equity securities, and trade credits, 
may have been fostered by the growing business opportunities in Lao PDR. 
The growth pattern of M2 has followed closely the growth patterns of both 
M1 and quasi-money. 
 The financial sector development is measured by the ratio of money 
supply to GDP. As shown in Table 2.8, the ratio of M1 to GDP has increased 
from 1.51% in 1980 to 10.2% in 2011, representing almost a sevenfold 
increase. The GDP ratio of quasi-money has experienced a fourfold increase, 
while the GDP ratio of domestic credit has experienced a threefold increase 
over the same period. Because of the dominance of the ratio of quasi-money 
to GDP, the GDP ratio of M2 has increased slower than that of M1.     
  Financial liberalization can play a crucial role in financial sector 
development. Since money balances and real assets are complementary, 
McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) have highlighted the significance of 
positive real interest rate and for achieving high rate of economic growth. 
Using annual data from 1990 to 2010, three real interest rates for 12-month 
deposits in Lao PDR have been calculated, namely kip accounts, baht 
accounts, and U.S. dollar accounts. This is a distinguishing feature of the 
Lao economy where accounts for two foreign currencies are allowed.  
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Table 2.8: Financial development indicators for Lao PDR, 1980–2011 
 
Notes :  a  Annual average growth rate. b  Real money supply diagrams have been calculated 
by deflat ing nominal  aggregates by GDP deflator, 2002: 100.  c  Real interest rate diagram s 
have been calculated by subtracting current  inflation from nominal  rates.  Consumer price 
index is used to  calculate inflation rate.  d  Diagrams are diagram s for 1993.  e  Diagrams are 
diagrams for 2010.  
Sources:  IMF’s International Financial  Stat ist ics;  World Bank’s Country Economic 
Memorandum (various issues); Bank of the Lao PDR’s Annual Report  of Interest  Rate 
(various issues);  and World Bank’s World Development Indicators, 2012.  
 As shown in Table 2.8, Lao PDR has experienced a negative interest rate 
as indicated by the negative mean of interest rate for kip account. But the 
negative mean of the kip account’s real interest rate does not reflect its 
actual development as the hyperinflation between 1998 and 1999 resulted in 
a substantially negative real interest rate. Once taking the average over the 
period 1990-2011, the real interest rate for kip deposit is negative. By 
closely examining the data, in real terms the deposit rate denominated in kip 
has been positive since 2001, while the deposit rates for the Thai baht and 
U.S. dollar do not show the exact pattern but mostly positive. By these 
measures, it  is evident that Lao PDR has experienced a significant interest 
rate deregulation and hence financial liberalization. This forms the basis for 
Indicator 1980 1990 2000 2011 1980–2011
Nominal in millions of Kips: (mean growth)a
Narrow money (M1) 157 25,088 344,351 6,473,800 54.64
Quasi-money 611 19,251 1,911,252 16,615,400 44.16
Broad money (M2) 768 44,339 2,255,603 23,089,200 46.74
Domestic credit 899 30,620 1,230,170 16,125,200 45.88
Real in millions of Kipsb
Narrow money (M1) 770 3,425 4,216 34,761 21.01
Quasi-money 2,995 2,628 23,400 89,217 15.24
Broad money (M2) 3,765 6,052 27,615 123,978 16.15
Domestic credit 4,407 4,180 15,061 86,585 18.94
Money/GDP ratio mean: 1980–2011
M1/GDP 1.51 3.90 2.67 10.20 4.11
Quasi-money/GDP 5.88 2.99 14.80 26.19 10.61
M2/GDP 7.39 6.89 17.46 36.39 14.73
Domestic credit/GDP 8.65 4.76 9.52 25.42 9.72
Real 12-month deposit ratesc mean: 1993–2010
Kip accounts 11.23d − 23.09 3.26e − 8.03
Baht accounts 4.88d 2.31 − 0.14e 0.76
U.S. dollar accounts 2.32d 0.52 1.51e 0.89
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assuming that the positive real interest rate has contributed to a high rate of 
economic growth in Lao PDR. That is, positive real interest rate has boosted 
domestic saving which increases the availability of investable funds.  
  However, the domestic saving in Lao PDR, measured by the GDP 
ratio of quasi-money, is relatively low, which is about 10.61% (Table 2.8). 
Therefore, either raising deposit rate or bringing down inflation rate or some 
combination of the two can improve the growth rate of the Lao economy.   
2.3.2.1 Stock market development in Lao PDR 
The Lao stock market, officially called Lao Securities Exchange 
(LSX), is not large enough to be a significant source of funds to finance 
firm-level activities. Firms borrow funds and/or sell equities in the stock 
market to finance their investment activities, which in turn promotes growth. 
Some of the empirical papers implying a positive link between growth 
performance and stock market development are (Beck and Levine 2004; 
Levine and Zervos 1996). The level of stock market development is 
measured by four indicators, namely total listed domestic companies, stock 
market capitalization, total value of stocks traded, and turnover ratio of 
stocks traded. Listed domestic companies are the domestically incorporated 
companies listed on the country's stock exchanges at the end of the year. 
Market capitalization (also known as market value) is the share price times 
the number of shares outstanding. Stocks traded refer to the total value of 
shares traded during the period. Turnover ratio is the total value of shares 
traded during the period divided by the average market capitalization for the 
period. According to these indicators, the level of LSX development is low 
in comparison with other ASEAN countries (Table 2.9). 
In 2012, there were only two companies listed on the LSX, including Banque 
Pour Le Commerce Exterieur Lao Public (BCEL) and EDL Generation Public 
Company (EDL-Gen). The number of listed domestic companies in Lao PDR 
is far lower than other ASEAN countries, ranging from 268 companies in the 
Philippines to 502 companies in Thailand and to 921 companies in Malaysia. 
The ratio of market capitalization to GDP of LSX is 11%, which is 
comparatively low in ASEAN. The ratio of market capitalization to GDP is 
21% in Vietnam, 105% in Thailand, and 156% in Malaysia. The total value 
of stock traded, which measures the market depth in terms of its liquidity or 
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the easiness to buy and sell shares, is only 0.17% in Lao PDR, while it is 2% 
in Vietnam, 41% in Malaysia, and 63% in Thailand. The turnover ratio of 
stocks traded is only 1.5% in Lao PDR, whereas it is 13% in Vietnam, 43% 
in Singapore, and 70% in Thailand.  
 
Table 2.9 Indicators of stock market development in Lao PDR and other 
ASEAN countries, 2012 
 
Source :  Lao data were collected from the annual report of Lao Securi ties Exchange. Data 
for other ASEAN countries were obtained from the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators.   
There are two main reasons for the low level of stock market development in 
Lao PDR. First, the LSX has been recently established on 10 t h October 2010. 
In 2012, it has only two brokers, namely Lanexang Securities Public 
Company and BCEL -KT Securities Company Limited. Second, there are few 
large enterprises that are qualified for participating in the LSX. According to 
enterprise survey in GIZ (2014), there are only 27 large enterprises 10 ,  
accounting for 4% of total surveyed enterprises.     
2.3.3 Currency substitution in Lao PDR 
In Lao PDR, people widely use two main foreign currencies, namely 
Thai baht and the US dollar, as a means of payment, a unit of account, and a 
store of value. Although both baht and dollar are not legal tender, in reality, 
residents can use both of them in economic transactions. In urban areas, for 
example, price of goods and services are often quoted either in the US dollar 
                                                     
10 Large enterprises are enterprises that employ at 100 staff.  
Country Listed domestic 
companies, total
Market capitalization (% 
of GDP)
Stocks traded, total 
value (% of GDP)
Stocks traded, 
turnover ratio (%)
Lao PDR 2 11.19 0.17 1.52
Vietnam 311 21.14 2.17 13.18
Indonesia 459 45.26 10.46 23.30
Thailand 502 104.65 62.70 70.44
Philippines 268 105.58 13.87 16.15
Singapore 472 144.34 54.53 43.31
Malaysia 921 156.16 40.81 28.57
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or Thai baht, and transactions are also carried out in both currencies, since 
consumers do not want to pay in kip, especially for high-value items.  
 
Table 2.10: Private savings deposits at banks denominated by currency in 
2003–2004 
(In percent) 
 
Source :  Toyoda and Kyophilavong (2005, p.162).  
 
Table 2.10 shows the deposits at banks denominated in three 
currencies, including, kip, dollar, and baht, for urban and rural Lao PDR. 
Deposits denominated in foreign currencies (the US dollar and Thai baht) 
accounted for almost 90% in local cities and almost all deposits in the 
capital city. Deposits at the state banks were mostly denominated in the US 
dollar accounting for 60% in local cities and 66% in the capital city, whereas 
deposits at the foreign banks in Lao PDR were denominated in the US dollar 
about 44% in local cities and about 35% in the capital city. About 96% of 
the deposits at foreign banks outside Lao PDR were denominated in the US 
dollar. Among the three banking institutions, deposits in Thai baht were 
larger than those in Lao kip but smaller than those in the US dollar, with the 
exception of deposits in Thai baht (59%) of urban people at foreign banks in 
Lao PDR, which were larger than those in the US dollar (35%). Deposits in 
Lao kip were lower than those in the US dollar and Thai baht, with the 
exception of deposits in Lao kip (43%) of rural people at foreign banks in 
Lao PDR, which were almost proportional to those in the US dollar (44%) 
and much higher than those in Thai baht (13%). All in all, Lao PDR’s private 
savings deposits at banks were mostly denominated by the US dollar,  
followed by Thai baht and Lao kip. 
 
Local cities Capital Local cities Capital Local cities Capital Local cities Capital
US dollar 60.31 65.63 44.16 34.65 0.00 96.27 59.16 83.02
Baht 30.52 20.54 13.06 59.05 0.00 3.69 29.28 14.45
Kip 9.17 13.83 42.77 6.30 0.00 0.04 11.56 2.52
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Currency State banks  Foreign banks in Laos  Foreign banks outside Laos Total
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Table 2.11: Currency substitution, exchange rate and interest rate in Lao 
PDR 
 
Notes :  a  Currency substi tution = foreign currency deposits  in  commercial  banks over 
money supply (M2). b  Number of units  of local currency (kip) per one US dollar.  c  Interest  
rate differential = interest rate on kip − interest rate on the US dollar. d  Average of the 
first half of 2012.  
Source :  Quarterly Lao Financial Statist ics published by Bank of  Lao PDR. 
 
 
In the Lao economy, there are two main causes of CS, which include 
high inflation (Zamarocksy and Sa, 2003) and exchange rate depreciation 
(Ra, 2008). CS reached its peak of 78% in 1999 which was the highest 
inflation period in Lao PDR (Table 2.11). However, Lao PDR has managed 
to achieve a significant reduction in CS over the past 12 years, when the 
share of FCD in M2 fell from 78% in 2000 to 46% in 2012. While this 
downward trend has slowed recently, with the interruption associated with 
the global financial crisis, the CS level remains well below that prevailing as 
of 2000. This tendency to reduce the CS degree represents an increasing 
preference for holding the national currency, which may be linked to the 
Year Currency substitutiona   Interest ratec
level % change
1993 0.35 728.04 −0.78 12.23
1994 0.35 726.31 −0.24 9.68
1995 0.37 849.89 17.01 10.95
1996 0.42 951.64 11.97 12.93
1997 0.47 1,350.15 41.88 13.00
1998 0.65 3,547.80 162.77 14.52
1999 0.78 7,769.39 118.99 15.91
2000 0.78 8,021.60 3.25 16.11
2001 0.75 9,004.42 12.25 13.86
2002 0.74 10,166.08 12.90 13.86
2003 0.67 10,649.84 4.76 13.76
2004 0.63 10,675.13 0.24 12.25
2005 0.60 10,690.06 0.14 10.45
2006 0.59 10,168.69 −4.88 8.78
2007 0.57 9,613.07 −5.46 8.12
2008 0.54 8,762.67 −8.85 7.76
2009 0.48 8,522.86 −2.74 6.54
2010 0.46 8,265.38 −3.02 5.97
2011 0.46 8,036.53 −2.77 5.28
2012d 0.46 8,007.61 −0.36 4.96
Exchange rateb
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improved confidence that comes with the elimination of high inflation and 
the implementation of sounder economic and financial policies. 
In particular, following the more liberalized interest rate and more 
flexible exchange rate management in 1998 and the implementation of tight  
monetary and fiscal policies, CS started to reverse in 2001 and continued to 
decline. This reversal of CS was influenced by a large interest rate 
differential between Lao kip and US dollar denominated deposits, which 
reached more than 16% in 2000. Reverse CS continued even after the 
narrowing of the interest differential during the period 2003–2012. This 
period observed significant fiscal adjustment, stability of the exchange rate, 
large capital inflows, and improvement in investor sentiment. 
In summary, the CS degree in Lao PDR has gradually decreased, but 
it is still  much higher than the average degree of CS in other economies with 
CS (Honohan, 2007, p. 4). The persistence of CS degree in Lao PDR has 
important implications for the conduct of macroeconomic policies which are 
discussed in the following chapters.  
 
  
71 
 
Chapter 3 Currency Substitution, Neutrality of Money, and 
Effectiveness of Macroeconomic Policies 
  
In this chapter, I review the theoretical literature that focuses on 
macroeconomic adjustments in economies with CS under three main 
macroeconomic theories: determinants of CS, long-run neutrality proposition, 
and effectiveness of macroeconomic policies in the presence of CS. This 
chapter also discusses some empirical literature related to each theory. The 
chapter consists of three sections. In the first section, the money demand 
function for analyzing CS determinants is discussed. Empirical studies on 
CS in Asia, Latin America, and Africa are also reviewed in the first section. 
The second section consists of a theoretical framework for testing LRN 
proposition based on Lucas-Sargent critique, and discusses empirical studies 
of testing LRN proposition using data from developed and developing 
countries. The third section presents a theoretical framework for assessing 
the effectiveness of macroeconomic policies, and discusses the effectiveness 
of macroeconomic policies under different exchange rate arrangements in 
terms of output and price. 
3.1 Macroeconomic determinants of currency substitution 
3.1.1 Theoretical framework of money demand function 
The growth in CS in a number of countries has been associated with 
increasing awareness of the resulting implications for economic and 
financial policy management. The analyses of CS determinants have been 
undertaken in a number of theoretical frameworks, including those based on 
the marginal utility theory of money demand (Bordo and Choudhri, 1982; 
and Rojas-Suarez, 1992), on the portfolio balance approach (Brillembourg 
and Shadier, 1979), on the theory of the precautionary demand for cash 
balances (Poloz, 1986), and on the money services production function 
approach (Miles, 1978). 
These analyses suggest that the main determinants of CS are actual or 
expected reductions in the value of domestic money holdings occasioned by 
increased domestic inflationary pressures, expectations of exchange rate 
depreciations, and lower interest rates on local currency holdings. By 
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altering the relative yield to holdings of foreign currency denominated 
money balances, and therefore their attractiveness as a store of value, these 
factors induce a change in the pace of CS. This process may be further 
affected by uncertainties regarding socio-political developments, as well as 
those relating to agents’ expenditure patterns. 
Following Rojas-Suarez (1992), we introduce the model for CS which 
assumes that there are two kinds of goods in an economy: tradable (with 
price P) and non-tradable goods (with foreign price P*). Let ߝ  denote the 
nominal exchange rate. Assume the price of foreign goods is equal to one, so 
that the real exchange rate can be written as ߝ/ܲ.  Assume also that money is 
the only form of wealth. Domestic residents may allocate their portfolio 
holdings between domestic money and foreign money. Foreign money is 
assumed to be an imperfect substitute for domestic money. 
The representative agent is assumed to maximize the following value 
function: 
 
 { }),,,(),(),,,( 1111 +++++= ttttTtHttttttt PFMVCCUMaxEPFMV ebe           (3.1) 
 
where:  ܥ௧ு  consumption of non-tradable goods. ܥ௧்   consumption of tradable goods. ܯ௧  stock of domestic currency at the beginning of period t . That is, ܯ௧ = ܯ௧ିଵ + ߬௧ , where ߬௧   is a transfer of domestic currency 
given by the government at the beginning of period t .  ܨ௧  stock of foreign currency. ߚ  discount rate. ܧ௧  expectation operator. 
 
On the right-hand side of equation (3.1), there are two terms: ௧ܷ(ܥ௧ு,ܥ௧் ) 
and ߚܸ(ܯ௧ାଵ,ܨ௧ାଵ, ௧ܲାଵ, ߝ௧ାଵ). ௧ܷ(ܥ௧ு ,ܥ௧் ) represents the utility from consuming 
non-tradable goods ( ܥ௧ு ) and tradable goods ( ܥ௧் ) in year t . ߚܸ(ܯ௧ାଵ,ܨ௧ାଵ, ௧ܲାଵ, ߝ௧ାଵ) represents the discounted value function of portfolio 
allocation for domestic and foreign monies in year t+1. Taken the two terms 
together, equation (3.1) states that the representative agent considers not 
only the utility from consuming goods this year, but also future plan for 
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holding domestic and foreign currencies next year, when it allocates a 
portfolio between holdings of domestic currency and foreign currency this 
year. 
The representative agent starts every period with a predetermined stock 
of domestic and foreign currencies. At the beginning of every period, it  
receives a transfer from the government in the form of domestic currency 
(߬௧). During the period, the agent engages in the production of tradable and 
nontradable goods and has to decide on its consumption plan of both 
commodities and on its demand for domestic and foreign currencies. Thus, 
the representative agent faces the following budget constraint: 
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where: ߨ௧  inflation rate of the non-tradable goods. ݔ௧  rate of change of the exchange rate. ௧ܻ  total real income derived from the production of non-tradable 
goods ( ௧ܻு ) and tradable goods ( ௧்ܻ ). Mathematically, ௧ܻ  is  
defined as: ௧ܻ = ௧ܻு + ቀఌ೟௉೟ቁ ௧்ܻ .  
Equation (3.2) states that total wealth must equal total expenditure. 
Total wealth consists of three sources which are represented by the left-hand 
side of equation (3.2). The first source is income from production of tradable 
and non-tradable goods ( ௧ܻ). The second source of wealth is the real stock of 
domestic currency held by the agent last year ÷÷ø
ö
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. The third source of 
wealth is the real stock of foreign currency held by the agent last year  
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1 .  Total expenditure contains three main components. The 
component of expenditure is consumption of nontradable and tradable goods 
( ܥ௧ு  and ܥ௧் ,  respectively). The second component is the demand for real 
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stock of domestic currency this year (ெ೟௉೟ ). The third component is the demand 
for real stock of foreign currency this year (ఌ೟ி೟௉೟ ). 
In addition, the representative agent faces a liquidity in-advance 
constraint of the form: 
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Equation (3.3) states that the consumption value of non-tradable and 
tradable goods must not exceed the total stock of domestic and foreign 
currencies. Equation (3.3) follows Calvo and Vegh (1992), where ݈(. )  is  
liquidity services production function and assumed to be a linear 
homogenous function where the marginal productivities of real domestic and 
foreign currencies (݈ଵ and ݈ଶ) are positive and diminishing. We also assume 
that డ௟భడቀഄಷು ቁ < 0  to ensure that domestic and foreign currencies are imperfect 
substitutes.  
Maximizing equation (3.1) subject to equations (3.2) and (3.3), where ߣ௧  denotes the Lagrange multiplier for budget constraint and ߛ௧  denotes the 
Kuhn-Tucker multiplier for the liquidity-in-advance constraint, first-order 
conditions yield the following equations: 
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where (.) is the argument of the value function evaluated at year t .  
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The ratio of equations (3.4) and (3.5) yields the marginal rate of 
substitution between tradable and non-tradable goods and equals the real 
exchange rate. Equations (3.6) and (3.7) show that the marginal value of 
holding an additional unit of currency into period t  + 1 is equal to its 
marginal cost, which is ఒ೟௉೟ for domestic currency and ఒ೟ఌ೟௉೟  for foreign currency. 
The ratio of equations (3.6) and (3.7) in the steady state, where ݔ௧ = ߨ௧,  can 
be expressed as follows: 
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Since the function ݈(. ) is homogenous of degree one, equation (3.8) 
implies that 
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Equation (3.9) shows that, in the steady state, the rate of change of 
the exchange rate is negatively related to the ratio of holdings of domestic to 
foreign currency (expressed in terms of domestic currency). In chapter 4, we 
deal with extensions, measurements, and implications of this result for the 
Lao economy. 
3.1.2 Empirical determinants of currency substitution 
Existing literature consider the CS in the framework of demand for 
money. Within this framework, there are a number of simplifying 
assumptions. In particular, it  is assumed that the scale variables in the two 
underlying money demand functions are similar and therefore play no role in 
determining the demand for local balances relative to that for foreign 
balances. In addition, it is assumed that both the transaction costs involved 
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in maintaining and switching between local and foreign balances and the 
overall level of monetization remain broadly unchanged throughout the 
estimation period. Using the framework of money demand, there are several 
studies that have examined the determinants of CS in a number of dollarized 
economies, including Latin American countries (Prock et al., 2003), Egypt 
and South African countries (Elkhafif, 2003), Peru (Rojas-Suarez, 1992), 
Kyrkyz Republic (Mogardini and Mueller, 1999), Thailand (Bahmani-
Oskooee and Techaratanachai, 2001), Turkey (Us, 2003), and Cambodia 
(Samreth, 2011). 
Rojas-Suarez (1992) analysed the process of CS and its implications 
for the conduct of monetary policy in Peru from January 1978 to December 
1990. Applying an error-correction model, the author showed that there is a 
long-run relationship between the expected rate of depreciation in the 
parallel exchange rate and the ratio of domestic money to foreign money. 
This implies that the hypothesis of CS can explain the behavior of real 
holdings of money. Applying VAR model the author also tested for the 
impact of CS on inflation. The results demonstrated that the importance of 
CS as a transmission mechanism through which fiscal and monetary policies 
affected the dynamics of inflation was relatively small during a period of 
high but relatively stable inflation, while it because an important factor in 
the inflation process during a period of hyperinflation. 
Prock et al. (2003) investigated the extent of currency substitution in 
Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico using monthly data from October 1986 to 
June 2001. In their analysis, a dependent variable is real money supply (M1) 
which is money supply deflated by CPI. A set of independent variables 
include interest rate on alternative assets of each countries as measured by 
the money market rate less the expected inflation rate, nominal effective 
exchange rate of each country as defined by the number of units of foreign 
currency per unit of the home currency, the productivity as measured by 
monthly percent change in manufacturing output and deflated by the CPI to 
proxy real income. 
Applying a vector error correction (VEC) model for each country, 
they found that Argentina has the highest magnitude of exchange rate 
coefficients at all lags among the sample, whereas Mexico appears to have 
the lowest. The lags of money supply appear to be significant only for 
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Argentina and Brazil for which the magnitudes of the M1 lags are highest in 
absolute value. Moreover, the results from the impulse response functions 
showed that the impact of the exchange rate on M1 for Argentina is greater 
than Brazil and Mexico, the latter being the least impacted. Furthermore, the 
M1 response to exchange rate for Argentina is quicker and last longer than 
that for Brazil and Mexico. The productivity stock to M1 is similar for both 
to Argentina and Brazil exhibiting positive and significant responses. 
Therefore, the authors conclude that CS occurs more in Argentina and Brazil 
than Mexico.  
In light of the empirical results, they concluded that the greater the 
degree of currency substitution, the more sensitive is a country’s monetary 
aggregates to sudden movements in exchange rates, productivity and interest 
rates. It indicate that the country that wish to adopt another country’s 
currency as a domestic currency needs to implement structural reforms to 
bring their economy in line with the anchor currency country. Such reforms 
would then lead to endogenous adjustments of key economic indicators such 
as: inflation rate, exchange rate, and interest rates to the level that are more 
consistent with dollarization as well as high sustainable growth. 
Bahmani-Oshooee and Techaratanachai (2001) determined the 
relationship between currency depreciation and domestic money holding in 
Thailand using quarterly data from 1977 to 1990. In their analysis a 
dependent variable is the real money stock (M2). A set of independent 
variables include real income, interest rate on alternative assets which is 
proxied by money market rate, and the nominal effective exchange rate 
defined as units of foreign currency per unit of the Thai baht. Applying 
cointegration analysis, they found that income and interest rate elasticities 
are positive and negative respectively. But the nominal effective exchange 
rate carries a positive coefficient indicating that as the Thai baht depreciates, 
public holding of M2 declines. It supported their argument that devaluation 
in Thailand may result in CS away from domestic money. It in turn could 
result in a slowdown in economic activity, thus, a recession. In light of the 
empirical results, the authors argued that macro policies in Thailand must 
aim at not only stabilizing the economy, but also at stabilizing the exchange 
rate value of the Thai baht. 
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Mongardini and Mueller (1999) analysed the determinants that driven 
the CS process in the Kyrgyz Republic using monthly data from May 1993 to 
October 1998. In the analysis, a dependent variable is the degree of CS 
which is defined in two different ways. The first measure is defined as the 
ratio of foreign currency deposits to total deposits in the Kyrgyz banking 
system. The second measure is defined by the ratio of foreign currency 
deposits and cash to broad money. A set of independent variables include 
interest rate differential between the average monthly yield on three-month 
Kyrgyz GKO (treasury bills) and the average monthly yield on three-month 
U.S treasury bills, nominal depreciation of the exchange rate, and the ratchet 
effect defined as the maximum level of the CS ratio. 
Applying the error-correction model, they found that the depreciation 
of the som has been a significant factor in increasing the CS ratio, 
particularly among deposits. Secondly, interest rate differentials have also 
been shown to be a significant determinant in the portfolio allocation of the 
private sector in the Kyrgyz Republic. Moreover, while there may be a 
ratchet effect in the currency allocation of deposits, this effect is not 
detectable in the economy at large. This implied that the economy as a whole 
has not yet reached a degree of CS that would make the process asymmetric 
and difficult to reverse, suggesting that policy measures may still  have a 
strong impact on the portfolio decisions of the private sector. As a result, 
they concluded that particularly strong policies would need to be pursued 
over an extended period of time so as to convince deposit holders to switch 
back to som-denominated assets. 
Elkhafif (2003) investigated the dynamic of CS in Egypt and South 
Africa using monthly data from July 1991 to July 2001. In their analysis, a 
dependent variable is CS defined as the share of nominal foreign currency in 
money supply (M2). A set of independent variable include exchange rate, 
and interest rate differential. Applying the error-correction model, they 
found that the elasticity of CS, with respect to exchange rate, is larger in 
South Africa than in Egypt, and the speed of adjustment from the short-term 
to long-term equilibrium is much faster in south Africa than in Egypt. In 
Egypt, changes in the exchange rate have significant impact on CS. The 
coefficient of the exchange rate suggests a short-term elasticity of 0.14, 
meaning that a 10% depreciation in Egyptian pound will lead to a 1.4% 
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increase in CS. The dynamic of the model implies a very slow adjustment 
process. The sum of the coefficients of the lagged dependent variable means 
that only 2% of the discrepancy between desired and actual holdings of 
foreign currencies is eliminated within one month, and the long-term desired 
holding of foreign currencies in response to a change in exchange rate will  
approaches its level in about 4 years.  
Furthermore, Elkhafif (2003) showed that CS in South Africa is more 
responsive to changes in exchange rates than that in Egypt. The coefficient 
of exchange rate suggests a short-term elasticity of CD with respect to the 
exchange rate of 0.32. This means that a 10% depreciation in the South 
Africa rand will result in a 3.2% increase in CS. This elasticity is 2.3 times 
that of Egypt. The adjustment process is also 5 times faster than that of 
Egypt. The sum of the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable suggests 
that the discrepancy between the desired and actual holding of foreign 
currencies is reduced by 9.7% within one month, or the long-run equilibrium 
approaches its level in about 10 months.  
Using the Granger causality tests, Elkhafif (2003) found that, in both 
Egypt and South Africa, changes in exchange rate lead to changes in CS. 
However, the causality between the exchange rate and interest rate 
differential breaks under the exchange rate anchoring policy (Egypt). 
Consequently, the author suggested that in a high CS environment, exchange 
rate anchoring policy can be effective in reversing the CS. The cost of this 
policy could take the form of a reduction in the reveres of the central bank 
and additional burden to public expenditure. As for inflation targeting policy, 
the evidence suggests that it can be effective in achieving its target in a low 
CS environment. The cost in this case could take the form of a high domestic 
interest rate and/or increase in CS. With a substantial increase in CS, the 
central bank may find itself forced to abandon inflation targeting and 
probably switch to exchange rate anchoring policy. However, under either 
policy, if the depreciation pressure on the domestic currency sources from 
chronic current account difficulties, either policy will be costly and 
ineffective. The long-term solution is to improve the productivity and 
competitiveness of the economy, which will ultimately reduce the pressure 
on the domestic currency from depreciation and bring the required stability 
to the economy. 
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Us (2003) analysed the persistence of CS at different level in Turkey 
through inclusion of a ratchet variable using monthly data for two subsample 
periods: 1990-1993 and 1995-1999. Applying an autoregressive distributed 
lag (ARDL) approach, the author found that, in the first period, for both 
levels of CS, the inclusion of the ratchet variable into the model produces 
insignificant coefficients. This suggests that in the first period, CS is not 
persistent enough to be irreversible. However, in the second period, even 
though CS in the narrow sense is persistent, CS in the broad sense is not 
irreversible. The empirical evidence showed that although there may be a 
ratchet effect in the narrow sense CS, this effect is not detectable in the 
overall economy. That is, the portfolio allocation preferences of domestic 
residents are not persistent. The monetary authorities can therefore conduct 
effective policies to induce reversal in the narrow sense of CS.  
Ra (2008) examined whether the holding of US dollars depend on the 
effect of the expected rate of depreciation in market exchange rates using 
monthly data from the three South East Asian countries, Cambodia, Lao, and 
Vietnam, covering the period of December 1994 to June 2007, December 
1993 to June 2007, and December 1992 to January 2007 (for Vietnam, data 
of January 1994 to December 1994 and July 1999 to November 2000 are 
omitted because the data are not available), respectively. Ra (2008) 
formulated the CS model using the ratio of foreign currency deposits to 
domestic money as a dependent variable. There are two definition of 
domestic money used in the estimation, namely M1 and M2. M1 is composed 
of domestic currency held outside banks and demand deposits. M2 consists 
of M1 plus quasi-money, which includes time and saving deposits plus 
foreign currency deposits (in terms of domestic currency). The independent 
variables include the expected rate of change of the exchange rate which is 
proxied by the actual change of the exchange rate.  
Applying the Rojas-Suarez (1992) method, Ra (2008) found that 
firstly, the expected rate of depreciation of the exchange rate significantly 
impacts on the desired ratio of foreign to domestic currency in Cambodia 
and Lao PDR. For Cambodia, the coefficient of the expected rate of 
depreciation is statistically significant at the 1% significant level for all 
cases; for Lao PDR, the coefficient is statistically significant at the 1% or 
5% significance level. Secondly, Cambodia seems to have stronger tendency 
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toward CS compared to Lao PDR and Vietnam. Foreign currency holdings in 
Cambodia have never been prohibited during the period under study whereas 
in Vietnam, the government has banned the use of foreign currencies. Third, 
the coefficient of the expected rate of depreciation in the past have also 
positive value and are statistically significant, implying that the desired 
composition of portfolio balance by economic agents is also significantly 
influenced by the exchange rate movement in the previous month for 
Cambodia and to Lao PDR. In other words, the dynamic adjustment process 
by domestic residents under the presence of CS in response to the previous 
month’s exchange rate changes seem to be affected by the past exchange rate 
movement.  
Ra (2008) suggested that, there are positive effects of the expected 
rate of depreciation in market exchange rates on holdings of US dollars. The 
results suggest strong evidence of CS in Cambodia, explaining the short-run 
behavior of domestic residents in substituting Cambodia riel in favor of US 
dollars. This suggests that changes in the expected rates of depreciation of 
riels have a significant impact on the composition of the US dollar holdings 
by an economic agent.  
In chapter 4, I examined the extent to which the variables included in 
previous studies explain the variation in the CS for Lao PDR and analysed 
whether these variables have a different impact on the CS in Laos. 
3.2 Long-run monetary neutrality proposition in Lao PDR 
3.2.1 Theoretical framework of long-run monetary neutrality  
Key classical macroeconomic hypotheses specify that permanent 
changes in nominal variables have no effect on real economic variables in 
the long-run. The simplest “long-run neutrality” proposition specifies that a 
permanent change in the money stock has no long-run consequences for the 
level of real output. Other classical hypotheses specify that a permanent 
change in the rate of inflation has no long-run effect on unemployment (a 
vertical long-run Phillips curve) or real interest rates (the long-run Fisher 
relation). In this dissertation, I focus on the long-run neutrality proposition. 
Testing LRN proposition is still a controversial issue. For example, 
Lucas (1972) and Sargent (1971) provided examples in which it is 
82 
 
impossible to test long-run neutrality using reduced-form econometric 
methods. Their examples feature rational expectations together with short-
run non-neutrality and exogenous variables that follow stationary processes 
so that the data generated by these models do not contain the sustained 
changes necessary to directly test long-run neutrality. In the context of these 
models, Lucas and Sargent argued that it was necessary to construct fully 
articulated behavioural models to test the neutrality propositions.  
The specific critique offered by Lucas and Sargent depends critically 
on stationarity of variables used for testing the long-run neutrality 
proposition. In models in which nominal variables follow integrated 
variables processes, long-run neutrality can be defined and tested without 
complete knowledge of the behavioural model. But, even when variables are 
integrated, long-run neutrality cannot be tested using a reduced-form model.  
Instead, what is required is the model’s “final form,” showing the dynamic 
response of the variables to underlying structural disturbances.11 
According to King and Watson (1997), the Lucas-Sargent critique can 
be formulated as follows. Consider a model consisting of an aggregate 
supply schedule (3.10a); a monetary equilibrium condition (3.10b); and a 
money supply rule (3.10c): 
 ݕ௧ = ߠ(݌௧ − ܧ௧ିଵ݌௧)        (3.10a) ݌௧ = ݉௧ − ߜݕ௧         (3.10b) ݉௧ = ߩ݉௧ିଵ + ߝ௧௠        (3.10c) 
 
where 
                                                     
11  Throughout this dissertation, by “structural model” we mean a simultaneous equations  
model in  which each endogenous variable is  expressed as a function of the other 
endogenous variables, exogenous variables, lags of the variables, and disturbances that  
have structural interpretat ion. By “reduced-form model” we mean a set of regression 
equations in which each endogenous variable is expressed as a function of lagged  
dependent variables and exogenous variables. By “final-form model” we mean a set of  
equations in  which the endogenous variables are expressed as a function of current  and 
lagged values of shocks and exogenous variables in the model.  
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ݕ௧  logarithm of output. ݌௧  logarithm of the price level. ܧ௧ିଵ݌௧  expectation of ݌௧ formed at ݐ − 1.  ݉௧  logarithm of the money stock. ߝ௧௠  mean-zero serially independent shock to money.  
To solve for output from the system (1), we first substitute equation 
(3.10b) into equation (3.10a): 
 ݕ௧ = ߠ[(݉௧ − ߜݕ௧) − ܧ௧ିଵ(݉௧ − ߜݕ௧)] ݕ௧ = ߠ(݉௧ − ߜݕ௧ − ܧ௧ିଵ݉௧ + ߜܧ௧ିଵݕ௧) 
 
Since ܧ௧ିଵݕ௧ = ܧ௧ିଵ[ߠ(݌௧ − ܧ௧ିଵ݌௧)] = ߠ(ܧ௧ିଵ݌௧ − ܧ௧ିଵ݌௧) = 0,  we have  
 ݕ௧ = ߨ(݉௧ − ܧ௧ିଵ݉௧)     (3.11) 
 
where ߨ = ߠ/(1 + ߜߠ) 
Substitute equation (3.10c) into equation (3.11), we have  
               ݕ௧ = ߨ(݉௧ − ߩ݉௧ିଵ) 
               = ߨ(1 − ߩܮ)݉௧ 
     = ߙ(ܮ)݉௧       (3.12) 
 
where ߙ(ܮ) = ߨ(1 − ߩܮ) = ߙ଴ + ߙଵܮ. 
As in Lucas (1973), the model is constructed so that only surprises in 
the money stock are not neutral and these have temporary real effects. 
Permanent changes in money have no long-run effect on output. However, 
the reduced form equation ݕ௧ = ߙ(ܮ)݉௧  suggests that a one-unit permanent 
increase in money will increase output by ߙ଴ + ߙଵ = ߙ(1) = ߨ(1 − ߩ) .  
Moreover, as noted by McCallum (1984), the reduced form also implies that 
there is a long-run correlation between money and output, as measured by 
the spectral density matrix of the variables at frequency zero. 
On this basis, Lucas (1972), Sargent (1971), and McCallum (1984) 
argue that a valid test of long-run neutrality can only be conducted by 
determining the structure of monetary policy (ߩ) and its interaction with the 
short-run response to monetary shocks ( ߨ ), which depends on the 
behavioural relations in the model (ߜand ߠ). While this is easy enough to 
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determine in this simple setting, it is much more difficult in richer dynamic 
models or in models with a more sophisticated specification of monetary 
policy. 
However, if ߩ = 1 , there is a straightforward test of the long-run 
neutrality proposition in this simple model. Adding and subtracting ߩ݉௧ from 
the right-hand side of equation (3.12) yields 
 ݕ௧ = ߨߩ∆݉௧ + (1 − ߩ)݉௧    (3.12’) 
 
so that with ߩ = 1, there is a zero effect of the level of money under the 
neutrality restriction. As a result, one can simply examine whether the 
coefficient on the level of money is zero when ݉௧ is included in a bivariate 
regression that also involves ∆݉௧ as a regressor. 
With permanent variations in the money stock, the reduced form of 
this simple model has two key properties: (i) the coefficient on ݉௧ 
corresponds to the experiment of permanently changing the level of the 
money stock; and (ii) the coefficient on ∆݉௧  captures the short-run 
nonneutrality of monetary shocks. Equivalently, with ߩ = 1 ,  the neutrality 
hypothesis implies that in the specification ݕ௧ = ∑ߙ௝݉௧ି௝ , the neutrality 
restriction is ߙ(1) = 0 , where ߙ(1) = ∑ߙ௝  is the sum of the distributed lag 
coefficients. 
In chapter 4, I develop an empirical model for testing the long-run 
neutrality proposition based on the Lucas-Sargent critique represented in 
equation (3.12’). 
3.2.2 Empirical analyses of long-run neutrality proposition 
A major strand of the literature, initiated by the work of Fisher and 
Seater (1993) and King and Watson (1997), has utilized progress in time-
series theory on nonstationary regressors to generate and test hypotheses 
concerning long-run neutrality and long-run superneutrality. The original  
studies by Fisher and Seater (1993) and King and Watson (1997) on U.S. 
data, have been supplemented by a number of studies using data on 
developed countries, including Boschen and Otrok (1994), Haug and Lucas 
(1997), Olekalns (1996), Coe and Nason (1999), and Serletis and Koustas 
(1998). 
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Fisher and Seater (1993) applied a system of two equations which 
involve a money measure as one of the variables. They analysed previous 
studies on testing long-run neutrality propositions which did not take 
explicit account of the time-series properties of the data. Fisher and Seater 
(1993) argued that the empirical evidence on long-run neutrality of money in 
Andersen and Karnovsky (1972), Kormendi and Meguire (1984), Lucas 
(1980), and Geweke (1986) are mostly consistent with long-run neutrality 
and not very informative about long-run superneutrality. Fisher and Seater 
(1993) also empirically investigated the long-run neutrality using the 
Friedman and Schwartz (1982) data on money, prices, nominal income, and 
real income from 1867 to 1975 in the United States. All variables are viewed 
as I(1), making tests of long-run neutrality possible. With respect to nominal 
income and prices, long-run monetary neutrality holds in this data, but with 
respect to real output, long-run monetary neutrality fails. 
Evidence of the failure of long-run monetary neutrality is either 
surprising or suspect among monetary theorists. Applying Fisher and Seater 
(1993) methodology, Boschen and Otrok (1994) tested the long-run monetary 
neutrality using the Friedman and Schwartz (1982) data, but now updating 
the time series through 1992. They split the data set into two subsamples,  
1869-1929 and 1940-92. Their results support the long-run neutrality 
proposition in both of the subsamples. They concluded that there may have 
been something special about the financial disruption during the Great 
Depression era that causes the test to fail when that period is included. 
The importance of the Great Depression for the rejection of long-run 
monetary neutrality in the United States is also supported by Haug and Lucas 
(1997) who applied Fisher and Seater (1993) methodology. Since Canada did 
not experience bank failures during the Great Depression, the evidence on 
long-run neutrality using Canadian data might provide further evidence that 
something unusual happened in the United States during this period. Their  
data set includes real national income and the money supply (M2) from 1914 
to 1994. They argued that pre-1914 data is inappropriate for this purpose 
because changes in the money supply were not exogenous in Canada at that 
time. Based on Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests, both time series are 
I(1). The results showed that long-run monetary neutrality with respect to 
real output cannot be rejected using the entire Canadian sample period.  
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The empirical evidence by Olekalns (1996) also supports the 
argument of Boschen and Otrok (1994) that the Great Depression matters for 
the rejection of long-run monetary neutrality in the United States. According 
to Olekalns (1996), the downturn of the 1930s was less severe in Australia 
than in the United States. Applying the Fisher and Seater methodology, 
Olekalns (1996) used two measures of money, M1 and M3, along with real  
gross domestic product to test for the long-run neutrality of money for 94 
years in Australia. All variables are reasonably described as I(1) according 
to ADF tests. Olekalns (1996) found that long-run monetary neutrality 
cannot be rejected using the narrower money measure. However, using the 
broader money measure, long-run neutrality can be rejected for this data set, 
and the rejection carries even when dummy variables are used to control for 
the Depression period as well as the World War II period. Olekalns (1996) 
concluded that results can be sensitive to the measure of money used. 
An empirical analysis by Coe and Nason (1999) also contributes to 
this literature. They used the same methodology and U.S. data as Fisher and 
Seater (1993), except that they updated the data through 1997. When Coe 
and Nason (1999) used a broad measure of the money stock, they replicated 
the Fisher and Seater (1993) rejection of long-run monetary neutrality with 
respect to real output. But when they replace the broad money measure with 
the monetary base, they can no longer reject long-run neutrality. They also 
consider about a century of data from the United Kingdom, and fail to reject 
long-run neutrality using either broad or narrow measures of money. Coe and 
Nason (2003) concluded that the Fisher and Seater (1993) rejection of long-
run neutrality is not robust to a change in either the measure of money or the 
country of study. 
Another important work in this literature is King and Watson (1997) 
who also used bivariate systems by taking into account the order of 
integration of the variables involved when devising tests of neutrality 
propositions. Importantly, King and Watson (1997) emphasized 
identification issues. They analysed long-run neutrality propositions across a 
range of possible identifications of their bivariate system, in an effort to 
understand the robustness of various conclusions to differing assumptions. 
The identifying assumptions are that either one of the impact elasticities is 
known to be a certain value, or that one of the long-run elasticities is known 
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to be a certain value. They used quarterly data on real output and money 
(M2) for the United States from the first quarter of 1949 to the fourth 
quarter of 1990:4. Based on unit-root diagnostic tests, King and Watson 
concluded that all the series involved can reasonably be viewed as I(1), so 
that tests of neutrality propositions can be executed. Their empirical results 
are consistent with the findings of Fisher and Seater (1993) and Boschen and 
Otrok (1994), because the sample period here covers the postwar United 
States.  
Weber (1994) is the first paper that applied the King and Watson 
testing procedures to G7 economies: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
the United Kingdom, and the United States. The data is quarterly, from the 
postwar era, but the particular years vary across countries. Weber begins 
with a battery of unit root diagnostics. For each country, he uses several 
different measures of the money stock, in part to confront the question of 
whether the results are sensitive to how money is defined. The combination 
of several diagnostic tests and many different time series produces a plethora 
of results that are not all the same. As a general rule, however, narrower 
monetary aggregates tended to be I(1), while broader aggregates tended to be 
I(2). Strictly speaking, according to the methodology outlined above, if 
money is I(2) then superneutrality can be tested, whereas neutrality cannot.  
In order to deal with this situation, Weber followed two approaches: 
In some cases, he performed neutrality tests anyway and warns the reader to 
interpret the results with caution, while in other cases he uses the I(1) 
aggregates to test for neutrality and the I(2) aggregates to test for 
superneutrality. The remaining series on output, inflation, interest rates, and 
unemployment rates, for the most part, can be reasonably interpreted as I(1).  
Weber then turns to tests of long-run monetary neutrality in these countries, 
using the same wide variety of possible identifying assumptions that King 
and Watson used. His general finding is that for broader monetary 
aggregates, such as M2 or M3, a wide variety of identifying restrictions are 
consistent with long-run monetary neutrality in the G7 economies during the 
postwar era. For narrower measures of money, the range of identifying 
restrictions consistent with long-run monetary neutrality is much smaller. 
Superneutrality is examined using a bivariate VAR in differenced money 
growth and differenced real output. In general, long-run superneutrality with 
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respect to the level of real output is rejected for a wide variety of identifying 
restrictions across the G7 economies. 
Bullard and Keating (1995) considered a sample of 58 countries that 
have at least 25 years to formulate tests of long-run neutrality propositions 
in the spirit of Fisher and Seater (1993) and King and Watson (1997). In 
working with a large number of countries, data availability and quality 
impinge significantly on the analysis. Accordingly, Bullard and Keating 
restrict attention to countries that produce at least moderately high quality 
data. Bullard and Keating focused their analysis on one particular version of 
a neutrality proposition: the effect of a permanent shock to inflation on the 
level of output. If money is long-run neutral—and the evidence reported in 
this survey suggests that this is a reasonable assumption— then this can be 
viewed as a test of monetary superneutrality with respect to the level of real 
output. Moreover, problems with the definition of money within and across 
countries are avoided.  
Bullard and Keating also began with a battery of unit-root diagnostic 
tests for the real output and GDP deflator time series they use. They divided 
countries into groups based on the results of these tests, according to 
whether a country can be characterized as having experienced permanent 
shocks to inflation or not, and similarly for the level of real output. 
Countries that experienced permanent shocks to inflation and also to the 
level of output are candidates for a test based on a bivariate VAR; there 
were 16 countries in this group, dubbed Group A. There were also nine 
Group B countries for which evidence of a unit root in inflation was found, 
but evidence of a unit root in output was lacking. A large number of 
countries, 31, show no evidence of permanent shocks in the inflation series,  
and were put into Group C. The two remaining countries were special cases. 
Following King and Watson (1997), Bullard and Keating (1995) 
estimated a two-variable VAR for the Group A countries, in differenced 
inflation and differenced output. The main results for the Group A countries 
are as follows: The long-run response of the level of output to a permanent 
inflation shock was positive and statistically significant for four countries, 
negative and statistically significant for one country, and not statistically 
different from zero for the remainder. The Group B countries, which possess 
permanent inflation shocks but no permanent output shocks, provide 
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evidence of superneutrality. The Group C countries are uninformative 
because they do not possess permanent inflation shocks. Altogether, the 
results appear to be consistent with superneutrality for most of the countries 
that are informative. 
The empirical results by Serletis and Krause (1996) also support a 
hypothesis of long-run monetary neutrality. They used the Backus and Kehoe 
(1992) data set, which included more than 100 years of annual observations 
on real output, prices, and money for Australia, Canada, Denmark, Germany, 
Italy, Japan, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States.  
Based on Zivot and Andrews’ (1992) unit root test to account for structural 
breaks in the series, they concluded that money is reasonably described as 
I(1) except in Germany and Japan where it is I(0); these latter two countries 
are therefore uninformative on neutrality questions in this data set. Serletis 
and Krause (1996) found that output is I(0) for Australia, Canada, Denmark, 
Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States. These countries, therefore, 
provide direct evidence in favour of long-run neutrality with respect to 
output.  
In order to understand the long-run relationship between inflation and 
productivity, Sbordone and Kuttner (1994) applied bivariate VAR 
methodology which is similar to that used by King and Watson (1997). Using 
data from the postwar United States, they concluded that both series are 
characterized as I(1). Sbordone and Kuttner used the King and Watson 
(1997) approach to identification, setting impact multipliers and long-run 
multipliers to various values in an effort to learn about the sensitivity of the 
results to alternative identification schemes. Under many of these schemes, 
the long-run impact of a permanent, positive shock to inflation on 
productivity is negative. If the identification scheme is that the long-run 
impact of a permanent shock to productivity on inflation is zero, then the 
estimated effect of a permanent inflation shock on productivity is negative 
but is not statistically different from zero. 
Following King and Watson (1997), Oi et al. (2004) investigated the 
long-run monetary neutrality in Japan over the period 1890-2003. They used 
three types of money stock, including cash currency in circulation, M1, and 
M2. Real output is represented by real GNP. Oi et al. (2004) started with the 
unit root and cointegration tests and found that the test results differ 
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depending on the testing procedures, especially whether or not consideration 
is given to a structural change. They concluded that the combination of M2 
and real GNP satisfies the preconditions for testing long-run monetary 
neutrality: they are both I(1) and are not cointegrated. Meanwhile, the 
possibility that M2 is I(2) cannot be denied, so they also test long-run 
monetary superneutrality for M2. They find strong evidence supporting the 
proposition of monetary neutrality. 
Some studies also focus on testing the long-run neutrality of money 
using a sample of developing countries. Sulku (2011) analysed the long-run 
neutrality of money (LRN) in the Turkish economy using quarterly data from 
January 1987 to March 2006. In his analysis, the dependent variables are real 
output and wholesale price index while a set of independent variables 
includes all alternative monetary aggregates such as M1, M2, M2Y and M3. 
M2Y is the summation of M2 and foreign exchange deposits in Turkish lira. 
Applying Fisher and Seater (1993) ARIMA framework, the author showed 
that LRN hypothesis holds in Turkey and the results are robust under all 
alternative monetary aggregates. 
Chen (2007) investigated the long-run real output response to a 
permanent monetary stock in South Korea and Taiwan using quarterly data 
for money stack M2 and real output from 1970:1 to 2004:4, and 1965:1 
to2004:1 respectively. Applying King and Watson (1997) approach, the 
author showed that the long-run neutrality of money is fully supported in the 
case of South Korea, but not in the case of Taiwan. That is level changes in 
money stock have no effect on the real variables and cause a proportionate 
increase in price level. 
Habibullah et al (2001) analysed the long-run neutrality of money 
with respect to aggregate output and its disaggregate output, namely the 
output of agriculture, manufacturing and services sector in Malaysia using 
quarterly data for the period 1973:1 to1999:4. Applying Fisher and Seater 
(1993) approach, the author showed that narrow money M1 does not matter 
in Malaysia during the sample period. The output data at both aggregate and 
disaggregate sectors support the long-run neutrality of money in Malaysia. 
This implies that the permanent changes in narrow money do not lead to 
changes in real output. This suggests that the growth of money supply M1 is 
not the prime mover for the Malaysia’s economic growth during the period 
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under study. Hence, de-emphasizing narrow money, M1, as intermediate 
target variable by mid-1980s was the right move by the central bank of 
Malaysia. 
Ekomie (2013) analysed the long-run neutrality of money in the 
Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (EMCCA) countries 
using annual data cover the period 1970-2008. Ekomie (2013) used different 
monetary aggregates, money supply in narrow sense (M1), money supply in 
the large sense (M2), and domestic credit (credit to private sector) with 
response to real GDP. Applying Fisher and Seater (1993) approach, the 
results indicate that money aggregates have significantly positive impacts on 
real GDP in the long-run. This implies that the long-run monetary neutrality 
hypothesis is rejected. In light of the empirical results, the authors 
concluded that in the context of poverty and unemployment that 
characterizes EMCCA countries, the Central Bank should pursue an 
objective of stabilization of the product, along with the objective of 
monetary stability. 
Bae and Ratti (2000) investigated the long-run neutrality and long-run 
superneutrality of money using annual data on monetary aggregate (M2), 
price index, and real output for Argentina and Brazil for the period 1884 to 
1996 and for the period 1912-1995 respectively. Applying Fisher and Seater 
(1993) framework, the results show that, the real output series was found to 
be I(1) and the money series was found to be I(2) for both countries. This 
suggests that money is long-run neutral for both Argentina and Brazil. 
Furthermore, they found that superneutrality of money was not found for the 
period 1884-1996 in Argentina and for the period 1912-1995 in Brazil. This 
result is consistent with the predictions of cash-in-advance models in which 
inflation is a tax on investment or labour. This suggests that indexing in the 
Brazilian economy and dollarization in Argentinean economy have not been 
fully effective at insulating real output from permanent shocks to the rate of 
money growth. The estimates imply that if the rate of money growth were to 
permanently rise from 40% per year to 100% per year, output would be 
approximately 4.0% lower in Argentina and Brazil. 
Moosa (1997) investigated the long-run neutrality of money with 
respect to real output and price level in India using quarterly data for the 
period 1972:1 to 1990:4. Applying seasonal cointegration techniques, the 
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author found that money and output are not cointegrated at the zero 
frequency which represents the long-run. On the other hand money and 
prices are cointegrated at all frequencies including zero frequency. This 
implies that money affects nominal but not real variables in the long-run. In 
light of the empirical results, the authors concluded that the effectiveness of 
monetary policy as a stabilization anti-inflation tool depends on the 
existence of stable and well understood link between money and prices. 
3.3 Macroeconomic policies in economies with currency substitution 
3.3.1 Theoretical framework of macroeconomic policies in the presence 
of currency substitution 
The impacts of macroeconomic policies on output and prices tend to 
be different in economies with and without CS. Following Clarida et al. 
(1999), I formulate a theoretical framework of the “New Keynesian” 
monetary policy model which includes N economies, indexed by ݅  ( ݅ =1,2, … ,ܰ). The loss function of each economy’s monetary authority takes the 
form 
  ( )[ ]{ }å¥= ++ +-= 0 2,2,21 j jtiijtiiiti kyEL pab         (3.13) 
 
where ݕ  output (in deviations from trend). ߨ  inflation. ߙ  relative weight on output deviations (ߙ > 0). ߚ  discount factor. 
E  mathematical expectation. 
k  output target. It is assumed to be equal or larger than zero 
because of distortions, such as imperfect competition or taxes. 
For each economy, aggregate supply is given by a “New Keynesian” 
expectations-augmented Phillips curve: 
   
  titittiiti uEy ,1,,, ++= +plp        (3.14) 
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where ߣ௜ > 0,ݑ௜,௧ = ∅௜ݑ௜,௧ାଵ, ݖ௜,௧ , 0 < ∅௜ < 1 and ݖ௜,௧~݅݅݀(0, ߬௜ଶ) . This can also be 
written in aggregate-supply form as 
   ݕ௜,௧ = ߴ௜൫ߨ௜,௧ − ܧ௧ߨ௜,௧ାଵ൯ + ߥ௜,௧    (3.15) 
 
where ߴ = 1/ߣ௜ and ߥ௜,௧ = −ݑ௜,௧/ߣ௜. Note that this implies ߥ௜,௧ = ߶௜ߥ௜,௧ − ߣ௜ି ଵݖ௜,௧.  
Without CS, when each economy’s central bank can pursue an 
independent monetary policy, minimizing (3.13) subject to (3.14) leads to 
the following outcome (“discretion”): 
 ߨ௜,௧ூே஽ = ߙ௜ݍ௜ݑ௜,௧ + ఈ೔ఒ೔ ݇௜ = ߙ௜ݍ௜ߣ௜ߥ௜,௧ + ఈ೔ఒ೔ ݇௜   (3.16) 
and  ݕ௜,௧ூே஽ = ߣ௜ݍ௜ݑ௜,௧ = ߣ௜ଶݍ௜ߥ௜,௧     (3.17) 
 
where IND superscript denotes outcomes under independent monetary policy, 
and ݍ௜ = 1/[ߣ௜ଶ + ߙ௜(1 − ߚ߶௜)] . The macroeconomic performance of the 
economy will be characterized by average (“trend”) inflation equal to 
 ߨത௜ூே஽ = ߙ௜݇௜/ߣ௜    (3.18) 
and output (“business-cycle”) volatility 
          ܸܽݎ(ݕ௜ூே஽) = ߣ௜ସ[ߣ௜ଶ + ߙ௜(1 − ߚ߶௜)]ିଶߪ௜ଶ                       (3.19) 
 
Equation (3.18) states that the inflation bias is increasing with the 
weight on output (ߙ), the output target (k), and the slope of the aggregate 
supply curve, ߴ = 1/ߣ.  It  is also apparent that there is a trade-off between 
average inflation and output variability:12 if ߙ is very low, average inflation 
will be very low, but output very unstable. 
The economy with complete CS is represented by the formation of 
monetary union. Suppose that there are N economies to form a monetary 
union, monetary authority is delegated to the United States (i  = 1), and the 
U.S. dollar is adopted by all N economies. Then, at equilibrium, each 
                                                     
12 As pointed out by Taylor (1979), there is also a trade-off between output variabil ity and 
inflat ion variabil ity, given here by: ܸܽݎ൫ߨ௜ூே஽൯ = ߙ௧ଶߣ௧ଶ[ߣ௧ଶ + ߙ௧(1 − ߚ߶௜)]ିଶߪ௧ଶ  a low ߙ reduces 
the volat il ity of inflation but raises that output.  
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member country of the monetary union has inflation rate equal to that of the 
United States. Mathematically, it is represented by ߨଵ,௧஽ை௅௅ = ߨଵ,௧஽ை௅௅ = ߨଵ,௧ூே஽, 
where ߨଵ,௧ூே஽ is given by (3.14) and the DOLL superscript refers to outcomes 
under dollarization. Substituting into (3.15) gives   
 ݕଵ,௧஽ை௅௅ = −ߙଵݍଵ(1 − ∅ଵ)ߥଵ,௧ + ߥ௜,௧ ,   (3.20) 
 
Equation (3.20) states that with CS, economy i’s output is affected 
not just by its own output shock, ߥ௜,௧, but also by the shock from the United 
States,  ߥଵ,௧. The economies with CS import the U.S. shock via the conduct of 
monetary policy by the Federal Reserve. 
How does the macro economy perform in the presence of CS? 
Average inflation will be given by 
 ߨ௜ି ஽ை௅௅ = ߙଵ݇ଵ/ߣଵ     (3.21) 
 and business-cycle volatility by 
 ܸܽݎ൫ݕ௜஽ை௅௅൯ = ߙଵଶݍଵଶ(1 − ߶ଵ)ଶߪଵଶ + ߪ௜ଶ − 2ߙଵݍଵ(1 − ߶ଵ)ߩ௜,ଵߪ௜ߪଵ (3.22) 
 
where ߩ௜,ଵ ≡ ܿ݋ݎݎ൫ߥ௜,௧, ߥଵ,௧൯. Costs and benefits of CS can now be identified. 
The main macroeconomic benefit of CS can be seen in terms of 
inflation by comparing equations (3.18) and (3.21). CS will reduce a 
country’s average inflation rate, provided the United States has a more 
conservative monetary authority ( ߙଵ < ߙ௜ and ݇ଵ < ݇௜ ) and a less temping 
aggregate supply (ߴଵ < ߴ௜):ߨ௜ି ஽ை௅௅ < ߨ௜ି ூே஽. 
However, equations (3.19) and (3.22) show that CS may increase 
output volatility: this is the macroeconomic cost of CS. From equation (3.22), 
this cost will be smaller, the closer ߩ௜,ଵ  is to unity. Intuitively, if business 
cycles in Lao PDR and the United States are highly correlated, 
countercyclical monetary policy conducted by the U.S. Federal Reserve will 
be a very close substitute for monetary policy conducted by BOL. The 
presence of CS in Lao PDR, even though it means giving up independent 
monetary policy, will not be very costly. If, on the other hand, Lao PDR’s 
output is negatively correlated with that of the United States, so that 
expansions in one of the two countries tend to coincide with recessions in 
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the other, surrendering monetary policy to the United States will destabilize 
Lao PDR by amplifying its business cycle. 
3.3.2 Exchange rate system and economic performance 
The recurrence of currency crises in emerging countries— Mexico, in 
1994, Thailand, Indonesia and Korea in 1997, Russia and Brazil in 1998, and 
Argentina and Turkey in 2000— has generated an intense debate on 
exchange rate policies. Countries that did not have pegged rates—among 
them South Africa, Israel in 1998, Mexico in 1998, and Turkey in 1998—
avoided crises of the type that afflicted emerging market countries with 
pegged rates. That said, pegged-but-adjustable exchange rate regimes have 
rapidly lost in popularity, while hard pegs and freely floating rates have 
gained in popularity (Fischer, 2001). This implies that emerging nations 
should completely give up their national currencies, and adopt an advanced 
nation’s currency as legal tender.  
The impacts of macroeconomic policies on output and price depend 
on different degree of CS and thereby different exchange rate systems in an 
economy. In this review, I divide CS into two types: partial CS and complete 
CS. Partial CS refers to the unofficial use of foreign currency in an economy 
which exists in developing countries with floating exchange system. 
Complete CS refers to the official adoption of foreign currency in an 
economy which implies the fixed exchange rate system.  
Recently, some emerging countries have decided to officially move 
toward complete CS, or official dollarization. Ecuador abolished its currency, 
the sucre, and adopted the U.S. dollar in 2000. El Salvador adopted the U.S. 
dollar as a legal tender in Guatemala in 2001. In other countries, however, 
politicians have systematically refused to consider official dollarization 13 ,  
even in the face of major and costly financial crises. This was the case, for 
instance, of Argentina during late 2001 and early 2002. 
Supporters of complete CS argue that countries that give up their 
currency will be unable to engage in monetary and macroeconomic 
mismanagement. Public finances will stay in balance, macroeconomic policy 
                                                     
13  The term ‘dollarization’ here refers to the complete subst itut ion of domestic currency by 
foreign currency.  
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will be credible, and the external accounts will move within reasonable 
bounds. According to this view, complete CS will have two major positive 
effects on economic performance. First, inflation will be lower in countries 
with complete CS than in countries with partial CS. Alesina and Barro (2001, 
p. 382), for instance, argued that adopting another nation’s currency 
‘eliminates the inflation bias problem of discretionary monetary policy’. 
Second, countries with complete CS will tend to grow faster than countries 
with partial CS. This growth effect is supposed to take place through two 
channels: (a) complete CS will mean lower interest rates, higher investment, 
and faster growth (Dornbusch, 2001); and (b) by eliminating exchange rate 
volatility, complete CS is supposed to encourage international trade and this, 
in turn, will result in faster growth. Rose (2000) and Rose and Wincoop 
(2001), among others, emphasized this trade channel.  
Other authors, however, have voiced scepticism regarding the alleged 
positive effects of complete CS on growth and overall macroeconomic 
performance. According to Eichengreen (2001) the evidence on the 
relationship between monetary regimes and growth is inconclusive, and does 
not support the claim that official dollarization—or any exchange rate 
regime, for that matter—is an important determinant of growth. 
The traditional view, on the other hand, is that in countries with a 
hard peg it is difficult to accommodate external shocks, including terms of 
trade and world interest rate disturbances. This, in turn, will be translated 
into greater instability and lower economic growth (Fischer, 1977). Frankel 
(1999) argued that there is no unique recipe on exchange rate policy; while 
some countries will benefit from hard pegs, for other countries a floating 
regime will be more appropriate. 
There are few empirical studies on the economic consequences of CS, 
except Edwards and Magendzo (2003). International comparative studies on 
alternative exchange rate and monetary regimes have ignored countries with 
CS. For example, the comprehensive study on exchange rate regimes, growth 
and inflation by Gosh et al. (1995) does not include nations that do not have 
a currency of their own. Likewise, the IMF (1997) study on alternative 
exchange rate systems excludes countries with CS, and the recent paper by 
Levy-Yeyeti and Sturzenegger (2001) on exchange rates and economic 
performance excludes nations that do not have a central bank. This lack of 
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empirical evidence means that countries that are contemplating dollarization 
have very little information on how other countries have historically 
performed under this monetary regime. Rose and Engel (2000) provide an 
early empirical analysis of economic performance in countries with no 
currency of their own. Their analysis, however, does not emphasize 
countries with CS that use an advanced nation’s currency. Instead, they 
focus mostly on currency unions, or countries whose common currency is not 
the currency of an advanced nation, but rather the union’s own currency. The 
Rose and Engel’s (2000) dataset include 26 countries that do not have a 
currency of their own and have data on real GDP per capita. Of these 23 
countries, only one—Panama—corresponds to a nation with CS; the other 25 
countries in the data set correspond to currency unions. 
Edwards and Magendzo (2003) is the first study to analyse 
macroeconomic performance of economies with complete CS. The empirical 
results show that inflation has been significantly lower in countries with CS 
than in countries without CS. They also found that countries with CS have 
had a lower rate of economic growth than countries without CS; and that  
macroeconomic instability, measured by the degree of volatility of GDP 
growth, is not significantly different across countries with and without CS. 
They concluded that the lower rate of economic growth in countries with CS 
is due, at least in part, to these countries’ difficulties in accommodating 
external disturbances, such as major terms of trade and capital flows shocks.  
 In economies with partial CS, some economists argue that the 
instruments of macroeconomic stabilization in the form of monetary policy 
are not effective. For example, Menon (2009) argued that growth in capital 
inflow in Vietnam needs to be accommodated by real exchange rate 
appreciations. However, the nominal exchange rate cannot be relied upon to 
deliver it , so inflation is usually the result, and it is also difficult for the 
central bank to conduct open market operations, in order to sterilize large 
capital inflows, or mop up excess liquidity. This could add to inflation. The 
combination of a young and inexperienced banking system and an 
investment-hungry state owned enterprise sector only exacerbates the 
situation, and increases the risk of imbalances that can result in a crisis. 
Given that the effectiveness of monetary policy is curtailed by CS, 
Menon (2009) suggested that the fiscal policy will play a crucial role in 
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stabilizing the economy. By cutting back on fiscal expenditure, the 
government can reduce its reliance on foreign savings to finance investment, 
and thereby limit the growth in the current account deficit. To reduce the 
pressure on real exchange rate appreciation associated with large capital 
inflows, selective liberalization of the capital account to facilitate capital 
outflow could be pursued. 
In contrast, using a sample of 108 developing countries over the 
period 1980-2001, Reinhart et al. (2003) found no evidence that partial CS 
makes it more difficult to bring down inflation from high levels, or that it  
alters or adds complexity to the monetary transmission process—particularly 
through systematic changes in the behaviour of money velocity, or in the 
link between money and prices. Seigniorage revenues are found to be fairly 
similar—both in terms of levels and variability—across all categories of 
economies with CS, especially in the late 1990s. Output fluctuations, and the 
scope for using countercyclical monetary policy to reduce them, are also 
found to be fairly similar in countries with different degrees and varieties of 
CS. 
The existing literature remains inconclusive about the effectiveness of 
macroeconomic policies in dollarized economies. In chapter 4, I built a small 
macroeconometric model to evaluate fiscal and monetary policies 
effectiveness in the Lao economy.  
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Chapter 4 Developments of Empirical Models for Currency 
Substitution, Neutrality of Money, and the Evaluation of 
Macroeconomic Policies 
 
In chapter 4, I discuss the model specifications for the analysis of 
currency substitution and the examination of neutrality proposition. This is 
followed by the structure of Lao macroeconometric model for the evaluation 
of monetary and fiscal policies under different exchange rate arrangements. 
Data description and estimation methods for each empirical model are also 
discussed.  
4.1 Model specification and data for analysing the determinants of 
currency substitution 
Empirical studies on the process of currency substitution (CS) are 
based mainly on a standard money demand function in which real domestic 
balances are specified to be a function of a scale variable (real wealth or 
income) and the opportunity cost of holding real balances. Conceptually 
more important existing literature following the framework of demand for 
money include Ramirez-Rojas (1985), El-Erian (1988), Rojas-Suarez (1992), 
Clements and Schwartz (1992), Mongardini and Mueller (1999), Us (2003), 
and Samreth (2011). The key assumption of these model specifications is 
that the demand for foreign currency by residents is driven by the uncovered 
interest parity condition, which, in turn, depends on the interest rate level 
abroad, the domestic interest rate, and expected developments in the 
inflation rate level abroad.  
4.1.1 Development of empirical model for testing the determinants of 
currency substitution 
The empirical specification in this paper  was modified from the 
model structure of Mongardini and Mueller (1999) which comes closest to 
the standard representation of the demand for foreign currenciesgiven data 
constraints. It can be formulated as follow: 
 
ttttt REICS ebbba ++++= lnln 321    (4.1) 
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where CS t is currency substitution. tI is the interest rate differential , 
measured by the difference between domestic and foreign currency deposit 
rates in the Lao banking system. tE is the expected depreciation of the Lao 
kip against the US dollar.The ratchet variable is denoted by tRln representing 
the persistence effect in the CS. It is proxied by the past peak value of the 
CS ratio. te is an error term and assumed to be white noise and normally and 
identically distributed. 
 The interest rate differential (I t) represents the opportunity costs of 
holding kip and US dollar. It is measured by the difference between the rates 
on kip-denominated 12-month time deposits and the dollar-denominated 12-
month time deposits. 1b is expected to be negative because a ceteris paribus  
increase in the interest rate differential raises the return on kip-denominated 
deposits, thereby reducing the CS ratio. 
 With the considerations for CS, the opportunity cost of holding 
domestic balances has to include another argument that is usually 
represented by the expected change in the nominal exchange rate. If the 
domestic currency depreciates (appreciates), the opportunity cost of holding 
domestic balances increases (decreases) relative to foreign money. Therefore, 
resident will switch to foreign balances (domestic balances). Following El-
Erian (1988) and Rojas-Suarez (1992), for the proxy for the expected rate of 
domestic currency depreciation, lnE t,  I choose the actual change of the 
exchange rate as a proxy to represent the expected rate of change of the 
exchange rate. 14Although there are two main foreign currencies, US dollar 
and Thai baht irculating in the Lao economy, my study focuses onlyon kip 
per US dollar rate because the use of US dollar in economic transactions in 
Lao PDR dominate over the use of Thai baht. The coefficient of the expected 
depreciation of kip per US dollar, 2b , is expected to be positive. That is, a 
ceteris paribus increase in the expected rate of depreciation of kip would 
imply an increase in the holdings of US dollar relative to kip.  
 Equation (4.1) also incorporates the CS ratchet for two reasons. One 
reason is that it gradually reaches new peaks during the observation period 
                                                     
14Because there is lack of reliable quarterly inflation data available especially for  
the first few years of the observation period, it  was decided to use the depreciation 
of the exchange rate as a proxy. 
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and thus is relatively immune to outliers, thereby more accurately 
representing the theoretical justification behind the inclusion of the ratchet 
effect in the model structure, particularly the building up of a sufficiently 
strong awareness threshold for the presence of large inflation and currency 
depreciation and the resulting process of developing, learning, and slowly 
beginning to apply inflation-beating money management techniques. Another 
reason is that it represents all the factorswhich in the past have influenced 
the CS process (Mueller, 1994). In the CS model that includes the CS ratchet, 
it is assumed that the CS ratio reacts asymmetrically to changes in the CS 
ratchet. Since the CS ratchet is defined as the past peak value of the 
dependent variable, its sign is expected to be positive. 
 The dummy variable, Asian t,  representing the effect of Asian 
financial crisis on Lao economy from the first quarter of 1997 to the fourth 
quarter of 1998, is included in Equation (4.1). The rapid exchange rate 
depreciation during the Asian financial crisis caused a dramatic change in 
exchange rates in Lao PDR. Between 1997 and June 1999, the kip lost 464% 
of its value against the dollar. This caused a rapid increase in inflation rate 
of 150% in the early 1999 and an increase in the ratio of CS from 41% to 
80% in the same period. In line with the above, the estimation equation can 
be modified as becomes 
 
  tttttt AsianREICS ebbbba +++++= 4321 lnln
                         
(4.2) 
 
Where Asian t = 1 for t  = 1997:Q1–1998:Q4, and Asian t = 0 otherwise. 4b is 
expected to be positive because people might diversify their wealth 
portfolios by switching from kip into foreign currency denominated accounts 
in order to avoid the impact of repeated devaluation. 
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4.1.2 Econometric methodology for testing the determinants of currency 
substitution 
 Following the modelling approach described in Pesaran et al. (2001), 
I assume that, there are two stages for the bounds test. The first stage 
involves establishment of long-run relationship exists among the variables in 
Equation (4.2). The second stage involves estimation  of long- and short-run 
coefficients of Equation (4.2) once variables are found cointegrated. To 
conduct the bounds test, consider a vector of two variables tz where 
),( ¢¢= ttt xyz , ty  is the dependent variable and tx is a vector of independent 
variables. The data generating process of tz  is a p-order vector 
autoregression. For cointegration, tyD is modelled as a conditional error-
correction model: 
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where yyp and yxp  are long-run multipliers, 0b is the drift, t  is the time trend, 
tw is a vector of exogenous components. Lagged values of tyD  and current 
and lagged values of txD  are used to model the short-run dynamic structure.  
The bounds test for the absence of any level relationship between ty  and tx  
is conducted by excluding the lagged variables 1-ty  and 1-tx  in Equation (4.3). 
It follows then that our test for the absence of a conditional level 
relationship between ty  and tx  entails the following null and alternative 
hypotheses: 
 
,0:0 =yyH p ,0¢=×xyxp           
 
,0:1 ¹yyH p 0¢¹× xyxp or ,0¹yyp 0¢=× xyxp  
or ,0=yyp 0¢¹× xyxp        (4.4) 
 
  I examine these hypotheses with the standard F-statistic. Since the F  
test has a non-standard distribution in the current ARDL setting, critical 
values reported in Pesaran et al. (2001) are used. Critical value bounds exist 
for all classifications of the regressors into purely first order of integration 
or I(1), purely I(0) or mutually cointegrated. If the computed F-statistic falls 
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outside the critical bounds, a conclusive decision can be made regarding 
cointegration without knowing the order of integration of the regressors. If  
the estimated F-statistic is higher than the upper bound of the critical values, 
then the null hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected. If the estimated F-
statistic is less than the lower bound of the critical values, then the null  
hypothesis of no cointegration cannot be rejected. 
  Once I establish that a long-run cointegration relationship exists, 
Equation (4.2) is estimated using the following ARDL(m, n, p, q) 
specification: 
  
  ttit
q
i i
it
p
i it
n
i it
m
i it
AsianR
EICSCS
ebb
bbbb
+++
+++=
-=
-=-=-=
å
ååå
51 4
1 311 211 10
ln
lnln
     (4.5) 
 
The long-run impact of the CS determinants can be obtained by estimating 
equation (4.6). The short-run impact of CS determinants can be obtained by 
estimating the error correction representation of equation (4.6) which is 
expressed as: 
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4.1.3 Selection of data for testing the determinants of currency 
substitution 
  The CS model specified in Equation (4.2) contains four main 
variables, namely, the CS ratio, interest rate differential, expected rate of 
exchange rate depreciation, and the past peak value of the CS ratio. This 
study uses quarterly data on these variables for the Lao economy from the 
first quarter of 1993 to the second quarter of 2012. Quarterly data are used 
because the relevant data series do not exist in monthly form. The starting 
point of the estimation period was determined on the basis of data 
availability.  
  The data of M2, interest rates on kip-denominated 12-month time 
deposits and the dollar-denominated 12-month time deposits, exchange rate,  
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and foreign currency deposits were collected from various issues of the 
Quarterly Lao Financial Statistics published by Bank of the Lao PDR. For 
the exchange rate, I use the quarterly average of the parallel market 
exchange rate, kip per US dollar. The proxy for CS is (e × FCD)/M2, where 
e is the nominal exchange rate for kip/US dollar and M2 is defined as the 
sum of currency in circulation, kip- and dollar-denominated deposits.  
Following Mongardini and Mueller (1999) and Cuddington et al. (2002), the 
accumulated experience (lnR t) is represented by the past peak value of the 
CS ratio, which can be expressed as follows: 
 
,max iit CSR = i = 0, 1, …,t – 1.      (4.7) 
 
 
Note :  The accumulated experience of domestic residents in using foreign currency is  
represented by the past  peak value of the currency subst itution (CS) ratio .  
Source :  BOL, Quarterly Lao Financial  Stat istics (various issues).  
Diagram  4.1: Accumulated experience of domestic residents in using foreign 
currency 
 
 The plot of R t over the sample period is illustrated in Diagram  4.1. 
The past peak value of CS ratio started at the very low level in the first  
quarter of 1993. It then gradually rose from 0.36 in the first quarter of 1994 
to 0.38 in the first quarter of 1995. As the Lao economy was severely 
affected by the Asian financial crisis during 1997–1998, R t sharply increased 
from 0.45 in the first quarter of 1997 to 0.84 in the second quarter of 1999. 
Therefore, all past peak values of CS ratio occurred in 1990s.   
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4.2 Model specification and data for testing long-run monetary 
neutrality proposition 
Neutrality of money has received increasing attention from academic 
researchers. Many papers have analyzed long-run monetary neutrality (e.g. , 
King and Watson 1992, 1997; Fisher and Seater 1993; Boschen and Otrok 
1994; Haug and Lucas 1997; Serletis and Koustas 1998, 2001; Shelley and 
Wallace 2004; Noriega 2004; Coe and Nason 2004; Bae et al. 2005; and 
Noriega et al. 2005, among many others). Most of these papers test the 
existence of long-run monetary neutrality (i.e., a permanent change in the 
money stock has no long-run effects on real GDP) and superneutrality (i.e.,  
permanent changes in the growth rate of money have no real effects on real 
money balances). Using unit-root tests on monetary aggregates and output 
with a long period of sample, the tests are then applied on the reduced form 
of the Fisher and Seater (1993) conditions. 
4.2.1 Development of empirical model for testing long-run monetary 
neutrality proposition 
Fisher and Seater (1993) work in terms of bivariate systems, with a 
measure of money as one of the variables. Adopting their notation, let m be 
the natural logarithm of the nominal money stock M . Let y be a second 
variable, expressed in either real or nominal terms, which is the logarithm of 
a variable like the price level or real output, and where the variable itself is 
Y 15 . Denote the order of integration of a variable by 〈ݔ〉 , so that if x is 
integrated of order 1, we write 〈ݔ〉 = 1. I also will use the phrase “x  is I(1)” 
to describe the order of integration. Denote a difference operator by ∆,  so 
that ∆ݕ indicates the approximate growth rate of the variable Y.  Fisher and 
Seater study the following system: 
                                                     
15 One could use other methods to statistically model a permanent shift in the level 
or growth rate of a monetary variable. One could, for instance, posit a discrete  
shift in the mean of the variable at a given date,  T , and one could then check to see 
how other variables responded to such a permanent movement.  Nothing here is 
ruling out such an approach, but the literature surveyed in this paper focuses on 
unit-root characterizations of variables of interest as measures of whether these 
series have permanent components or not.  
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ܽ(ܮ)∆〈௠〉݉௧ = ܾ(ܮ)∆〈௬〉ݕ௧ + ݑ௧     (4.8) ݀(ܮ)∆〈௬〉ݕ௧ = ܿ(ܮ)∆〈௠〉݉௧ + ݓ௧   (4.9) 
 
where a(L), b(L),  c(L) and d(L) are lag polynomials, and ܽ଴ = ݀଴ =1 and ܾ଴ and ܿ଴ are unrestricted. The error vector (ݑ௧,ݓ௧) is iid with zero mean 
and covariance ∑. Now let ݔ௧ ≡ ∆௜݉௧  ܽ݊݀ ݖ௧ ≡ ∆௝ݕ௧ , with i, j  = 0 or 1. Fisher 
and Seater define a certain long-run derivative (LRD) that is central to their 
findings. The LRD is a change in z  with respect to permanent change in x,  
given by 
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provided lim௞→∝ ߲ݔ௧ା௞ /߲ߤ௧ ≠ 0, otherwise the LRD is undefined and the long-
run neutrality is not testable. Fisher and Seater then define long-run 
neutrality and long-run superneutrality in this framework, and for each, 
discuss four cases that depend on the order of integration of the variables.16 
Firstly, money is long-run neutral with respect to y if ܮܴܦ௬,௠ = 1 
when y  is a nominal variable or if ܮܴܦ௬,௠ = 0 when y  is a real variable. The 
four cases are: first, the order of money growth (denoted by 〈∆݉〉) is less 
than one. Mathematically, the first case is represented by 〈݉〉 < 1. Here the 
LRD is not defined because there have been no permanent shocks to the level 
of the money stock, and the data are uninformative concerning long-run 
monetary neutrality. The second case is that the order of money growth is 
greater than one and the order of real output (〈ݕ〉). Mathematically, this case 
is represented as 〈݉〉  ≥  〈ݕ〉 + 1 ≥ 1 . Here the LRD is zero because while 
there have been permanent shocks to the level of the money stock, there have 
been none to output, if y is a nominal variable, long-run neutrality is 
violated, otherwise it holds. The third case is that the order of money growth 
is greater than one but is equal to the order of real output. Mathematically, 
                                                     
16  To simplify the discussion in this section, interest rates are left out here, even 
though they are included in Fisher and Seater’s (1993) framework. 
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the third case is represented by 〈݉〉 =  〈ݕ〉 ≥ 1. This case admits tests of long-
run neutrality, in an effort to find out if the permanent shocks to the level of 
the money stock are correlated with the permanent shocks to the variable y .  
The fourth case is that the order of money growth is greater than one but is 
less than the order of real output. Mathematically, the fourth case is 
represented by 〈݉〉 =  〈ݕ〉 − 1 ≥ 1. This case in more complicated. A necessary 
condition for long-run neutrality is that the permanent shock to money does 
not change the growth rate of y.   
Secondly, money is long-run superneutral with respect to y  if ܮܴܦ௬,∆௠ = 0 . There are four cases for testing the long-run monetary 
superneutrality. The first case is that the order of money growth (denoted 〈∆݉〉) is less than one. Mathematically, the first case is expressed by 〈∆݉〉 <1. Here the LRD is not defined because there have been no permanent shocks 
to the growth rate of the money stock, and the data are uninformative 
concerning long-run monetary superneutrality. The second case is that the 
order of money growth is greater than one and the order of real output (〈ݕ〉).  
Mathematically, this case is expressed by represented as 〈∆݉〉  ≥  〈ݕ〉 + 1 ≥ 1. 
The LRD is zero because while there have been permanent shocks to the 
growth rate of the money stock, there have been none to y . Long-run 
superneutrality holds. The third case is that the order of money growth is 
greater than one but is equal to the order of real output. Mathematically, the 
third case is expressed by 〈∆݉〉 =  〈ݕ〉 ≥ 1. This case admits tests of long-run 
superneutrality, in an effort to find out if the permanent shocks to the level 
of the money stock are correlated with the permanent shocks to y.  The fourth 
case is that the order of money growth is greater than one but is less than the 
order of real output. Mathematically, the fourth case is expressed by 〈∆݉〉 = 〈ݕ〉 − 1 ≥ 1 . Here  ܮܴܦ∆௬,∆௠  = 0  is testable; that is, one can determine 
whether a permanent change in the growth rate of money is associated with a 
permanent change in the growth rate of y .  
The Fisher and Seater analysis provides a simple test of long-run 
neutrality. If money and real output are integrated of order one, the long-run 
derivative of real output with respect to money is equal to the slope 
coefficient of regression of growth rates of real output on growth rates of 
money. Therefore, the proposition of long-run neutrality is found if this 
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slope coefficient approaches zero as the span over which these growth rates 
are calculated approaches to infinity. This is formally illustrated in Equation 
(4.11), where y denotes the log of real output, m is the log of money, and ܾ௞ 
is the slope coefficient. The long-run money neutrality is tested under the 
null hypothesis of ܾ௞ = 0.  
 ݕ௧ − ݕ௧ି௞ିଵ = ߙ௞ + ܾ௞(݉௧ − ݉௧ି௞ିଵ) + ݁௞௧ ,   k = 1, …, 20              (4.11) 
 
Table 4.1: Growth rates of M1, M2, real GDP, and sectoral outputs 
 
Year M1 M2 GDP Agriculture Industry Services
1985–1989 178.70 114.71 4.14 4.17 7.60 3.49
1990–1994 20.59 33.82 6.13 5.23 12.93 4.68
1995–1999 33.75 60.11 6.42 4.82 11.12 7.42
2000–2004 41.99 27.81 5.98 3.72 10.93 5.95
2005–2009 32.17 24.80 7.73 3.85 13.12 8.15
2010–2011 30.04 30.50 7.90 3.39 14.25 7.24
1985 41.11 35.55 5.07 11.04 5.54 −2.61
1986 64.88 70.00 4.89 5.12 15.91 1.66
1987 101.24 131.01 −1.43 −1.92 −16.06 3.27
1988 65.45 6.71 −2.01 −4.19 −2.26 0.82
1989 620.80 330.29 14.19 10.78 34.88 14.31
1990 −0.16 7.84 6.70 8.65 16.23 1.53
1991 12.52 15.73 4.30 −1.75 19.86 7.47
1992 24.50 49.01 5.56 8.27 7.58 0.87
1993 48.64 64.59 5.91 2.71 10.30 6.84
1994 17.43 31.93 8.16 8.30 10.69 6.68
1995 9.51 16.40 7.03 3.14 13.05 8.83
1996 12.48 26.73 6.93 2.64 17.16 8.09
1997 5.79 65.76 6.87 7.08 8.22 7.52
1998 111.40 113.28 3.97 3.67 8.55 4.96
1999 29.59 78.36 7.31 7.58 8.60 7.69
2000 57.25 46.04 5.80 4.93 8.50 5.34
2001 7.98 13.72 5.75 3.77 10.13 5.81
2002 57.86 37.60 5.92 3.98 10.11 5.94
2003 42.51 20.07 6.07 2.51 18.33 3.77
2004 44.32 21.64 6.36 3.42 7.60 8.90
2005 29.12 7.87 7.11 1.42 12.67 9.91
2006 28.19 26.72 8.62 4.16 17.58 7.65
2007 53.36 38.72 7.60 7.40 7.77 7.66
2008 21.23 18.31 7.82 3.46 12.89 8.65
2009 28.94 32.41 7.50 2.83 14.65 6.87
2010 32.55 39.13 8.53 2.79 19.38 5.62
2011 14.12 23.94 8.04 0.49 16.58 7.39
Average (1985-2011) 58.62 50.72 6.24 4.16 11.65 5.98
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Source :  Author’s calculat ion using data from World Bank (2011) and International  
Monetary Fund (2012).  
Notes :  growth rates of M1, M2, real  GDP, and sectoral  outputs are calculated as ∆ݔ௧ =ቂ௫೟ି௫೟షభ௫೟షభ ቃ × 100,  where ݔ௧ the levels of M1, M2, real  GDP, and sectoral  outputs.  
Most existing literature obtains estimates of ܾ௞  for values of k 
ranging from one to 30 over the periods of study (see for example, Fisher 
and Seater, 1993; Boschen and Otrok, 1994; Haug and Lucas, 1997). They 
plot the estimates of ܾ௞ along with the 95% confidence intervals versus the 
values of k. Since our sample period is very short relative to them, the 
values of k are set to equal 20, accounting for more than half of the period 
under investigation. 
The analysis of long-run impact of money on output in this 
dissertation takes a similar approach and compares the response of output in 
four sectors of the economy. The principal aim is to provide stylised facts 
about how monetary policy developments feed through the economy. As a 
corollary, these facts might also provide some indirect evidence about the 
underlying nature of the transmission mechanism. At the broadest level, the 
output measure of the economy, GDP, can be sub-divided into three parts, 
namely agriculture, industry, and services. Manufacturing sector is also 
added as a component of the industrial sector.  
4.2.2 Selection of data for testing long-run monetary neutrality 
proposition 
  An important source for the monetary aggregates (M1 and M2) is the 
World Bank online database ‘World Development Indicators’, which 
provides data on real GDP and sectoral output in Lao kip for the period 
1984–2011, and M1 and M2 data for the period 1987–2011. The money 
supply reported in the World Bank measures the value of the money supply 
circulating in the economy. The broad monetary aggregate, M2, comprises 
M1 plus short-term (usually a year and under) savings and time deposits, 
certificates of deposit, foreign currency transferable deposits and repurchase 
agreements. The monetary aggregate, M1, comprises currency held outside 
the banking system; the current account deposit liabilities of commercial  
banks held for transactions; and some foreign currency deposits that are used 
for domestic transactions.  
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  Data sources for M1 prior to 1988 and M2 prior to 1986 are World 
Bank publications ‘Lao People’s Democratic Republic Country Economic 
Memorandum’. Data source for M1 and M2 for the year 2011 is the BOL 
publication ‘Annual Report 2011’, which reports the latest data on Lao 
monetary aggregates for 2011. The growth rates of monetary aggregates and 
real output are presented in Table 4.1. The growth rates of M1 and M2 in 
Laos fell from 179% and 115% per year for the period 1985–1989 to 30% 
and 30.5% for the period 2010–2011. Similarly, the growth rates of 
agriculture and manufacturing decreased from 4.2% and 11.2% to 3.4% and 
8.6% for the same periods. In contrast, the growth rates of real GDP, 
industry and services, rose from 4.1%, 7.6%, and 3.5% for the period 1985–
1989 to 7.9%, 14.3%, and 7.2%, respectively, for the period 2010–2011.  
4.3 Development of macroeconometric model and selection of data for 
testing the effectiveness of fiscal and monetary policy in Lao PDR 
4.3.1 Structure of Lao macroeconometric model 
 The Lao macroeconometric model is a small, compact, and highly 
aggregate macro model. It is divided into four blocks: production, final 
demand, government, and money and price. The relationship between four 
blocks is illustrated in Diagram 4.1. Diagram 4.1 presents flow chart of the 
model which illustrates the relationships between endogenous and exogenous 
variables. At the bottom part of the flow chart, all shaded variables are the 
exogenous variables while all non-shaded variables are either endogenous 
variables or variables used in the identities. A brief description of each 
block is given below. 
 
a. Production structure of Lao economy 
  The production block consists of three behavioral equations and two 
identities. The behavioral equations include agriculture output, non-
agriculture output, and non-agriculture labor. Agriculture output per labour 
is a function of agriculture area per labour. Non-agriculture labour is a 
function of nominal wage and its lag one year. The identities include GDP in 
supply side and agriculture labour. GDP in supply side is the sum of 
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agriculture and non-agriculture outputs. Agriculture labour is the difference 
between total labour force and non-agriculture labour.  
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Source: Author’s compilation. 
 
Diagram 4.1: Flowchart of Lao macroeconometric model 
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b. Composition of Lao final demand 
  The final demand block consists of five behavioral equations and 
three identities. The behavioral equations include private consumption, 
government consumption, domestic private investment, export, and import.  
Private consumption is specified as a function of the disposable income and 
its own lag. Government consumption is a function of government revenues 
and its own lag. Domestic private investment is a function of GDP growth, 
lag of capital stock, and domestic lending rate denominated in kip. Export is 
a function of world demand and kip/dollar exchange rate. Import is a 
function of Lao GDP and kip/dollar exchange rate. The identities include 
GDP in demand side, national income, and total investment. GDP in demand 
side is the sum of consumption, investment and the trade balance. National 
income is defined as GDP minus indirect tax revenue. Total investment is 
the sum of government investment, domestic private investment, and foreign 
direct investment (FDI). Both government investment and FDI are treated as 
exogenous variables.  
 
c. Tax revenue of the government 
  The government block consists of one behavioral equation and one 
identity. The behavioral equation is direct tax revenue which is a function of 
net national income and its own lag. Direct tax revenue includes revenue 
from income and profit taxes. National income is derived by subtracting 
indirect tax revenue from GDP. An increase in national income tends to 
increase direct tax revenue at a given tax rate. The identity is total tax 
revenue which is the sum of direct and indirect tax revenue. 
 
d. Monetary aggregates, exchange rate and price level 
The money and price block consists of four behavioral equations and 
one definitional equation. The behavioral equations include money demand 
for foreign currencies, general price, wage, and managed-floating exchange 
rate. The money demand for foreign currencies is a function of the ratio of 
domestic deposit rate in kip to domestic deposit rate in US dollar and of 
GDP. General price is a function of domestic demand pressure, ratio of M2 
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to GDP and kip-dollar exchange rate. Nominal private wage is a function of 
general price, nominal GDP, and its lag one year. Real exchange rate is 
determined by its own lag which reflects the backward-looking behaviour in 
exchange rate expectations. The definitional equation is the broad money 
supply (M2) which is the sum of narrow money supply (M1), saving and time 
deposits denominated in kip, and foreign currency deposits. 
4.3.2 Estimation method for macroeconometric model  
  The three-stage least squares (3SLS) method is employed to estimate 
the Lao macroeconometric model. 3SLS involves the application of 
generalized least squares estimation to a system of equations, each of which 
has been then first estimated by using 2SLS. In the first stage the reduced 
form of the parameters are estimated by the 2SLS estimates. In the second 
stage, the residuals of each equation are used to estimate the cross-equations 
variances and covariances, just like in the SUR estimation process. In the 
third and final stage, generalized least squares (GLS) estimates parameters 
are obtained. The 3SLS procedure can yield more efficient parameter 
estimates than 2SLS because it takes into account cross-equation correlation 
(Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1998). 
  The system method of 3SLS is superior to single-equation methods, 
namely ordinary least squares (OLS) and two-stage least squares estimates 
(2SLS). 3SLS can address the simultaneity problem in the macroeconometric 
model, while OLS cannot. Because of the simultaneous nature of the 
equations in the macroeconometric model, OLS cannot provide consistent 
parameter estimates. Unbiasedness and consistency of OLS estimates rest on 
the assumption that the explanatory variables are uncorrelated with the 
stochastic disturbance terms. This assumption becomes invalid for any 
individual equation in a system of equations whenever at least one of the 
explanatory variables of that equation is jointly determined and makes the 
use of the OLS inappropriate.  
  3SLS is more efficient than 2SLS. 2SLS provides a very useful 
information procedure for obtaining the values of structural parameters in 
over-identified equations. 2SLS estimation uses the information available 
from the specification of an equation system to obtain a unique estimate for 
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each structural parameter. However, the 2SLS is less efficient than 3SLS 
when there are cross-equation error correlations in the model. 
 
Table 4.2: Key variables’ names and data sources 
 
Source :  Author’s compilat ion.  
Variable Code Unit Endogenous/
Exogenous
Source
Agriculture land AL 1,000 ha Exogenous Food and Agriculture 
Organization
Government consumption CG Bill. kip Endogenous United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD)
Private consumption CP Bill. kip Endogenous UNCTAD
Domestic private consumption DPI Bill. kip Endogenous UNCTAD
Dollar-denominated deposit rate DRD Percent Exogenous Bank of the Lao PDR (BoL)
Kip-denominated deposit rate DRK Percent Exogenous BoL
Demand pressure (GDP/GDPS) DS Endogenous UNCTAD
Direct tax revenue DTAX Bill. kip Endogenous BoL
Exports EX Bill. kip Endogenous UNCTAD
Foreign currency deposit FCD Bill. kip Endogenous BoL
Foreign direct investment FDI Bill. kip Exogenous UNCTAD
Government expenditure G Bill. kip Endogenous UNCTAD
Real GDP (demand side) GDP Bill. kip Endogenous UNCTAD
Agriculture output GDPAG Bill. kip Endogenous UNCTAD
Non-agriculture output GDPNAG Bill. kip Endogenous UNCTAD
Nominal GDP GDPP Bill. kip Endogenous UNCTAD
Real potential GDP (supply side) GDPS Bill. kip Endogenous UNCTAD
Total investment I Bill. kip Endogenous UNCTAD
Government investment IG Bill. kip Exogenous UNCTAD
Imports IM Bill. kip Endogenous UNCTAD
Indirect tax revenues ITAX Bill. kip Exogenous BoL
Capital stock K Bill. kip Exogenous UNCTAD
Time and saving deposits in kip KCD Bill. kip Exogenous BoL
Lending rate for kip LRK Percent Exogenous BoL
Money supply (M1) M1 Bill. kip Exogenous BoL
Broad money supply (M2) M2 Bill. kip Endogenous BoL
Non-agriculture labour NAL Bill. kip Endogenous UNCTAD
Real national income NI Bill. kip Endogenous UNCTAD
Non-tax revenues NTAX Bill. kip Exogenous BoL
General price PL Index Endogenous UNCTAD
General price of U.S. PLU Index Exogenous UNCTAD
Exchange rate RATEU Kip/dollar Endogenous UNCTAD
Government revenues REV Bill. kip Endogenous BoL
Total tax revenues TAX Bill. kip Endogenous BoL
Total labour force TL 1,000 
persons
Exogenous UNCTAD
Private wage rate WAG Bill. kip Endogenous UNCTAD
World demand WD Bill. dollar Exogenous Asian Development Bank
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4.3.2 Lao macroeconomic data for the macroeconometric model 
To estimate the Lao macroeconometric model, I utilized Lao PDR’s 
macroeconomic data which includes production, monetary aggregates, and 
prices. Key production data include agriculture and non-agriculture sectors, 
and labour force. The nominal exchange rate between kip and US dollar is  
defined as the price of kip in terms of US dollar. 
Primary data sources include Lao Annual Economic Report of the 
Bank of the Lao PDR (BoL), United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD), and ‘Key Indicators of Developing Asian and 
Pacific Countries 2013’ of Asian Development Bank. The data covers the 
period 1993-2012. The lower bound of the sample period is limited by the 
availability of interest rates, while the upper bound is the maximum year of 
Lao economic data availability at the time of estimation. Variables’ names 
and data sources are summarized in Table 4.2. 
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Chapter 5 Determinants of Currency Substitution and Long-Run 
Monetary Neutrality in Lao PDR—Empirical Analysis 
 
In Chapter 5, I report two main empirical results, namely 
determinants of currency substitution and testing long-run monetary 
neutrality in Laos. The discussions refer to Lao economic background 
discussed in Chapters 2; to the theoretical issues discussed in Chapter 3; and 
to the methodology in Chapter 4. This chapter is divided into two main 
sections. The results of CS determinants and of LRN proposition in Lao PDR 
are discussed in Section 5.1 and 5.2, respectively. Each section is further 
divided into three subsections, including unit root tests of the relevant 
variables, discussion of the empirical results, and policy implications.  
 
5.1 Determinants of currency substitution in Lao PDR 
  This section begins with a unit root test of the relevant variables 
using the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perron (PP) tests. 
Then we apply the autoregressive distributed lagged model to investigate the 
determinants of currency substitution in Laos. Finally, we discuss our 
findings and draw some policy implications based on the empirical results of 
currency substitution.  
5.1.1 Time series properties of the data on currency substitution 
  The critical values for the bounds test reported in Pesaran et al. 
(2001) is based on whether the variables in consideration are I(0) or I(1). If 
any of the variables are integrated of order 2 or I(2), the F-test conducted to 
confirm the existence of a cointegration relationship among the variables 
may not be applicable. In what follows, it  is therefore necessary to check the 
characteristics of the CS ratio and its determinants based on the ADF and PP 
tests.  
  The ADF test, proposed by Said and Dickey (1984), is an augmented 
version of the basic autoregressive unit root test developed by Dickey and 
Fuller (1979) to accommodate general autoregressive moving average 
(ARMA (p,  q))17 models with unknown orders. An important practical issue 
                                                     
17  p  is  the order of the autoregressive part.  q  is  the order of the moving average part .  
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for the implementation of the ADF test is the speciﬁcation of the lag length 
p.  If p is too small then the remaining serial correlation in the errors will 
bias the test. If p is too large then the power of the test will suﬀer. In our 
application, the lag length is determined by the Akaike information criterion 
(AIC).18 The ADF statistic used in the test is a negative number. The more 
negative it is, the stronger the null hypothesis of a unit root is rejected. 
Some empirical studies on currency substitution based on the ADF tests 
include Prock et al. (2003), Ra (2008), and Samreth (2011). 
 
Table 5.1 Unit root tests 
 
Note :  *,  **,  *** is  significant at  10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
Source :  Author’s estimation.  
 
  To further investigate the time series properties of the CS variables, 
the PP test developed by Phillips and Perron (1988) is applied. The PP unit 
root tests diﬀer from the ADF tests mainly in how they deal with serial 
correlation and heteroskedasticity in the errors. In particular, while the ADF 
tests use a parametric autoregression to approximate the ARMA structure of 
the errors in the test regression, the PP tests correct for any serial 
correlation and heteroskedasticity in the errors by directly modifying the test  
statistics. According to Zivot and Wang (2006), the PP tests are more 
                                                     
18  The formula for calculat ing AIC is expressed as AIC = −[2×ln(l ikel ihood)]  + (2×k) ,  
where k is number of parameters estimated.  
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advantageous than the ADF tests for two reasons. First, they are robust to 
general forms of heteroskedasticity in the error term. Second, they do not 
require any specifications of a lag length for the test regression.  
 
Table 5.2: F-statistics for cointegration relationship 
 
Source :  Author’s estimation.  
 
  Results of unit root tests for CS variables are presented in Table 5.1. 
A rejection of the null hypothesis is marked with asterisks, namely, one 
asterisk for the 1% significance level, two asterisks for the 5% significance 
level, and 10% for the 10% significance level. The ADF test provides similar 
result about the characteristics of variables under investigation with that of 
the PP test. Both of them indicate that none of the variables are I(2). More 
precisely, I(0) is found in the expected exchange rate depreciation (E) 
calculated from the quarterly average of the parallel market exchange rate, 
whereas I(1) is found in the logarithm of the CS ratio (lnCS) and interest  
rate differential (I). The order of integration of lnR is mixed: it  is I(0) when 
either the intercept or time trend is excluded in the unit root test and I(1) 
when the intercept and a time trend are considered. The mixed results of this 
integration order also justify the use of the ARDL approach instead of the 
maximum likelihood approach for cointegration analysis proposed by 
Johansen and Juselius (1990), which requires all variables to be I(1). 
5.1.2 Empirical results for currency substitution in Lao PDR 
  In the first step of the ARDL analysis, we tested for the presence of 
long-run relationships in Equation (4.2). As we use quarterly data, the 
maximum number of lags in the ARDL was set equal to 4. Table 5.2 reports 
Critical value bounds of the F -statistic for k  = 3
90% level 95% level 99% level
I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1)
Intercept and trend 3.47 4.45 4.01 5.07 5.17 6.36
Intercept and no trend 2.72 3.77 3.23 4.35 4.29 5.61
Lag length
Calculated F -statistics 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
F lnCS (lnCS |I , E , lnR , trend ) 3.15 4.96* 5.29** 4.85* 3.50 2.37 3.10 11.10*** 8.42*** 7.61***
F lnCS (lnCS |I , E , lnR ) 2.62 5.22** 5.20** 4.36* 2.62 1.12 2.38 12.64*** 9.05*** 7.97***
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the calculated F-statistics with various lag orders. According to the F-
statistics with and without time trend, generally )(×CSF is higher than the 
upper bound critical value. Therefore, the null hypothesis of no 
cointegration cannot be accepted and there is a long-run cointegration 
relationship amongst the variables in the model. 
 
Table 5.3: Estimated long-run impacts of the CS determinants in Laos 
 
Note :  ARDL (1, 1 , 2,  1) was selected based on the Akaike Information Criterion.  
Source :  Author’s estimation.  
 
  Given the long-run cointegration relationship amongst the CS 
variables, Equation (4.6) (Chapter 4) is estimated to investigate the short- 
and long-run impact of CS determinants. A maximum of 4 lags was used in 
 
Table 5.4 Estimated short-run impacts of the CS determinants in Laos 
 
Source :  Author’s estimation.  
Regressor Coefficient Standard error 
∆I t  −0.0109** 0.0045
∆E t 0.0867 0.0771
∆lnR t 1.2304*** 0.1644
Asian t 0.0236 0.0316
Constant  −0.0094* 0.0053
EC t-1  −0.3164** 0.1346
S.E. of regression 0.0432
0.4672
F-statistic 14.1555
DW statistic 2.0407
Functional form test F  = 1.8651 [0.1765]
EC  = 0.0431I  + 0.2121E  + 0.6743lnR  + 0.0770Asian  + 4.4605
2R
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the estimation of Equation (4.6). The estimated model presented here is 
based on minimizing the AIC. Given two or more models fit  on the same 
data, the model with the smaller value of the information criterion is 
considered to be better. The empirical results, obtained through normalizing 
on the log of CS (lnCS), in the long-run are reported in Table 5.3. 
  The short-run impacts of the CS determinants together with 
diagnostic statistics based on Equation (4.6) are presented in Table 5.4. The 
F-statistic is highly significant, suggesting that the included regressors can 
jointly determine the CS ratio. The value of 2R  is 0.47, indicating that the 
model can explain about 47% in the variation of CS in the Lao economy over 
the period 1993–2012. The error-correction term (EC t−1)in the short-run 
error correction model is statistically significant with a negative sign, which 
confirms that a long-run equilibrium relationship exists between the 
variables. The error-correction coefficient is −0.3164, which means that  
once shocked convergence to equilibrium is quite fast with 32% of the 
adjustment occurring in the first year. The short-run model passes the 
standard test for functional form and, as expected under the ARDL procedure, 
the Durbin-Watson statistic does not indicate any sign residual serial 
correlation. 
5.1.1.1 Expected rate of domestic currency depreciation 
  The expected rate of depreciation of the kip/US dollar has an 
expected positive sign, but is not statistically significant at any conventional 
level in the long-run model. Although the estimated coefficient of expected 
exchange rate depreciation is not statistically significant, the magnitude of 
its coefficient indicates that a 1% increase in the expected rate of 
depreciation of the kip/US dollar will result in a 0.21% increase in CS ratio. 
The result is consistent with the observation that an increase in the expected 
exchange-rate depreciation will increase the CS and increase the demand for 
foreign currency. 
  The magnitude of the long-run estimate is in the range of the previous 
study for Lao PDR, but is below that of other countries. Previous Lao study 
suggests that the long-run impact on dollarization of the expected rate of 
change in the exchange rate lies between 2.07 and 2.57 (Ra, 2008, Tables IV 
and V). The long-run estimate of the expected rate of change in the exchange 
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rate in the CS model varies significantly across countries, ranging from 3.13 
in Cambodia (Samreth, 2011), 3.18 in Vietnam (Ra, 2008), 11.95 in Kyrgyz 
Republic (Mongardini and Mueller, 1999), to 28 in Peru (Rojas-Suarez, 
1992) and to 32.44 in Turkey (Us, 2003). This suggests that the CS in Lao 
PDR is less sensitive to the expected rate of depreciation than the 
experiences of other countries suggest. 
  As expected, the impact on CS of expected exchange-rate 
depreciation is much larger in the long-run than the short-run, which 
suggests that exchange rate policy will have stronger effect over time. The 
magnitude of the short-run impact on CS of expected exchange-rate 
depreciation is small and is statistically insignificant. In the short-run, the 
impact on CS of the expected rate of change in the exchange rate is 0.0867. 
This is similar to what estimated by Ra (2008) for Lao PDR and Vietnam, 
which were 0.093 and 0.108, respectively, and they were statistically 
insignificant. However, the estimated impact on CS of expected exchange-
rate depreciation in our study is much lower than in other dollarized 
economies. It ranges from 0.47 in Cambodia (Samreth, 2011), 0.60 in 
Kyrgyz Republic (Mongardini and Mueller, 1999), and to 2.59 in Turkey (Us, 
2003). 
5.1.1.2 The currency substitution ratchet variable 
  The coefficient of the ratchet effect denoting the persistence of CS 
has the expected sign in both the short- and long-run, and is statistically 
significant at 1% level. In the long-run the ratchet effect on CS is 0.6743, 
while in the short-run, it is 1.2304. This indicates that as the past peak value 
of CS increases, the current CS increases in the short-run. Such impact will, 
however, decrease over time. Previous studies have found different long-run 
estimates of the ratchet effect on CS. In Cambodia, estimate of the Ratchet 
effect was 0.8411 (Samreth, 2011). In Turkey, the long-run ratchet effect 
was 0.62 (Us, 2003), while in Kyrgyz Republic, it  is much higher, being 
estimated at 5.10 (Mongardini and Mueller, 1999). Therefore, our estimate 
of the long-run ratchet effect on CS is at the lower end of the range of 
estimates found in the previous studies in other countries.  
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5.1.1.3 Interest rate differential 
Both the short-run and long-run coefficients of interest rate 
differential are statistically significant. The coefficient of interest rate 
differential is negative in the short-run, whereas it is positive in the long run. 
This indicates that in the long-run as the gap between the rates on kip-
denominated 12-month time deposits and the dollar-denominated 12-month 
time deposits increases, demand for foreign exchange increases. Normally, 
we would have expected this relationship to be negative. However, the 
negative relationship in the short-run and the positive relationship in the 
long-run between interest rate differential and the demand for foreign 
exchange suggest that a strategy for reducing the CS ratio through higher 
interest rate on kip deposits will only be effective in the short-run; however, 
in the long-run the high level of the interest rate and its further increase 
shift the domestic portfolio allocations toward foreign-denominated assets 
even more due to the increase in risk premium. Therefore, we see a positive 
relationship between the interest rate differential and the demand for foreign 
exchange in the long-run. This finding is similar to that in South Africa by 
Elkhafif (2003) and that in Turkey by Us (2003), who use similar empirical 
model.   
5.1.1.4 Dummy of Asian financial crisis 
The dummy variable of the Asian financial crisis has an unexpected 
sign and is not statistically significant in the short- and long-run model. Its 
positive coefficient indicates that when there is a large economic shock, 
domestic residents fear of not being able to withdraw their deposits from 
banks or other financial institutions. Therefore, they rush to withdraw money, 
leading to a reduction in foreign currency deposits and eventually in a 
decrease in the CS ratio. This finding is similar to that in Cambodia by 
Samreth (2011) who found that the effect of political upheaval from 1997 to 
1998 reduced the CS ratio.  
Nevertheless, this dummy should be explained with caution because 
the financial anxiety caused by economic disturbances can be captured by 
other macroeconomic variables, especially exchange rate and interest rate. 
Since the exchange rate and interest rate have also been included into the 
model, they may partially capture the impact of Asian financial crisis on the 
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CS in Lao PDR, thereby reducing the explanatory power of the Asian dummy. 
Therefore, the coefficient of Asian  dummy is not statistically significant in 
our model. 
5.1.1.5 Recursive residual tests for structural breaks 
As indicated by Hansen (1992), estimated parameters of a time series 
may vary over time. Parameter stability tests are of particular importance, 
because unstable parameters can lead to model mis-specification, which can 
bias the results. The parameter stability tests are conducted using the 
Pesaran and Pesaran (1997) test.  
 
 
Source :  Author’s estimation.  
Diagram  5.1: Recursive CUSUM test on CS ratio 
 
According to Pesaran and Pesaran (1997), the short-run dynamics are 
essential in testing for the stability of the long-run coefficients. The Pesaran 
and Pesaran (1997) test amounts to estimating the error-correction model 
specified in Equation (4.6) (see Chapter 4). Once the model has been 
estimated, Pesaran and Pesaran (1997) suggest applying the cumulative sum 
of recursive residuals (CUSUM) and the CUSUM of square (CUSUMSQ) 
tests proposed by Brown et al. (1975) to assess the parameter constancy. 
Both the CUSUM and CUSUMSQ tests plot the cumulative sum together 
with 5% critical lines. Parameter instability is found if the cumulative sum 
goes outside the area between the two critical lines. So, movement of the 
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sample CUSUM and CUSUMSQ tests outside the critical lines is suggestive 
of coefficient instability.  
 
 
Source :  Author’s estimation.  
Diagram  5.2: Recursive CUSUMSQ test on CS ratio 
 
The model was estimated by ordinary least squares and the residual 
was subjected to the CUSUM and CUSUMSQ tests. Diagram s 5.1 and 5.2 
plot the CUSUM and CUSUMSQ tests for Equation (4.6). The result from 
the CUSUM clearly indicates the absence of any instability of the 
coefficients because the plot of the CUSUM statistics is confined within the 
5% critical bounds of parameter stability. In contrast, the result from the 
CUSUMSQ shows some instability of the coefficients, but the deviation 
seems to be transitory as the plot of CUSUMSQ returns toward the criterion 
bands 
As a further check on parameter stability, the one-step forecast test 
allowing for the identification of the specific point of break in the data 
series was conducted. The test result is presented in Diagram  5.3.The upper 
portion of the graph (right vertical axis) reports the recursive residuals and 
standard errors while the lower portion (left vertical axis) shows the 
probability values for those sample points where the hypothesis of parameter 
stability would be rejected at the 5, 10 and 15% levels. The point with p-
value less than 5% corresponds to those points where the recursive residuals 
go outside the standard error bounds. In this case, the graph will sometime 
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show dramatic jumps as the postulated equation tries to digest a structural 
break. As shown in Diagram  5, no break point was found in the CS ratio 
data. Thus, the results of the one-step forecast test statistics corroborate 
those of the CUSUM and CUSUMSQ tests. This indicates that the structure 
of the parameters have not diverged abnormally over the period of the 
analysis. 
 
 
Source :  Author’s estimation.  
Diagram  5.3: Recursive one-step forecast test on CS ratio 
 
To summarize, the econometric results show that the parameters 
estimated are stable, and that the interest rate differential is a significant 
determinant of the CS process in the Lao economy. Moreover, there is a 
ratchet effect in the allocation of deposits. 
5.1.2 Policy implications for reducing the degree of currency substitution 
in Lao PDR 
The empirical evidence and econometric results have illustrated that 
the CS phenomenon in Laos has reached an irreversible threshold. In 
particular, there is a ratchet effect in the portfolio allocation of the 
sophisticated Lao deposit holders at large. The presence of the ratchet effect 
in the CS ratio implies that particularly strong policies over an extended 
period of time would need to be pursued to convince deposit holders to 
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switch back to kip-denominated assets, while a reduction of the relative 
importance of dollar cash may be easier and faster to achieve. 
Interest rate differential has been shown to be a significant 
determinant in the portfolio allocation of the private sector. The econometric 
results are based on the difference between 12-month deposit rate of kip and 
that of dollar. Since interest rates are liberalized in Laos, the authorities’ 
scope for directly affecting banks’ setting for such rates is limited. Nominal 
interest rates on kip deposits have been relatively low, while those on dollar 
deposits have been relatively high over the past few years. This reflects the 
fact that banks have been eager at times to attract dollar deposits by 
providing relatively high interest rates on these deposits in order to extend 
additional dollar credits and profit from the large margin associated with 
them.  
Consequently, the interest rate differential may not have been 
sufficiently high to compensate kip depositors for the expected depreciation 
of the domestic currency and the risk premium that inevitably is associated 
with it. Since the estimated long-run coefficient of interest rate differential 
is positive, the strategy of raising kip denominated deposits should be 
carefully considered. Otherwise, this could deteriorate the public trust in kip, 
thereby increasing the CS ratio rather than reducing it. 
The econometric results also show that the depreciation of the kip has 
not been a significant factor in increasing the CS ratio, particularly among 
deposits, for two reasons. First, the increasingly restricted holdings of 
foreign currency in Laos prevent residents to adjustment their wealth 
balances immediately after a change in the CS ratio from the previous 
quarter. Second, the main incentive for the public to switch to dollar 
deposits has not been to hedge against the risk of further depreciation. 
Instead, the hovering of the deposit-based CS ratio at about 50% during that 
period could indicate that the role of dollar deposits as a provider for the 
store-of-value function to sophisticated investors has been gradually 
replaced by the medium of exchange function for holding foreign exchange 
in Laos. 
While reliance on foreign currency in financial intermediation can be 
beneficial, the relative importance of, and persistence in, the use of foreign 
currency in financial intermediation in Laos raises the question of the 
128 
 
potential fragility of the banking system, which is commonly known as one 
of the major costs of dollarization. The non-performing loans in the Lao 
banking system are related to repayment difficulties of some borrowers for 
dollar-denominated loans. According to IMF (2002, p. 5), the Lao state-
owned commercial banks—accounting for about 63% of total loans in the 
Lao economy in 2009 (BOL, 2011)— provide about 75% of loans made in 
foreign currencies (US dollar and Thai baht) to borrowers who do not have a 
foreign exchange income source. This clearly illustrates the need to adopt 
special prudential measures to help commercial banks weather times of 
significant exchange rate adjustments and swings of capital flows.  
This is even more important as distress in the banking system reduces 
the predictability of the monetary transmission process and impedes the 
central bank to perform its function as lender of last resort. In the current 
environment, it  is therefore imperative to enhance banking supervision and 
enforce an appropriately defined loan risk classification system in order to 
maintain confidence in the banking system. It is also useful to regularly 
assess the appropriateness of the BOL’s monetary policy instruments and 
liquidity forecasting techniques. 
Finally, one of the main factors driving the CS in dollarized 
economies is the lack of markets for medium- and long-term securities 
denominated in the domestic currency. This lack of medium- and long-term 
intertemporal markets is typically associated with periods following high 
inflation, as in the case of Laos. Given the lack of these securities, the 
natural demand for credits that go beyond the longest horizon in the 
domestic currency, especially mortgages and business credits, can only be 
fulfilled by denominating the credits in foreign currency and attracting 
matching liabilities. In view of this, an additional avenue for reducing the 
degree of CS is to actively pursue a deepening of financial assets by 
lengthening the maturing of domestic securities, in particular government 
bonds which could set a benchmark for long-term private securities.  
5.2 Testing the long-run neutrality of money in the Lao economy 
  This section begins with a unit root test of the relevant variables 
using the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perron (PP) tests. 
Then I apply the Fisher and Seater method to investigate the impact of 
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monetary aggregates on real GDP and real output of agriculture, industry, 
manufacturing, and services. Finally, I discuss the findings and draw some 
policy implications based on the empirical results of LRN in Laos.  
5.2.1 Time series properties of the data on long-run monetary neutrality 
  King and Watson (1992) and Fisher and Seater (1993) showed that 
tests of long-run neutrality can be conducted if the order of integration of 
both monetary aggregates and real macroeconomic variables is at least equal 
to one and equal for both series. The order of integration of the annual data 
on money and output for Lao PDR therefore has to be established. In this 
regard, it is necessary to test for stationarity of variables based on the ADF 
and PP tests. Some empirical studies on monetary neutrality based on the 
ADF tests include Weber (1994), Olekalns (1996), King and Watson (1997), 
Haug and Lucas (1997), Serletis and Koustas (1998), Wallace (1999), and 
Bae and Ratti (2000). 
 
Table 5.5: Results of stationarity tests with and without a time trend 
Variables Unit root tests   Likely degree of 
integration  ADF PP 
  Levels 1st diff.    Levels 1st diff.    
With constant 
              
lnGDP   2.024 ‒4.221***   4.893 ‒4.156*** I(1) 
lnARG ‒0.387 ‒5.691*** ‒1.702 ‒6.399*** I(1) 
lnIND   1.056 ‒4.681***   1.795 ‒4.783*** I(1) 
lnSER   2.144 ‒3.063**   2.217 ‒5.786*** I(1) 
lnM1 ‒1.109 ‒5.059***   2.000 ‒5.059*** I(1) 
lnM2 ‒2.516 ‒5.656*** ‒2.622 ‒5.631*** I(1) 
With constant and trend 
lnGDP ‒2.186 ‒4.906*** ‒2.101 ‒5.917*** I(1) 
lnARG ‒2.750 ‒5.579*** ‒2.814 ‒6.276*** I(1) 
lnIND ‒2.832 ‒4.757*** ‒2.594 ‒5.075*** I(1) 
lnSER ‒2.344 ‒3.116* ‒4.443*** ‒5.581*** I(1) 
lnM1 ‒2.283 ‒5.472*** ‒2.205 ‒5.472*** I(1) 
lnM2 ‒1.681 ‒4.002**   ‒1.537 ‒6.632***   I(1) 
Source :  Author’s estimation.  
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  Results of unit root tests for Lao PDR’s money and output data over 
the period 1984–2011 based on the ADF method are presented in Table 5.5, 
second column for level form and third column for first-differenced form. A 
rejection of the null hypothesis is marked with asterisks, namely, one 
asterisk for the 1% significance level, two asterisks for the 5% significance 
level, and 10% for the 10% significance level. The null hypothesis of a unit 
root in all variables cannot be rejected for a variety of specifications and lag 
lengths. For the change in all variables, however, the null hypothesis of unit 
root cannot be accepted for any of the specifications and time periods tested. 
Consequently, the ADF tests indicate that monetary aggregates and real 
aggregate and sectoral outputs contain a unit root, implying that the series 
are integrated of order one which is denoted as I(1).  
  To further investigate the time series properties of the LRN variables, 
the PP test is applied. Some empirical studies on monetary neutrality based 
on the PP tests include Noriega (2004) and Oi et al. (2004). Results of unit 
root tests for LRN variables based on the PP method are presented in Table 
5.5, fourth column for level form and fifth column for first-differenced form. 
The null hypothesis of a unit root in all variables cannot be rejected for a 
variety of specifications and lag lengths. For the change in all variables, 
however, the null hypothesis of unit root for all series, except lnSER with 
constant, cannot be accepted for any of the specifications and time periods 
tested. The results unit root tests based on the PP method confirm those of 
the ADF that Laos’ monetary aggregates and real aggregate and sectoral 
outputs are I(1). Therefore, the series can be tested for LRN.  
  The findings in this study that unit root tests for Lao monetary 
aggregates (M1 and M2) and real output are I(1) are consistent with 
international evidence on unit root tests for monetary aggregates and real 
output by Noriega (2004) and Oi et al. (2004). Using three methods of unit 
root tests, namely, ADF, PP, and Kwiatkowski–Phillips–Schmidt–Shin 
(KPSS), Noriega (2004) find that real output and money supply (M2) are I(1) 
for Argentina, Australia, Italy, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Similarly, 
Oi et al. (2004) show that real output, M1, and M2 are I(1) for Japan. 
However, our findings stand in sharp contrast with the results in Weber 
(1994) who examines long-run monetary neutrality using post-war quarterly 
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data for the G-7 countries. Weber (1994) points out that the narrowly 
defined money stock tends to be I(1), while the broadly defined money stock 
tends to be I(2).  
5.2.2 Testing monetary neutrality based on money supply, M2 
  Money supply (M2) measures the “store of value” characteristic of 
money. Since household savings represent deferred consumption, M2 should 
provide leading information about future spending and, hence, about 
inﬂation (Atta-Mensah, 2000). Given the I(1) of Lao PDR’s data on M2 and 
real aggregate and sectoral outputs, the hypothesis of monetary neutrality 
can be tested by the method of Fisher and Seater. Table 5.6 presents the 
values of estimated coefficients (bk) and White’s (1980) heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors of the long-run relationship between M2 and real 
GDP as well as the GDP components expressed in equation (4.9), over the 
period 1984–2011. Due to the limited number of observations on the output 
and money series, k  is restricted to values from 1 through 20. 
  The results in Table 5.6 indicate that the hypothesis of long-run 
neutrality of money is rejected with respect to broad money supply and real 
GDP and real sectoral output, except agriculture (lnARG). In particular, a 
permanent change in the level of M2 has an impact on real GDP and real 
outputs of industry, and services in the long-run. For real GDP, the point 
estimates for bk  are negative and statistically significant for k ≥ 2.  For real 
output of industry, the point estimates for bk  are negative and statistically 
significant for 2 ≤ k ≤ 8 and k ≥ 14. For real output of services, the point 
estimates for βk are negative and statistically significant for k ≥ 3.   
  For real GDP, the point estimates of βk  for k ≥ 2 are approximately 
−0.067. This value implies that if the level of M2 were to permanently rise 
from 20% per year to 50% per year, the level of output would be about 1.5% 
lower for an extended period. The estimates are obtained in the following 
way. Increases in levels of M2 of 20% and 50% imply log values of 0.182 
and 0.405. Thus, a permanent rise in the levels of M2 in Laos from 20% to 
50% implies a change in the log of output given by bk(0.405 – 0.182) = 
−0.067(0.223) = −0.015. Since e−0. 015  = 0.985, output is reduced by 1.5%. By 
the same token, if the level of M2 were to further rise permanently from 50% 
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Table 5.6: Long-run regressions of real output on money supply, M2 
  GDP   Agriculture   Industry   Services 
k      bk  SE k          b k  SE k        b k  SE k        b k  SE k  
1 −0.023 0.026  0.030 0.025  −0.059 0.080  −0.025 0.022 
2 −0.051** 0.017  0.005 0.024  −0.114** 0.055  −0.038 0.023 
3 −0.053** 0.014  0.008 0.021  −0.095** 0.038  −0.045*** 0.014 
4 −0.054** 0.013  0.014 0.015  −0.079** 0.036  −0.059*** 0.014 
5 −0.056** 0.015  0.025 0.017  −0.074** 0.033  −0.068*** 0.018 
6 −0.061** 0.015  0.024 0.017  −0.081*** 0.026  −0.072*** 0.017 
7 −0.064*** 0.013  0.027 0.017  −0.086*** 0.025  −0.079*** 0.019 
8 −0.063*** 0.014  0.034* 0.017  −0.084** 0.032  −0.078*** 0.020 
9 −0.057*** 0.017  0.041** 0.016  −0.058 0.045  −0.074*** 0.023 
10 −0.051** 0.020  0.043** 0.018  −0.037 0.051  −0.065** 0.023 
11 −0.052** 0.020  0.032 0.022  −0.030 0.046  −0.063*** 0.020 
12 −0.060*** 0.015  0.021 0.020  −0.044 0.038  −0.072*** 0.018 
13 −0.061*** 0.013  0.016 0.016  −0.058 0.034  −0.076*** 0.018 
14 −0.064*** 0.011  0.016 0.013  −0.067* 0.034  −0.084*** 0.014 
15 −0.070*** 0.011  0.017 0.014  −0.089** 0.032  −0.090*** 0.016 
16 −0.081*** 0.010  0.010 0.015  −0.107*** 0.027  −0.098*** 0.018 
17 −0.088*** 0.012  0.001 0.016  −0.112*** 0.032  −0.104*** 0.019 
18 −0.092*** 0.018   −0.001 0.019  −0.119*** 0.033  −0.105** 0.030 
19 −0.098*** 0.021   −0.008 0.021  −0.150*** 0.038  −0.093** 0.034 
20 −0.098*** 0.021    −0.002 0.025   −0.189*** 0.045   −0.081* 0.037 
Source :  Author’s estimation.  
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per year to 100% a year then output would be lower by a further 1.9%. These 
estimates are not implausible given the data collected from the World Bank’s 
World Development Indicator and Bank of Lao PDR’s annual report, which 
indicates that real GDP growth in Lao PDR averaged only about 6.2% per 
year from 1985 to 2011, while the growth rate of M2 was 50.7% per year for 
the same period. In contrast, Lao real GDP growth averaged about 7.9% per 
year from 2005 to 2011, while the growth rate of M2 was 26.7% per year for 
the same period. This supports our findings that the higher the growth rate of 
M2, the lower the growth rate of real GDP. 
  For the real output of industry, the point estimates of bk  for 2 ≤k  ≤ 8 
are approximately −0.087, and imply that a permanent increase in the level 
of M2 from 20% per year to 50% would reduce the level of industrial output 
by about 1.9%. A further permanent rise in the level of M2 from 50% per 
year to 100% per year would reduce industrial output a further 2.5%. These 
are conservative estimates of the effect of permanent increases in the level 
of M2 on long-run output since the absolute value of bk is increasing as k 
rises, although not all the bk  for k ≥ 8 are statistically significant. The 
average value of the bk that are statistically significant (2 ≤k ≤ 8 and k  ≥ 14), 
given by −0.103, indicates that a rise in the level of M2 from 20% to 50% 
would reduce industrial output by 2.3%.  
  Similar to the industrial sector, the point estimates of bk  of the 
service sector for k  ≥ 3 are approximately −0.078, and imply that a 
permanent increase in the level of M2 from 20% per year to 50% would 
reduce the level of service output by about 1.7%. A further permanent rise in 
the level of M2 from 50% per year to 100% per year would reduce service 
output a further 2.2%.  
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c.  Industry           d.  Services 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source :  Author’s estimation.  
Notes :  A continuous line refers to the point estimates. A dashed l ine refers to the 
confidence interval . A straight dashed l ine refers to the zero origin of the diagram. 
Diagram  5.4: Lao real output on M2 money, 1984–2011 
 
  To further investigate the long-run impact of M2 on the real sector, 
Fisher and Seater (1993) present the point estimates and confidence intervals 
with a diagram. The hypothesis of long-run monetary neutrality is rejected 
when the confidence intervals do not contain a number of zero values. 
Diagram 5.1 depicts the results of the long-run relationship between M2 and 
real GDP (Diagram 5.1a) as well as the GDP components (Diagrams 5.1b-
5.1.e) for Lao PDR, over the period 1984–2011. The coefficient on M2 (the 
continuous line) is plotted along with its 95% confidence intervals (the 
dashed lines). Due to the limited number of observations on the output and 
money series, k  is restricted to values from 1 through 20. 
  The results in Diagram 5.1 support the findings shown in Table 5.6 
that real GDP and real sectoral output, except agriculture (lnARG) and 
manufacturing, reject the hypothesis of long-run neutrality of money. In 
particular, a permanent change in the level of M2 has an impact on real GDP, 
real industrial output, and real service output in the long-run. The main 
contrast with the findings of Fisher and Seater (1993), Boschen and Otrok 
(1994), and Haug and Lucas (1997) is that the point estimates for bk  are 
negative and statistically significant for all values of k . The point estimates 
for bk  in my empirical results diverge from zero as k increases.  
The existing literature shows that structural break could lead to the 
rejection of LRN. This issue is particularly acute in Lao PDR as the Asian 
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financial crisis caused a dramatic rise in inflation rate in the period 1997–
1999. In this regard, it is important to include a crisis dummy for the period 
1997–1999. Xaiyavong and Czerkawski (2013) show that the inclusion of 
such dummy does not change the conclusion regarding the non-neutrality of 
money in Lao PDR. In particular, they find that the results do not support 
LRN as the point estimates of bk move away from the zero line and are 
significantly different from zero for all values of k . The findings in my study 
are consistent with the evidence from Chen (2007) who tested the LRN in 
South Korean and Taiwan, and Puah et al. (2008) who tested the LRN in 10 
member countries of the South East Asian Central Banks (SEACEN) 
Research and Training Centre, including Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, 
Nepal, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, and 
Thailand, and found the evidence that does not support the LRN hypothesis 
in the case of Indonesia, Taiwan, and Thailand. However, the empirical 
results of these four countries provide positive estimate coefficient on 
money supply. 
Previous studies show that LRN proposition can sometimes be 
rejected when different types of money stock data are adopted (Weber, 1994; 
Olekalns, 1996; Coe and Nason, 2003; Jefferson, 1997; Serletis and Koustas, 
2001). For this reason, the use of money stock data aside from M2 is 
considered to be important and is therefore investigated in the following 
subsection. 
5.2.3 Testing monetary neutrality based on money supply, M1 
Money supply (M1) measures the “transactions” characteristic of 
money in Laos. Given the I(1) of Lao data on M1 and real aggregate and 
sectoral outputs, the hypothesis of monetary neutrality can be tested by the 
method of Fisher and Seater. Table 5.7 presents the values of estimated 
coefficients (bk) and White’s (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard 
errors of the long-run relationship between M2 and real GDP as well as the 
GDP components for Lao PDR expressed in equation (4.9), over the period 
1984–2011. Due to the limited number of observations on the output and 
money series, k  is restricted to values from 1 through 20. 
  The results in Table 5.7 indicate that the hypothesis of long-run 
neutrality of money is rejected with respect to M1 and real GDP and real
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Table 5.7: Long-run regressions of real output on money supply, M1 
  GDP   Agriculture   Industry   Services 
k     b k  SE k        b k  SE k        b k  SE k        b k  SE k  
1 −0.013 0.022    0.007 0.023  −0.018 0.065  −0.008 0.016 
2 −0.034** 0.015  −0.016 0.015  −0.059 0.053  −0.020 0.016 
3 −0.042*** 0.010  −0.020** 0.009  −0.058 0.037  −0.034*** 0.012 
4 −0.042*** 0.008  −0.015 0.010  −0.048 0.029  −0.047*** 0.010 
5 −0.046*** 0.011  −0.014 0.014  −0.042 0.028  −0.058*** 0.015 
6 −0.050*** 0.013  −0.017 0.010  −0.046* 0.024  −0.063*** 0.017 
7 −0.051*** 0.014  −0.019* 0.011  −0.050* 0.024  −0.068** 0.024 
8 −0.054*** 0.014  −0.021** 0.010  −0.056* 0.027  −0.074*** 0.023 
9 −0.048*** 0.016  −0.017 0.018  −0.038 0.036  −0.068** 0.028 
10 −0.046** 0.018  −0.011 0.019  −0.023 0.040  −0.061* 0.029 
11 −0.042* 0.021  −0.008 0.019  −0.022 0.037  −0.051 0.031 
12 −0.050* 0.020  −0.005 0.016  −0.041 0.034  −0.056* 0.028 
13 −0.054** 0.018    0.002 0.012  −0.061* 0.031  −0.065* 0.031 
14 −0.059*** 0.017    0.012 0.013  −0.065 0.037  −0.077** 0.025 
15 −0.064*** 0.017    0.016 0.013  −0.079* 0.039  −0.084*** 0.023 
16 −0.071*** 0.017    0.007 0.014  −0.085** 0.036  −0.084** 0.024 
17 −0.074*** 0.015  −0.002 0.014  −0.083* 0.036  −0.084** 0.022 
18 −0.069*** 0.017  −0.003 0.016  −0.080** 0.034  −0.074** 0.026 
19 −0.066*** 0.016  −0.004 0.015  −0.093** 0.032  −0.058* 0.024 
20 −0.063** 0.015     0.002 0.017   −0.119** 0.033   −0.048 0.025 
Source :  Author’s estimation.  
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sectoral output. Generally, the results are consistent with those found in 
Table 5.5. In particular, a permanent change in the level of M1 has an impact 
on real GDP and real outputs of industry and services in the long-run. For 
real GDP, the point estimates for bk are negative and statistically significant 
for k ≥ 2.  For real output of industry, the point estimates for bk  are negative 
and statistically significant for 6 ≤ k ≤ 8 and k ≥ 15. For real output of 
services, the point estimates for bk  are negative and statistically significant 
for 3 ≤ k ≤ 10 and k ≥ 12.   
  For real GDP, the point estimates of bk  for k ≥ 2 are approximately 
−0.054. This value implies that if the level of M1 were to permanently rise 
from 20% per year to 50% per year, the level of output would be about 1.2% 
lower for an extended period. By the same token, if the level of M2 were to 
further rise permanently from 50% per year to 100% a year then output 
would be lower by a further 1.5%. These estimates are not implausible given 
the data collected from the World Bank’s World Development Indicator and 
Bank of Lao PDR’s annual report, which indicates that real GDP growth in 
Lao PDR averaged only about 6.2% per year from 1985 to 2011, while the 
growth rate of M1 was 58.6% per year for the same period. In contrast, Lao 
real GDP growth averaged about 7.9% per year from 2005 to 2011, while the 
growth rate of M1 was 29.7% per year for the same period. This supports my 
findings that the higher the growth rate of M1, the lower the growth rate of 
real GDP. 
  For the real output of industry, the point estimates of bk  for 6 ≤k  ≤ 8 
are approximately −0.051, and imply that a permanent increase in the level 
of M1 from 20% per year to 50% would reduce the level of industrial output 
by about 1.1%. A further permanent rise in the level of M1 from 50% per 
year to 100% per year would reduce industrial output a further 1.5%. These 
are conservative estimates of the effect of permanent increases in the level 
of M1 on long-run output since the absolute value of bk is increasing as k 
rises, although not all the bk  for k ≥ 9 are statistically significant. The 
average value of the bk that are statistically significant (6 ≤k ≤ 8 and k  ≥ 15), 
given by −0.07, indicates that a rise in the level of M1 from 20% to 50% 
would reduce industrial output by 1.6%.  
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  Similar to the industrial sector, the point estimates of bk  of the 
service sector for 3 ≤k  ≤ 10 and 12 ≤k  ≤ 19 are approximately −0.066, and 
imply that a permanent increase in the level of M1 from 20% per year to 
50% would reduce the level of service output by about 1.5%. A further 
permanent rise in the level of M1 from 50% per year to 100% per year would 
reduce service output a further 1.9%.  
 
a.  GDP           b.  Agriculture 
 
 
 
 
 
c.  Industry           d.  Services 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source :  Author’s estimation.  
Notes :  A continuous line refers to the point estimates. A dashed l ine refers to the 
confidence interval . A straight dashed l ine refers to the zero origin of the Diagram .  
Diagram  5.5: Lao real output on M1 money, 1984–2011 
 
  To further investigate the long-run impact of M1 on the real sector, a 
diagram is used to present the point estimates and confidence intervals. The 
hypothesis of long-run monetary neutrality is rejected when the confidence 
intervals do not contain a number of zero values. Diagram 5.2 depicts the 
results of the long-run relationship between M1 and real GDP (Diagram 
5.2a) as well as the GDP components (Diagrams 5.2b-5.2e) over the period 
1984–2011. The coefficient on M1 (the continuous line) is plotted along with 
-0.12
-0.1
-0.08
-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
0
0.02
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19
Co
eff
ici
en
t o
n M
1
k
-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19
Co
eff
ici
en
t o
n M
1
k
-0.21
-0.16
-0.11
-0.06
-0.01
0.04
0.09
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19
Co
eff
ici
en
t o
n M
1
k
-0.14
-0.12
-0.10
-0.08
-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
0.00
0.02
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19
Co
eff
ici
en
t o
n M
1
k
139 
 
its 95% confidence intervals (the dashed lines). Due to the limited number of 
observations on the output and money series, k is restricted to values from 1 
through 20. 
  The results in Diagram 5.2 support the findings shown in Table 5.7 
that real GDP and real sectoral output, except agriculture (lnARG), reject the 
hypothesis of long-run neutrality of money. In particular, a permanent 
change in the level of M1 has a negative impact on real GDP, real industrial 
output, and real service output in the long-run. The conclusion is robust for 
an alternative specification with a time dummy for the period during which 
the Asian financial crisis affected the Lao economy (Xaiyavong and 
Czerkawski, 2013). 
  The underdeveloped financial markets may distort the monetary polic, 
resulting in the rejection of LRN with respect to real GDP and services 
output. Any increase in money supply is unlikely to stimulate the real sector 
through an increase in private investment as investors run their businesses 
under imperfect information and are lack of confidence in government policy. 
The net effect of expansionary monetary policy only results in higher 
general prices and makes the economy more vulnerable. As Xaiyavong 
(2013) points out, the BOL used real monetary aggregates as the main policy 
instrument, implying that its monetary policy tends to suffer from instability 
in the demand for money either due to high degree of CS and persistent 
changes resulting from financial innovation. The macroeconomic instability 
seems to exist in the Lao economy not only in the short-run but also in the 
long-run. This is why the empirical results provide negative estimated 
coefficient on money supply. Similar empirical evidence with negative 
estimated coefficient on money is also found by Wallace (1999) who tested 
the LRN in the Mexican economy and Sulku (2011) who tested the LRN in 
the Turkish economy. However, both studies found empirical evidence that 
support the LRN proposition. 
5.2.4 Implications for monetary policy in Lao PDR 
  Applying the reduced-form neutrality of Fisher and Seater (1993) to 
examine the impact of money supply on real GDP in Laos over the period 
1984–2011, it is found that the LRN proposition holds with respect to 
agricultural and industrial output. In contrast, the LRN proposition does not 
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hold with respect to real GDP and services output. In particular, changes in 
the quantity of money have negative long-run effect on the level of real GDP 
and services output in Lao PDR. The rejection of LRN proposition with 
respect to real GDP and services output is robust whether M1 or M2 is used 
as the monetary measure. It is also robust for an alternative specification 
with a time dummy for the period during which the Asian financial crisis 
affected the Lao economy.  
  The negative impact of money on real GDP implies that monetary 
expansion is unlikely to stimulate output, eliminate recession, and increase 
job opportunity. By contrast, the net effect of expansionary monetary policy 
may result in higher prices and make the economy more vulnerable. Hence, 
the monetary authority should not manipulate monetary policy to stabilize 
the fluctuations in business cycle before considering the relationship 
between money and real output.   
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Chapter 6 Macroeconomic Policies under the Managed-Floating 
and Fixed Exchange Rate Regimes in Lao PDR—Empirical 
Analyses 
 
 
 In Chapter 6, I present the empirical results on the evaluation of 
macroeconomic policies effectiveness by the simulation analyses in the Lao 
macroeconometric model. The simulation analyses involve two alternative 
degrees of CS, partial CS and complete CS. Macroeconomic policies are 
evaluated for the case of an economy with partial CS compared with the case 
of an economy with complete CS. The economy with partial CS is 
represented by the managed-floating exchange rate regime, whereas the 
economy with complete CS is represented by the fixed exchange rate regime. 
The effectiveness of macroeconomic policies is evaluated against changes in 
real GDP. This chapter consists of six sections. In Section 1, I present the 
model specifications and estimation results of Lao macroeconometric model 
estimated by the three-stage least square. The model performance is reported 
in Section 2. The simulation analyses on the macroeconomic policy 
effectiveness in Lao PDR are discussed in Section 3, and policy implications 
of the results are provided in Section 4.   
6.1 Estimation results of Lao macroeconometric model 
The Lao macroeconometric model is constructed under the managed-
floating and fixed exchange rate regimes. The major difference between the 
two regimes is that exchange rate is treated as an endogenous variable in the 
latter, while it is treated as an exogenous variable. The estimation results 
under the two regimes are very similar. Therefore, the specifications and 
estimations for the Lao macroeconometric model are explained only under 
the managed-floating exchange rate regime. The Lao macroeconomic model 
consists of four building blocks: production, final demand, money and prices, 
and government. There are 13 behavioural equations, six identities, and one 
definitional equation. Given the estimated behavioural equations, accounting 
identities and definitional equation, a policy shock initially disturbs a 
specific relation and then affects the economy through the propagation 
mechanism across the four building blocks. All the variables go through a 
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dynamic adjustment process until the economy finds a new equilibrium. The 
estimation results and a brief description of the behavioural equations in 
each block are presented in the following subsections.  
6.1.1 Production structure of Lao economy 
a. Agriculture output 
Agriculture output (GDPAG) is a function of agriculture area (AAG) 
and labour supply for agriculture sector (AL). Alternatively, agriculture 
output per labour is a function of agriculture area per labour.      
 log(ܩܦܲܣܩ ܣܮ⁄ ) = 7.180 + 9.863log (ܣܣܩ ܣܮ⁄ ) 
                                                 (11.53)        (11.95)            
    Adjusted R2  = 0.84, S.E. of regression = 0.45 
 
The estimation result shows that the model of agriculture output is 
good. The model’s adjusted R2  is 0.84, suggesting that agriculture area per 
labour  (ܣܣܩ ܣܮ⁄ ) can explain the variation of agriculture output about 84%. 
Agriculture area per labour is positive and statistically significant at 1% 
level. The coefficient of agriculture area per labour is about 9.9, indicating 
that a 1% increase in agriculture area per labour increases agriculture output 
per labour by 9.9%. 
 
b. Non-agriculture output 
Non-agriculture output (GDPNAG) is a function of capital stock 
lagged one year (ܭ௧ିଵ) and non-agriculture labour (NAL). Alternatively, non-
agriculture output per labour is a function of capital stock per labour.      
 log(ܩܦܲܰܣܩ ܰܣܮ⁄ )୲ = 0.406 + 1.178log (K୲ିଵ NAL୲⁄ ) 
                                         (3.06)        (21.55)            
    Adjusted R2  = 0.91, S.E. of regression = 0.39 
 
The estimation result shows that the model of non-agriculture output 
is very good. The model’s adjusted R2  is 0.91, suggesting that capital stock 
per labour  (K୲ିଵ NAL୲⁄ )  can explain the variation of non-agriculture output 
about 91%. Capital stock per labour is positive and statistically significant at 
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1% level. The coefficient of capital stock per labour is about 1.2, indicating 
that a 1% increase in capital stock per labour increases non-agriculture 
output per labour by 1.2%. 
 
c. Non-agriculture labour 
Non-agriculture labour (NAL) is a function of nominal wage (ܹܣܩ) 
and its lag one year (ܰܣܮ௧ିଵ).  The estimation result shows that the model of 
non-agriculture labour is very good. However, the coefficient of ܹܣܩ  is 
negative and not statistically significant. In theory, the coefficient of ܹܣܩ 
should have a positive sign, meaning that an increase in nominal wage 
should encourage more workers to work in the non-agriculture sector. The 
negative sign and non-statistical significance of the coefficient of ܹܣܩ may 
imply that the labour market in Lao PDR is underdeveloped .  The 
underdevelopment of labour market reflects imperfect information about 
wage.   
 log(ܰܣܮ௧) = −0.066 − 0.003 log(ܹܣܩ) + 1.021log (ܰܣܮ௧ିଵ) 
                                (−1.24)        (−1.61)           (90.24)            
                       Adjusted R2 = 0.99, S.E. of regression  = 0.005 
 
Instead of relying on wage information as an indicator for 
participating in the non-agriculture sector, workers may decide to work 
through social connections. The coefficient of ܰܣܮ௧ିଵ is positive and 
statistically significant at 1% level. Its magnitude is about 1, indicating that 
a 1% increase in last year labour forces in the non-agriculture sector may 
lead to a proportional increase in this year labour forces. 
6.1.2 Composition of Lao final demand 
Final demand or real GDP is defined as the sum of private 
consumption, government consumption, private fixed investment, 
government fixed investment, increase in stock or inventory, exports of 
goods and services minus imports of goods and services, and statistical 
discrepancies. Nominal GDP is the product of the real GDP and GDP 
deflator.  
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a. Private consumption 
Real private consumption (CP/PL) is specified as a function of the real 
disposable income (ܰܫ)and its own lag ((CP/PL)௧ିଵ).19 Both ܰܫ and (CP/PL)௧ିଵ 
can explain real private consumption very well. The adjusted R-squared 
(adjusted R2) is 0.99, indicating that ܰܫ  and (CP/PL)௧ିଵ  can explain the 
variation in real private consumption about 99%. The estimated coefficient 
of ܰܫ  is statistically significant at 1% level as its t-statistic is 24.58. The 
magnitude of ܰܫ  coefficient is 0.915, suggesting that a 1% increase in the 
real disposable income increases real private consumption by 0.9%. The 
estimated coefficient of (CP/PL)௧ିଵ  has a negative sign, but it is not 
statistically significant at any conventional level. It thereby implies that 
household does not decide the current consumption level based on the past 
consumption. 
 log(CP/PL)௧ = 0.764 + 0.915 log(ܰܫ௧) − 0.024log(CP/PL)௧ିଵ 
                                        (5.78)             (24.58)                 (−0.65) 
Adjusted R2  = 0.99, S.E. of regression = 0.10 
 
b. Government consumption 
Government consumption (ܥܩ௧) in the final demand block is a part of 
government expenditures consisting of government consumption and 
government investment. ܥܩ௧ is a function of government revenues (ܴܧ ௧ܸ) and 
its own lag (ܥܩ௧ିଵ) . The specification is based on a simple relationship 
between the government account and national income account.  
 log(ܥܩ௧) = −0.391 + 1.065 log(ܴܧ ௧ܸ) − 0.041log (ܥܩ௧ିଵ)        
                                  (−2.58)        (13.57)            (−0.58) 
  Adjusted R2  = 0.99, S.E. of regression = 0.15  
 
The estimation result shows that both ܴܧ ௧ܸ and ܥܩ௧ିଵ can explain ܥܩ௧ 
very well. The adjusted R2  is 0.99, indicating that ܴܧ ௧ܸ  and ܥܩ௧ିଵ  can 
explain the variation in government consumption about 99%. The 
government consumption is more sensitive to government revenues than its 
                                                     
19  ‘PL’  denotes the price level measured by the GDP deflator.  
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past consumption. The estimated coefficient of ܴܧ ௧ܸ  is statistically 
significant at 1% level and about 1.1. That is, a 1% increase in government 
revenues leads to 1.1% increase in government consumption. However, the 
past level of government consumption does not help explain the current level  
of government consumption. The estimated coefficient of ܥܩ௧ିଵ  is not 
statistically significant at any conventional level. 
 
c. Domestic private investment 
Domestic private investment is part of the total investment consisting 
of government investment, foreign direct investment (FDI), and domestic 
private investment. Both government investment and FDI are treated as 
exogenous variables. Government investment is by principle made by 
government and is therefore treated as a key variable of fiscal policy. FDI 
inflows can be mainly influenced by source countries and thereby, treated as 
an exogenous variable. Real domestic private investment ( (ܦܲܫ ܲܮ⁄ )௧ ) is a 
function of real GDP growth ( ݈݋݃ (ܩܦ ௧ܲ ܩܦ ௧ܲିଵ⁄ )), lag of real capital stock 
((ܭ ܲܮ⁄ )௧ିଵ), and real domestic lending rate denominated in kip ((ܮܴܭ ܲܮ⁄ )௧).  
 ݈݋݃(ܦܲܫ ܲܮ⁄ )௧ = −0.535 + 0.591݈݋݃ (ܩܦ ௧ܲ ܩܦ ௧ܲିଵ⁄ ) + 1.571݈݋݃(ܭ ܲܮ⁄ )௧ିଵ 
                         (−1.90)      (0.31)                            (4.77) 
                                   −6.931݈݋݃(ܮܴܭ ܲܮ⁄ )௧ 
(−1.18) 
  Adjusted R2  = 0.53, S.E. of regression = 2.41  
 
The estimation result shows that the model of domestic private 
investment is moderately good. The model’s adjusted R2 is 0.53, suggesting 
that real GDP growth, lag of real capital stock, and real domestic lending 
rate can explain the variation of real domestic private investment about 53%. 
More specifically, only the estimated coefficient of (ܭ ܲܮ⁄ )௧ିଵis positive and 
statistically significant at 1% level. The magnitude of the coefficient is 
about 1.6, indicating that a 1% increase in the past level of real capital stock 
leads to an increase in real domestic private investment by 1.6%. 
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d. Exports 
Export ( ܧܺ ) is a function of world demand (ܹܦ)  and kip/dollar 
exchange rate. World demand is represented by the weighted average of top 
five countries for Lao exports, namely Thailand, Vietnam, Republic of China, 
Germany, and United Kingdom. An increase in the world demand tends to 
absorb exports from Lao PDR.    
 log(ܧܺ௧) = −31.545 + 2.447 log(ܹܦ௧) + 0.794log (ܴܣܶܧ ௧ܷ) 
                               (−27.07)     (26.36)               (26.61) 
     Adjusted R2  = 0.99, S.E. of regression = 0.14  
 
The estimation result shows that the model of exports is very good. 
The model’s adjusted R2 is 0.99, suggesting that world demand and 
kip/dollar exchange rate can explain the variation of exports about 99%. The 
coefficients of both world demand and kip/dollar exchange rate are positive 
and statistically significant at 1% level. However, exports tend to be more 
sensitive to world demand than kip/dollar exchange rate. The magnitude of 
the world demand’s coefficient is about 2.5, indicating that a 1% increase in 
the world demand leads to an increase in exports by about 2.5%. The 
magnitude of the kip/dollar exchange rate’s coefficient is about 0.8, 
indicating that a 1% depreciation of the kip/dollar exchange rate leads to an 
increase in exports by about 0.8%. 
 
e. Imports 
Import (ܫܯ) is a function of GDP and kip/dollar exchange rate. The 
estimation result shows that the model of imports is very good. The model’s 
adjusted R2 is 0.99, suggesting that world demand and kip/dollar exchange 
rate can explain the variation of exports about 99%. The coefficients of both 
world demand and kip/dollar exchange rate are statistically significant at 1% 
level. However, imports tend to be more sensitive to GDP than kip/dollar 
exchange rate. The magnitude of GDP’s coefficient is about 1.7, indicating 
that a 1% increase in GDP leads to an increase in imports by about 1.7%. 
The magnitude of the kip/dollar exchange rate’s coefficient is about −0.9, 
indicating that a 1% depreciation of the kip/dollar leads to a reduction of 
imports by about 0.9%.    
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log(ܫܯ௧) = 0.617 + 1.660 log(ܩܦ ௧ܲ) − 0.911log (ܴܣܶܧ ௧ܷ) 
                                 (2.61)      (21.24)               (−9.27) 
         Adjusted R2 = 0.99, S.E. of regression  = 0.13  
6.1.3 Tax revenue of the Lao government 
a. Direct tax revenue 
Direct tax revenue (ܦܶܣܺ) is a function of net national income (ܰܫ) 
and its own lag  (ܦܶܣܺ௧ିଵ).  ܦܶܣܺ includes revenue from income and profit  
taxes.  ܰܫ  is derived by subtracting indirect tax revenue from GDP. An 
increase in ܰܫ tends to increase direct tax revenue at a given tax rate.  
 log(ܦܶܣܺ௧) = −0.671 + 0.262 log(ܰܫ௧) + 0.763log (ܦܶܣܺ௧ିଵ) 
                                  (−2.42)      (5.77)       (23.13) 
         Adjusted R2 = 0.99, S.E. of regression  = 0.15  
 
The estimation result shows that the model of direct tax revenue is 
very good. The model’s adjusted R2  is 0.99, suggesting that net national 
income and lagged direct tax revenue can explain the variation of current 
direct tax revenue about 99%. The coefficients of both net national income 
and lagged direct tax revenue are statistically significant at 1% level. 
However, current direct tax revenue tends to be more sensitive to its own lag 
than net national income. The magnitude of lagged direct tax revenue’s 
coefficient is about 0.7, indicating that a 1% increase in lagged direct tax 
revenue leads to an increase in current direct tax revenue by about 0.7%. The 
magnitude of net national income’s coefficient is about 0.3, indicating that a 
1% increase in net national income leads to an increase in current direct tax 
revenue by about 0.3%. 
6.1.4 Monetary aggregates, exchange rate, and price level 
a. Foreign currency deposit 
Foreign currency deposit (FCD) is part of broad money supply (M2) 
which consists of M1 (i.e., currency in circulation and demand deposit), 
saving and time deposits denominated in kip, and saving and time deposits 
denominated in Thai baht and US dollar. In this dissertation, saving and time 
deposits denominated in Thai baht and US dollar are referred to as FCD. The 
model specification of FCD is based on the money demand framework which 
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states that money demand depends on the opportunity cost of holding money 
and income. The opportunity cost of holding money is represented by 
domestic interest rates for 1-year time deposit denominated in kip and US 
dollar. Income is represented by real GDP. In the Lao macroeconometric 
model, real FCD (ܨܥܦ ܲܮ⁄ ) is a function of the ratio of real domestic deposit  
rate in kip to real domestic deposit rate in US dollar (DR) and of real GDP. 
Deposit rate, ܦܴ is mathematically defined as  (ܦܴܭ/ܲܮ) (ܦܴܦ ܲܮܷ⁄⁄ ), where 
DRK is kip deposit rate, PL is general price in the Lao PDR, DRD is dollar 
deposit rate, and PLU is general price in the US.     
 log(FCD PL⁄ )୲ = −4.322 − 0.178log(DR୲) + 1.263log (GDP୲) 
       (−16.83)      (−4.66)          (47.24)  
     Adjusted R2  = 0.98, S.E. of regression = 0.19  
 
 The estimation results show that the model of FCD is very good. The 
model’s adjusted R2 is 0.98, suggesting that ܦܴ  and ܩܦܲ  can explain the 
variation of real FCD about 98%. Both DR  and GDP  are statistically 
significant at 1% level. FCD is more sensitive to GDP than deposit rate. The 
coefficient of DR is negative and about 0.2, indicating that a 10% increase in 
kip deposit rate reduces FCD by 2%. The coefficient of GDP is positive and 
about 1.3, indicating that a 10% increase in GDP increases in FCD by 12%.  
 
b. General price level 
General price (ܲܮ) is a function of domestic demand pressure (ܦܵ),  
ratio of M2 to GDP (ܯܵ ܩܦܲ⁄ ) and kip-dollar exchange rate (ܴܣܶܧܷ). The 
estimation result shows that the model of general price is very good. The 
model’s adjusted R2 is 0.88, suggesting that ܦܵ, MS/GDP, and RATEU can 
explain the variation of general price about 88%. All variables are 
statistically significant at 1% level. General price is more sensitive to DS 
than MS/GDP. The coefficient of ܦܵ is positive and about 2, indicating that 
a 1% increase in domestic demand pressure increases general price by 2%. 
The coefficient of MS/GDP is positive and about 0.6, indicating that a 1% 
increase in the ratio of M2 to GDP leads to an increase in general price by 
0.6%.  
 
149 
 
log(ܲܮ௧) = 1.579 + 1.976 log(ܦܵ௧) + 0.556 log(ܯܵ ܩܦܲ⁄ )௧ − 0.077log (ܴܣܶܧ ௧ܷ) 
                   (7.59)         (5.23)       (16.81)        (−3.55) 
         Adjusted R2 = 0.88, S.E. of regression  = 0.11  
  
 The coefficient of ܴܣܶܧܷ has an unexpected sign which is negative. 
In theory, it  should have a positive sign, meaning that the depreciation of 
exchange rate results in an increase in general price because of higher costs 
of imports. Nonetheless, the negative sign of ܴܣܶܧܷ coefficient may indicate 
that the depreciation of exchange rate may improve competitiveness of local 
businesses in Lao PDR. An improvement of competitiveness may encourage 
domestic firms to produce more outputs and thereby, reducing general price. 
 
c. Private wage 
In theory, nominal private wage (ܹܣܩ) is a function of general price, 
nominal GDP, and its lag one year. Higher prices of goods may force 
workers to request for higher wage rates in order to maintain their 
purchasing power. Higher GDP may indicate more demand for goods which 
induce firms to produce more outputs. An increase in production leads to an 
increase in labour demand which causes higher wage rate. The lagged 
nominal private wage may reflect the backward looking behaviour of firms 
to adjust the wage rate. In the Lao macroeconometric model, the model of 
private wage is formulated in real term. In particular, real private wage 
( ܹܣܩ/ܲܮ ) is a function of real GDP (GDP), and its lag one year (ܹܣܩ ܲܮ⁄ )௧ିଵ.  
 log(ܹܣܩ ܲܮ⁄ )௧ = 4.710 + 0.370 log(ܩܦ ௧ܲ) + 0.496log (ܹܣܩ ܲܮ⁄ )௧ିଵ 
                                  (7.40)        (9.89)               (8.92) 
         Adjusted R2 = 0.93, S.E. of regression  = 0.31  
 
The estimation result shows that the model of real wage is very good. 
The model’s adjusted R2  is 0.93, suggesting that real GDP and lagged real 
wage can explain the variation of current real wage about 93%. All variables 
are statistically significant at 1% level. Current real wage is more sensitive 
to last year’s real wage than real GDP. A 10% increase in last year’s real 
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wage results in an increase in the current real wage by about 5%. A 10% 
increase in real GDP increases the current real wage by about 4%. 
d. Exchange rate 
The nominal exchange rate is represented by the kip/dollar exchange 
rate (RATEU). There are two alternative exchange rate regimes in the Lao 
macroeconometric model. Fist, the fixed exchange rate regime is represented 
by the treatment of exchange rate as an exogenous variable. That is, 
exchange rate is controlled by the Bank of Lao PDR. Therefore, the model of 
exchange rate is not discussed here. Second, the managed floating exchange 
rate is characterized by the government intervention in the foreign exchange 
market without specifying a pre-announced path for the exchange rate 
(Bofinger and Wollmershäuser 2001). Under the managed-floating exchange 
rate regime, real exchange rate is determined by its own lag which reflects 
the backward-looking behaviour in exchange rate expectations. 
 ݈݋݃(ܴܣܶܧܷ ܲܮ⁄ )௧ = 1.570 + 0.823log(ܴܣܶܧܷ ܲܮ⁄ )௧ିଵ 
       (3.92)       (17.54) 
         Adjusted R2 = 0.87, S.E. of regression  = 0.36  
 
The estimation result shows that the model of real exchange rate is 
good to predict the development of exchange rate. The model’s adjusted R2  
is 0.87, suggesting that lagged real exchange rate can explain the variation 
of current real exchange rate about 87%. It is statistically significant at 1% 
level. A 10% depreciation of last year’s real exchange rate results in a 
depreciation of current real exchange rate by about 8%. 
6.1.5 Identities and definitional equation in Lao macroeconometric 
model 
Six identities and one definitional equation are included to close the 
models. The identities include GDP in supply side, agriculture labour, GDP 
in demand side, national income, total investment, and total tax revenue. 
GDP in supply side is the sum of agriculture and non-agriculture outputs. 
Agriculture labour is the difference between total labour force and non-
agriculture labour. GDP in demand side is the sum of consumption, 
investment and the trade balance. National income is defined as GDP minus 
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indirect tax revenue. Total investment is the sum of government investment,  
domestic private investment, and foreign direct investment (FDI). Both 
government investment and FDI are treated as exogenous variables. The 
definitional equation is the broad money supply (M2) which is the sum of 
narrow money supply (M1), saving and time deposits denominated in kip, 
and foreign currency deposits. The identities and definitional equation are 
represented as follows: 
 ܩܦܲܵ௧ = ܩܦܲܣܩ௧ + ܩܦܲܰܣܩ௧  ܣܮ௧ = ܶܮ௧ − ܰܣܮ௧ ܩܦ ௧ܲ = ܥ ௧ܲ + ܥܩ௧ + ܦܲܫ௧ + ܫܩ௧ + ܨܦܫ௧ + ܧܺ௧ − ܫܯ௧     ܰܫ௧ = ܩܦ ௧ܲ − ܫܶܣܺ௧ ܶܣܺ௧ = ܦܶܣܺ௧ + ܫܶܣܺ௧ ܫ௧ = ܦܲܫ௧ + ܫܩ௧ + ܨܦܫ௧ ܯ2௧ = ܯ1௧ + ܭܥܦ௧ + ܨܥܦ௧ 
 
 The identities and definitional equation are taken into account when 
constructing a model for simulation analyses. 
6.2 Performance of Lao macroeconometric model 
The model under the managed-floating exchange rate regime performs 
better than the model under the fixed exchange rate regime. Table 6.1 shows 
the ex-post simulation which compares the actual and fitted values of 
variables used in the Lao macroeconometric model. The estimation of Lao 
macroeconometric model under the managed-floating exchange rate regime 
includes the behavioural equation of exchange rate, while the estimation of 
Lao macroeconometric model under the fixed exchange rate regime excludes 
it. Under the managed-floating exchange rate regime, the root mean-squared 
percentage errors (RMSPE) of fitted values are 0.44% for NAL, 8.96% for 
CP,  and 26.53% for WAG.  Under the fixed exchange rate regime, RMSPE of 
fitted values are 0.45% for NAL, 9.09% for CP, and 28.01% for WAG.   
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Table 6.1: Comparison of model performance by root mean square 
percentage error 
 
Source :  Author’s estimation.  
 
This may reflect the partial CS in Lao PDR which exists under the 
managed-floating exchange rate regime. The complete CS represented by the 
fixed exchange rate may not reflect well the actual CS in Lao PDR. 
Therefore, RMSPE of variables under the fixed exchange rate regime are 
slightly higher than those variables under the managed-floating exchange 
rate regime. 
6.3 Simulation analyses of fiscal and monetary policies under the 
managed-floating and fixed exchange rate systems 
6.3.1 Effects of fiscal and monetary policies on Lao economy 
The combination of fiscal and monetary policies tends to be more 
effective under fixed exchange rate regime than under managed-floating 
exchange rate regime. Table 6.2 shows the effects of policy mix which is the 
combination of expansionary fiscal policy and restrictive monetary policy. 
Expansionary fiscal policy is conducted by an increase in government 
investment. Government investment is assumed to increase by 2% of GDP 
which is consistent with annual average of the simulated period (2005-2012). 
Restrictive monetary policy is conducted by an increase in kip-denominated 
deposit rate which may be considered as a strategy to reduce FCD. The 
combination of an increase in both government investment and kip-
denominated deposit rate increases real GDP in demand side (GDP) by 1.8% 
Macroeconomic variable Managed floating exchange rate Fixed exchange rate
NAL 0.44 0.45
CP 8.96 9.09
CG 15.03 15.22
EX 12.71 12.71
IM 12.04 12.06
DTAX 13.65 13.66
FCD 17.23 17.45
PL 10.12 9.24
WAGE 26.53 28.01
RATEU 29.30 —
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and 3.6% under the managed-floating and fixed exchange rate regimes, 
respectively. Similarly, it increases real GDP in supply side (GDPS) by 1.8% 
and 3.8% under the managed-floating and fixed exchange rate regimes, 
respectively. 
 
Table 6.2: Effects of policy mix, percentage change of the baseline 
 
Note :  Figures are the percentage change of the basel ine, mathematical ly defined as (ݏ݅݉ݑ݈ܽݐ݁݀ ݒ݈ܽݑ݁ − ܾܽݏ݈݁݅݊݁ ݒ݈ܽݑ݁) × 100/(ܾܽݏ݈݁݅݊݁ ݒ݈ܽݑ݁).  
Source :  Author’s estimation.  
 
 Under the managed-floating exchange rate, an increase in kip-
denominated deposit rate increases the cost of holding the US dollar and 
thereby, reducing FCD. An increase in government investment results in an 
increase in GDP which also increases FCD. The net impact of policy mix 
leads to a reduction in FCD by 2.2% and hence M2 by 1.2%. The reduction 
of M2 implies that there is less money to purchase goods. The reduction of 
Managed floating exchange rate Fixed exchange rate
Production block
GDPS  (Real) 1.812 3.805
GDPAG  (Real) 0.024 0.055
GDPNAG  (Real) −0.001 −0.002
AL −0.003 −0.006
NAL 0.008 0.019
Final demand block
GDP  (Real) 1.786 3.609
DS −0.026 −0.187
NI  (Real) 1.785 3.604
CP −0.204 −0.572
CG 0.771 1.550
DPI −0.548 −0.348
EX −1.412 0.000
IM 4.674 6.144
Government block
REV 0.747 1.501
TAX 0.864 1.765
DTAX 1.211 2.616
Money and price block
M2 −1.185 −1.145
FCD −2.167 −2.140
PL −1.774 −3.626
WAGE −0.664 −1.503
RATEU −1.774 —
Macroeconomic variable ∆IG = 2% × GDP, ∆DRK = 20%
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M2, fall of domestic demand pressure, and an appreciation of kip/dollar rate 
decrease the price level by 1.8%. A fall in the price level reduces private 
wage rate (WAGE) by 0.7% and results in the appreciation of kip/dollar rate 
(RATEU) by 1.8%.        
 The fall in the wage rate has important effects on the Lao economy. 
Since the reduction of wage rate is smaller than the price level, real wage 
rate increases in the non-agriculture sector. An increase in real wage 
increases supply of labour in the non-agriculture sector by 0.008%, while 
reduces the supply of labour in the agriculture sector by 0.003%. Given the 
fixed capital stock, an increase in non-agriculture labour means that labours 
have lower productivity, resulting a fall of the production of output in the 
non-agriculture sector. In contrast, given the limited agricultural land, lower 
labour supply in the agriculture sector improves productivity of farmers,  
resulting in an increase in agriculture output. The net impact of the rise of 
real wage is that aggregate production (GDPS) increases by 1.8%. 
 The appreciation of kip/dollar rate also has important effects on the 
Lao economy. It reduces the exports of goods and services by 1.4%. The 
combined effect of the appreciation of kip/dollar rate and an increase in GDP 
in the demand side stimulates more imports by 4.7%. Since the percentage 
change of exports is slower than that of imports, trade deficit of Lao PDR 
tends to be more severe. Such trade deficit can be offset by other 
components of GDP, especially government consumption (CG). 
 The net effect of policy mix under the managed-floating exchange 
rate regime increases government consumption by 0.8%. This favourable 
outcome is resulted from an improvement in government revenue. The 
conduct of policy mix generates total government revenue by 0.8%. For 
instance, the policy mix increases national income (NI) by 1.8%, resulting in 
an increase in revenues of direct taxes (DTAX) by 1.2%. In contrast, the 
conduct of policy mix reduces private consumption (CP) by 0.2% and 
domestic private investment (DPI) by 0.5%. 
 Under the fixed exchange rate regime, the kip/dollar rate is treated as 
an exogenous variable. The conduct of policy mix under both fixed and 
managed-floating exchange rate regimes produce similar economic outcomes 
in that they increase real GDP while reducing the price level. However, the 
reduction of the price level is much higher in the fixed exchange rate regime 
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(−3.6%) than in the managed-floating exchange rate regime (−1.8%). This is 
consistent with the theory that the managed-floating exchange rate regime 
may absorb some shocks in the economy, while the fixed exchange rate 
regime translates all shocks to the economy. Since real GDP is defined as 
the ratio of nominal GDP to the price level, the impact of policy mix on real 
GDP under the fixed exchange rate regime is 3.6% which is much higher 
than that under the managed-floating exchange rate regime. 
6.3.2 Effects of tight monetary policy on Lao economy 
 Monetary policy tends to be more effective under the managed-
floating exchange rate regime than under the fixed exchange rate regime 
     
Table 6.3: Effects of tight monetary policy, percentage change of the 
baseline 
 
Note :  Figures are the percentage change of the basel ine, mathematical ly defined as (ݏ݅݉ݑ݈ܽݐ݁݀ ݒ݈ܽݑ݁ − ܾܽݏ݈݁݅݊݁ ݒ݈ܽݑ݁) × 100/(ܾܽݏ݈݁݅݊݁ ݒ݈ܽݑ݁).  
Source :  Author’s estimation.  
Managed floating exchange rate Fixed exchange rate
Production block
GDPS  (Real) −0.057 −0.176
GDPAG  (Real) −0.002 −0.004
GDPNAG  (Real) 0.000 0.000
AL 0.000 0.000
NAL −0.001 −0.002
Final demand block
GDP  (Real) 0.013 −0.060
DS 0.070 0.116
NI  (Real) 0.015 −0.057
CP 0.070 0.125
CG 0.007 −0.024
DPI 0.021 0.040
EX 0.045 0.000
IM −0.030 −0.101
Government block
REV 0.007 −0.023
TAX 0.008 −0.027
DTAX 0.012 −0.041
Money and price block
M2 −1.249 −1.196
FCD −2.288 −2.241
PL 0.056 0.176
WAGE 0.065 0.138
RATEU 0.056 —
Macroeconomic variable ∆DRK = 20%
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(Table 6.3). An increase in kip-denominated deposit rate by 20% increases 
real GDP in demand side by 0.013% under the managed-floating exchange 
rate regime, while it reduces real GDP in the demand side by 0.060% under 
the fixed exchange rate regime. More precisely, tight monetary policy under 
the managed-floating exchange rate regime has more favourable effects on 
production, final demand, government revenues, and prices than those of the 
fixed exchange rate.  
 Under the managed-floating exchange rate regime, real GDP in 
production side reduces by 0.057%. In contrast, components of final demand 
also increase by 0.070% for private consumption, 0.045% for exports, and 
0.007% for government consumption. Given the decrease in imports by 
0.030%, trade balance tends to improve. In addition, government revenue 
increases by 0.007%. FCD decreases by 2.288%, resulting in a decrease in 
M2 by 1.249%.     
 Under the fixed exchange rate regime, real GDP in production side 
reduces by 0.176%. Government consumption and import decrease by 
0.024% and 0.101%, respectively. A decrease in import tends to improve 
trade balance between Lao PDR and its trading partners given that export 
remains unchanged. Government revenue decreases by 0.023% which is in 
sharp contrast with the case of managed-floating exchange rate regime where 
tight monetary policy increases government revenue.  FCD decreases by 
2.242%, resulting in a decrease in M2 by 1.196%. In contrast, private 
consumption and domestic private investment increase by 0.125% and 
0.040%, respectively. 
6.3.3 Effects of expansionary fiscal policy on Lao economy  
 Fiscal policy tends to be more effective under the fixed exchange rate 
regime than under the managed-floating exchange rate regime (Table 6.4). 
This is different from the case of tight monetary policy where monetary 
policy tends to be more effective under the managed-floating exchange rate 
regime than under the fixed exchange rate regime. An increase in 
government investment by 2% of GDP increases real GDP in demand side by 
3.670% under the fixed exchange rate regime and 1.772% under the 
managed-floating exchange rate regime. Therefore, expansionary fiscal 
policy under the fixed exchange rate regime has more favourable effects on 
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production, government consumption, government revenues, and prices than 
those of managed-floating exchange rate regime.  
 
Table 6.4: Effects of expansionary fiscal policy, percentage change of the 
baseline 
 
Note :  Figures are the percentage change of the basel ine, mathematical ly defined as (ݏ݅݉ݑ݈ܽݐ݁݀ ݒ݈ܽݑ݁ − ܾܽݏ݈݁݅݊݁ ݒ݈ܽݑ݁) × 100/(ܾܽݏ݈݁݅݊݁ ݒ݈ܽݑ݁).  
Source :  Author’s estimation.  
 
 Under the fixed exchange rate regime, real GDP in production side 
increases by 3.988%. Government consumption and import increase by 
1.573% and 6.249%, respectively. An increase in import tends to worsen 
trade balance between Lao PDR and its trading partners given that export 
remains unchanged. Government revenue and direct tax revenue increase by 
1.524% and 2.656%, respectively. FCD and M2 increase by 0.128% and 
0.065%, respectively.  
Managed floating exchange rate Fixed exchange rate
Production block
GDPS  (Real) 1.870 3.988
GDPAG  (Real) 0.026 0.059
GDPNAG  (Real) −0.001 −0.002
AL −0.003 −0.007
NAL 0.009 0.021
Final demand block
GDP  (Real) 1.772 3.670
DS −0.096 −0.304
NI  (Real) 1.769 3.661
CP −0.274 −0.697
CG 0.763 1.573
DPI −0.569 −0.391
EX −1.456 0.000
IM 4.704 6.249
Government block
REV 0.740 1.524
TAX 0.855 1.792
DTAX 1.199 2.656
Money and price block
M2 0.071 0.065
FCD 0.134 0.128
PL −1.830 −3.793
WAGE −0.729 −1.639
RATEU −1.830 —
Macroeconomic variable ∆IG = 2% × GDP
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 Under the managed-floating exchange rate regime, real GDP in 
production side increases by 1.870%. Government consumption increases by 
0.763%. While export reduces by 1.456%, import increases by 4.704%. This 
tends to worsen trade balance between Lao PDR and its trading partners. 
Government revenue and direct tax revenue increase by 0.740% and 1.199%, 
respectively. FCD and M2 increase by 0.134% and 0.071%, respectively.  
6.4 Policy implications for macroeconomic management in Lao PDR 
The simulation analyses reveal some aspects of the linkage between 
macroeconomic policies and macroeconomic performance in the presence of 
CS. By incorporating a model of FCD into the Lao macroeconometric model, 
I conducted simulation analyses by changing kip-denominated deposit rate 
and/or government investment to evaluate fiscal and monetary policies 
effectiveness under the managed-floating and fixed exchange rate regimes. 
The simulation analyses show that policy mix tends to be more effective 
under the fixed exchange rate regime than under the managed-floating 
exchange rate regime. This implies that adopting foreign currency to replace 
the Lao kip tends to increase the effectiveness of Lao macroeconomic 
management. But the decision to move toward this direction depends on the 
political view which may not occur in the short-term. An alternative strategy 
is to reduce the level of FCD, which seems to be a clear means to strengthen 
the instruments of fiscal and monetary policies.  
The conduct of monetary policy in the presence of partial CS is not 
effective (Menon, 2009). For example, growth in capital inflow needs to be 
accommodated by real exchange rate appreciations. However, the nominal 
exchange rate cannot be relied upon to deliver it , so inflation is usually the 
result, and it is also difficult for the central bank to conduct open market 
operations, in order to sterilize large capital inflows, or mop up excess 
liquidity. This could add to inflation.  
In the presence of CS, the fiscal policy will play a crucial role in 
stabilizing the economy. For instance, to deal with large capital inflows, 
cutting back on government investment can reduce the government’s reliance 
on foreign savings to finance investment, and thereby limit the growth in the 
current account deficit. To reduce the pressure on real exchange rate 
appreciation associated with large capital inflows, selective liberalization of 
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the capital account to facilitate capital outflow could be pursued (Menon, 
2009). More stable exchange rate would encourage the public to hold more 
kip, and therefore reduce FCD. 
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Conclusions 
 
The study was set out to empirically evaluate the effectiveness of fiscal and 
monetary policies in the presence of currency substitution (CS) in Lao PDR. 
The theoretical literature on this subject in the context of Lao PDR is 
inconclusive on several vital questions within the CS discourse. The study 
sought to answer three main questions: 
 
1. What are the determinants of CS in the Lao economy? 
2. Does the proposition of long-run neutrality hold in the economy with CS? 
3. Are fiscal and monetary policies effective in the presence of CS? 
 
The main empirical findings are chapter specific and were 
summarized within the respective empirical chapters: Chapter 5 
‘Determinants of Currency Substitution and Long-Run Monetary Neutrality 
in Lao PDR—Empirical Analysis’ addressed the first two research questions; 
Chapter 6 ‘Macroeconomic Policies under the Managed-Floating and Fixed 
Exchange Rate Regimes in Lao PDR—Empirical Analyses’ addresses the 
third research question. The following sections will synthesize the empirical 
findings to answer the study’s three research questions. 
The analysis of CS determinants in Lao PDR contributes to the CS 
literature in two aspects. First, I empirically investigated the CS 
determinants within the error-correction framework for the period 1993–
2012. The error-correction framework is useful for the CS analysis because 
it reports both long- and short-run impacts of CS determinants. Given the 
short sample period, I applied the bounds testing or ARDL approach to 
cointegration whose estimates are robust in small sample sizes and do not 
require the same order of integration for variables under investigation 
(Pesaran and Shin, 1999). This issue has not been sufficiently addressed in 
most of the empirical analyses of CS determinants (de Zamarocksy and Sa, 
2002; Chaleunsinh, 2003; Keovongvichith, 2007; Ra, 2008). 
The bounds testing approach to cointegration is demonstrated by the 
empirical case study of CS determinants in Lao PDR. Results of unit root 
tests for CS variables show the mixed results of integration order. For 
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instance, the order of integration of the CS ratchet effect (lnR) is mixed: it is 
I(0) when either the intercept or time trend is excluded in the unit root test 
and I(1) when the intercept and a time trend are considered. The mixed 
results of integration order justify the use of the bounds testing approach 
instead of the maximum likelihood approach for cointegration analysis 
proposed by Johansen and Juselius (1990) 20 . Therefore, the bounds testing 
approach is adopted to examine the long- and short-term relationship 
between CS and its determinants in Lao PDR. 
The findings in this study for the long-run impacts of the CS 
determinants are generally consistent with previous Lao studies and studies 
for other countries. The coefficient of the expected exchange rate 
depreciation was found to be statistically insignificant, and thereby 
indicating an increase in the CS ratio may not be associated with the 
expectation of exchange rate depreciation. This finding is consistent with 
Ra’s (2008) results for the case of Lao PDR. The coefficient of the interest 
rate differential between kip and US dollar is statistically significant and 
positive, indicating the CS ratio increases when the interest rate differential  
widens. Therefore, a strategy of reducing the CS ratio by raising the interest 
rate of kip-denominated deposits should be carefully considered. 
More importantly, the ratchet variable—the past peak value of the 
CS—was proven to exist. This implies that the CS during 1993–2012 is 
persistent and that particularly strong policies would need to be pursued over 
an extended period of time in order to convince depositors to switch back to 
kip-denominated assets. The coefficient of the ratchet variable is towards the 
lower end of existing estimates, namely Mongardini and Mueller (1999) for 
Kyrgyz Republic and Samreth (2011) for Cambodia. This suggests that in 
Lao PDR changes in foreign currency holdings, and therefore in the CS ratio, 
in response to measures for the reduction of CS such as the direct control of 
using the US dollar for economic transaction within the country, is likely to 
be slower than what Mongardini and Mueller (1999) and Samreth (2011) 
suggest.  
                                                     
20  Johansen and Juselius’s (1990) cointegration approach requires all  variables to  be the  
first order of integration.   
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However, the short-run impact is much larger than the long-run 
impact, and the coefficient of the error-correction term is large. Therefore, 
in the short-run changes in the CS ratio in response to policy changes 
designed to reduce foreign currency holdings will be large and over time 
they will gradually decrease. Nevertheless, the experience of other countries 
suggests that direct control of foreign currency holdings by monetary 
authorities should be complemented with an appropriate policy that leads to 
public trust in domestic currency. Otherwise, the direct control of foreign 
currency holdings is not recommended and must be avoided. 
Second, it  is argued that the parameter stability of the money demand 
function is an empirical issue. The estimation of a time series may result in 
unstable parameters which can lead to model mis-specification and hence, 
biases the results (Hansen, 1992). In this dissertation, the parameter stability 
tests applies the Pesaran and Pesaran (1997) test, which involves the 
CUSUM, CUSUM of squares, and one-step forecast tests for parameter 
stability. Both the CUSUM and CUSUMSQ tests plot the cumulative sum 
together with 5% critical lines. Parameter instability is found if the 
cumulative sum goes outside the area between the two critical lines. As a 
further check on parameter stability, the one-step forecast test is used to 
identify the specific point of break in the data series. The CUSUM, CUSUM 
of squares, and one-step forecast tests show that the parameters for the 
determinants of the CS degree for Lao PDR are stable over time. This result 
lends support to the persistence of CS in the Lao economy over the period 
1993-2012. 
 The long-run neutrality of money was tested for the Lao economy 
using data of monetary aggregates, real GDP, and real output in three sectors,  
namely, agriculture, industry, and services. In the monetarist theories, 
money is assumed to be neutral in the long-run. That is, changes in the 
quantity of money affect the nominal variables in the macroeconomic system 
such as prices, wages and exchange rates, but not the real variables, such as 
employment, real GDP, and real consumption. The empirical study for Lao 
PDR provides more empirical evidence to the existing literature on LRN in 
the context of developing countries. 
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 Following the existing literature on testing long-run monetary 
neutrality (e.g., Shelley and Wallace, 2004; Coe and Nason, 2004; Noriega, 
2004), I apply the Fisher and Seater’s (1993) method to test for LRN for the 
Lao economy over the period 1984–2011. The Fisher and Seater analysis 
provides a simple test of LRN. The LRN proposition is found if this slope 
coefficient approaches zero as the span over which these growth rates are 
calculated approaches to infinity. The test is commonly shown in the 
diagram which plots the slope coefficients from 1 to 30 over the periods of 
study along with the 95% confidence intervals (Fisher and Seater, 1993; 
Boschen and Otrok, 1994; Haug and Lucas, 1997). Since the sample period 
for the Lao economy is short relative to the existing literature, I plot the 
slope coefficients from 1 to 20 over the periods of study along with the 95% 
confidence intervals. 
 The empirical results on testing LRN proposition for the Lao economy 
show that the LRN proposition holds with respect to agricultural and 
industrial output. My results confirm the hypothesis of LRN found in the 
previous studies, including Sulku (2011) for Turkey, Chen (2007) for South 
Korea and Taiwan, and Habibullah et al (2001) for Malaysia. 
 In the aggregate level, however, the LRN proposition does not hold 
with respect to output of services and real GDP in the Lao economy. In 
particular, changes in the quantity of money have negative long-run effect on 
the level of real GDP. The rejection of LRN proposition with respect to 
services output and real GDP is robust whether M1 or M2 is used as the 
monetary measure. It is also robust for an alternative specification with a 
time dummy for the period during which the Asian financial crisis affected 
the Lao economy. The negative impact of money on real GDP implies that 
monetary expansion is unlikely to stimulate output, eliminate recession, and 
increase job opportunity. By contrast, the net effect of expansionary 
monetary policy may result in higher prices and make the economy more 
vulnerable. Hence, the monetary authority should not manipulate monetary 
policy to stabilize the fluctuations in business cycle before considering the 
relationship between money and real output. 
The presence of CS has important implications for the conduct of 
fiscal and monetary policies. First, the government faces some loss of 
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seigniorage. The replacement of domestic currency by foreign currency in 
transactions limits the revenue that the government receives for printing 
domestic currency. Second, monetary policy becomes less effective, because 
changes in the domestic money supply or the domestic monetary base have 
less impact on domestic expenditure. The loss of government revenue and 
less effectiveness of monetary policy tools complicate the macroeconomic 
management in countries with partial CS. 
Fiscal and monetary policies in Lao PDR were evaluated by the 
simulation analyses in the Lao macroeconometric model. The simulation 
analyses involve two alternative degrees of CS, partial CS and complete CS. 
Macroeconomic policies are evaluated for the case of an economy with 
partial CS compared with the case of an economy with complete CS. The 
economy with partial CS is represented by the managed-floating exchange 
rate regime, whereas the economy with complete CS is represented by the 
fixed exchange rate regime. The effectiveness of macroeconomic policies is 
evaluated against changes in real GDP. 
The Lao macroeconometric model was constructed under the 
managed-floating and fixed exchange rate regimes. The major difference 
between the two regimes is that exchange rate is treated as an endogenous 
variable in the latter, while it  is treated as an exogenous variable. The 
estimation results under the two regimes are very similar. Therefore, the 
specifications and estimations for the Lao macroeconometric model are 
explained only under the managed-floating exchange rate regime. The Lao 
macroeconomic model consists of four building blocks: production, final 
demand, money and prices, and government. There are 13 behavioural 
equations, six identities, and one definitional equation. Given the estimated 
behavioural equations, accounting identities and definitional equation, a 
policy shock initially disturbs a specific relation and then affects the 
economy through the propagation mechanism across the four building blocks. 
All the variables go through a dynamic adjustment process until the economy 
finds a new equilibrium. 
The simulation analyses of fiscal and monetary policy under different 
exchange rate arrangements support the view that the implementation of 
policy mix between fiscal and monetary policy is more effective to stimulate 
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economic growth than the implementation of either fiscal or monetary policy. 
By incorporating a model of FCD into the Lao macroeconometric model, I 
conducted simulation analyses by changing kip-denominated deposit rate 
and/or government investment to evaluate fiscal and monetary policies 
effectiveness under the managed-floating and fixed exchange rate regimes. 
The simulation analyses show that policy mix tends to be more effective 
under the fixed exchange rate regime than under the managed-floating 
exchange rate regime. This implies that adopting foreign currency to replace 
the Lao kip tends to increase the effectiveness of Lao macroeconomic 
management. But the decision to move toward this direction depends on the 
political view which may not occur in the short-term. An alternative strategy 
is to reduce FCD, which seems to be a clear means to strengthen the 
instruments of fiscal and monetary policies.  
The empirical results on the assessment of fiscal and monetary 
policies effectiveness in Lao PDR supported Menon (2009) who argues that 
the conduct of monetary policy in the presence of partial CS is not effective. 
For example, growth in capital inflow needs to be accommodated by real 
exchange rate appreciations. However, the nominal exchange rate cannot be 
relied upon to deliver it , so inflation is usually the result, and it is also 
difficult for the central bank to conduct open market operations, in order to 
sterilize large capital inflows, or mop up excess liquidity. This could add to 
inflation.  
In the presence of CS, the fiscal policy will play a crucial role in 
stabilizing the economy. For instance, to deal with large capital inflows, 
cutting back on government investment can reduce the government’s reliance 
on foreign savings to finance investment, and thereby limit the growth in the 
current account deficit. To reduce the pressure on real exchange rate 
appreciation associated with large capital inflows, selective liberalization of 
the capital account to facilitate capital outflow could be pursued (Menon, 
2009). More stable exchange rate would encourage the public to hold more 
kip, and therefore reduce FCD. 
The scale of currency-substitution debate is extensive and 
multifaceted even at a single country level. To generate achievable policy 
strategies and development targets with regards to the reduction of CS level, 
there is a need to investigate other macroeconomic implications of CS to 
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allow further assessment of cost and benefit of the subject. Exploring the 
following as future research strategies can facilitate the attainment of this 
goal. 
First, the research should address the research question of whether 
partial CS has promoted international trade between Lao PDR and its 
partners. The existing studies on the relationship between the appropriate 
exchange regime and trade remain inconclusive. In theory, the hard peg 
option, such as a currency union or dollarization, is seen as having two 
potential benefits; providing a nominal anchor for macroeconomic stability, 
and fostering trade integration between an emerging market country and the 
industrial country to which it links its currency. The conjecture that currency 
unions foster trade integration could be supported by Rose (2000) and Rose 
and van Wincoop (2001) who demonstrate that membership in a currency 
union has a large, statistically significant effect on bilateral trade patterns. 
In contrast, the empirical results by Klein (2005) doubt on the trade-
enhancing effects of dollarization among those countries most likely to 
adopt this policy. Currency unions do not significantly promote bilateral 
trade of Western Hemisphere countries that have experience with 
dollarization, nor do they affect bilateral United States trade with non-
industrial countries or with Western Hemisphere countries.  
Second, the research should address the research question of whether 
partial CS has helped Lao PDR achieve lower inflation, economic stability,  
and growth. The literature on CS and economic performance remains 
inconclusive. Supporters of CS have argued that countries that give up their  
currency will not encounter in monetary and macroeconomic mismanagement.  
Public finances will stay in balance, macroeconomic policy will be credible, 
and the external accounts will move within reasonable bounds. According to 
this view, CS will have two major positive effects on economic performance. 
First, inflation will be lower in countries with CS than those without CS. 
Alesina and Barro (2001), for instance, have argued that adopting another 
country’s currency eliminates the inflation-bias problem of discretionary 
monetary policy. Second, countries that give up their currency will tend to 
grow faster than countries without CS. This growth effect is supposed to 
take place through two channels: (a) CS will mean lower interest rates, 
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higher investment, and faster growth (Dornbusch, 2001). And (b), by 
eliminating exchange rate volatility, CS may promote international trade and 
this, in turn, will result in faster growth.  
Other authors, however, do not agree with the potential positive 
effects of CS on growth and overall macroeconomic performance. The 
empirical evidence on the relationship between monetary regimes and growth 
does not support the claim that CS or any exchange rate regime is an 
important determinant of growth (Eichengreen, 2001). Countries with a hard 
peg are difficult to accommodate external shocks, including terms of trade 
and world interest rate disturbances, which will be translated into greater 
instability and lower economic growth (Fischer, 1977). There is no unique 
recipe on exchange rate policy; while some countries will benefit from hard 
pegs, for other countries a floating regime will be more appropriate (Frankel, 
1999). 
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Appendix A 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s estimation. 
Diagram  A.1 Lao real output on M1 money, 1980–2011: 95% confidence interval 
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Source: Author’s estimation. 
Diagram  A.2 Lao real output on M1 money with crisis dummy, 1980–2011: 95% confidence interval 
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